Connecticut College

Digital Commons @ Connecticut College
Government and International Relations Honors
Papers

Government and International Relations
Department

5-2009

The Restriction of Civil Liberties during Times of
Crisis: The Evolution of America's Response to
National Military Threats
Matthew D. Fairman
Connecticut College, mfairma@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.conncoll.edu/govhp
Part of the American Politics Commons, and the United States History Commons
Recommended Citation
Fairman, Matthew D., "The Restriction of Civil Liberties during Times of Crisis: The Evolution of America's Response to National
Military Threats" (2009). Government and International Relations Honors Papers. 7.
http://digitalcommons.conncoll.edu/govhp/7

This Honors Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Government and International Relations Department at Digital Commons @
Connecticut College. It has been accepted for inclusion in Government and International Relations Honors Papers by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ Connecticut College. For more information, please contact bpancier@conncoll.edu.
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author.

THE RESTRICTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
DURING TIMES OF CRISIS
THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO NATIONAL MILITARY
THREATS

An Honors Thesis
Presented By
Matthew David Fairman

To the Department of Government in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for Honors in the Major Field

CONNECTICUT COLLEGE
NEW LONDON, CONNECTICUT
MAY 1, 2009

ABSTRACT
This treatise explores the nature and significance of the threat posed to civil liberties
during times of major national military crisis and evaluates changes in the nature of wartime
repression over the course of American history. It tests the thesis that the evolution in
Americans’ response to such crises has not been a simple progression toward increasing
restraint on the part of federal, state, and local policymakers, as is sometimes assumed. Rather,
major twentieth and twenty-first century developments related to the nature of threats to
American national security and government capabilities to covertly repress dissent have
interacted with evolutionary changes in the nature of wartime repression in reinforcing and
conflicting ways. Because of those changes, modern crises will last longer, the restriction of civil
liberties during wartime will increasingly be accomplished through covert forms of repression,
and, therefore, the durability of wartime restrictions will be greater. In sum, during future crises,
Americans’ civil liberties will be restricted for longer periods, with the return to normalcy after
those crises becoming increasingly difficult. To test this thesis, this treatise uses the past major
national military crises in American history as case studies. They include the Quasi-War with
France at the end of the 18th century, the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and the Cold
War. The concluding chapter connects the “War on Terror” to these arguments. Overall, the
case study analysis in Chapters I through V combined with the overarching assessment of
historical changes in the nature of wartime repression and the durability of wartime restrictions
in Chapter VI prove the validity of this thesis.
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INTRODUCTION
This treatise explores the nature and significance of the threat posed to civil
liberties during times of major national military crisis and evaluates changes in the nature of
wartime repression over the course of American history. During times of national crisis, the
American public and its elected officials react fearfully to perceived national threats by placing
restrictions on basic civil liberties, restrictions that they later come to regret and see as the
byproduct of histrionic fears. In broad outline, this pattern has been evident in every past national
military crisis, from the Quasi-War against France in the 1790‘s through the Civil War, World
Wars I and II, and the Cold War. This pattern is further evident in today‘s ―War on Terror.‖
Yet while this broad pattern has been reflected in every major crisis in American history,
including the twenty-first century ―War on Terror,‖ important changes have occurred over time
in the way in which policymakers and the public respond to crises. These changes can be
grouped loosely into three broad categories: (1) evolutionary changes in Americans‘ response to
crises, (2) twentieth and twenty-first century developments in the nature of threats to American
national security, and (3) twentieth and twenty-first century developments in government
capabilities to monitor and suppress dissent in a covert manner.
Changes falling under the first category have had conflicting effects on Americans‘ civil
liberties. Four are particularly relevant. First, laws established during wartime often outlast the
crises during which they were enacted, available to be implemented by policymakers in future
crises. Second, the U.S. Supreme Court has gradually become more protective of individual civil
liberties, which has mitigated against repression. Third, there has been growing public support
for civil liberties, particularly as evidenced by the twentieth century emergence of groups
advocating civil liberties. Fourth, evolving methods of repression have led to more sophisticated
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methods of repression and greater reliance on covert forms of repression. That shift has been
largely the result of increasing respect for civil liberties among the public and the Court, which
makes overt forms of repression increasingly untenable politically and legally.
Changes falling under the second category—those altering the nature of threats to
American national security—have had a largely negative impact by extending the length of
crises and, thus, the length of time in which civil liberties are restricted. Three changes were
particularly relevant in producing that effect. The first change was shifting distributions of power
in the international system, which resulted in a shift from a multipolar to a bipolar world at the
end of World War II and then to a unipolar world at the end of the Cold War. The second was the
recent prevalence of ideological conflicts, as seen in the Cold War and the current ―War on
Terror.‖1 The third was the ―democratization of violence,‖ as Fareed Zakaria terms the diffusion
of technologies of mass destruction to non-state actors. This change began late in the twentieth
century and has created angst among the public because of the uncertainty of when and where
violence can occur. This fear has enabled longer and possibly broader repression of civil
liberties. Collectively, these changes have produced a shift from state-based threats to American
national security to non-state threats, as the only significant threat to security in a unipolar world
can come from non-state actors.
Changes falling under the third category—the creation and expansion of federal
intelligence agencies and the proliferation of surveillance technologies—have also had a largely
negative impact by increasing the likelihood that civil liberties will be restricted in a covert
manner. This in turn contributed, and continues to contribute, to greater durability of wartime

1

The term ―ideological‖ is used in this treatise to characterize conflicts that strike deeply at the American way of
life; the conflict between atheistic communism and Judeo-Christian capitalism seen in the Cold War or the current
conflict involving radical Islam are perfect examples. While the other crises had ideological elements to them, they
fundamentally were not driven by ideological differences of that degree.
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restrictions because covert methods of repression tend to have greater durability than overt
methods given their comparative invisibility to the American people.
In the twentieth century (and it appears the twenty-first as well), these three categories of
change have affected the restriction of civil liberties during times of crisis in both positive and
negative ways. The central thesis of this treatise is that the evolution in Americans‘ response to
national military crises has not simply followed a natural, unobstructed progression toward
increasing restraint (compelled or voluntary) on the part of federal, state, and local policymakers,
as is sometimes assumed. Rather, major twentieth and twenty-first century developments have
radically altered the nature of wartime repression such that modern crises will last longer, the
restriction of civil liberties during wartime will increasingly be accomplished through covert
forms of repression, and, therefore, the durability of wartime restrictions will be greater. In sum,
during future crises, Americans‘ civil liberties will be restricted for longer periods, with the
return to normalcy becoming more difficult.
To test this thesis, this treatise seeks the answers to three multifaceted research questions.
First, to what degree were civil liberties restricted during the Quasi-War of the late eighteenth
century, the Civil War, both World Wars, and the Cold War? In what way? What role did
different governmental institutions play in the crisis? Second, for each of these crises, to what
degree did wartime restrictions outlast the crises during which they were established? Third, to
what degree has the nature of wartime repression changed over the course of American history,
particularly during the twentieth century? In particular, how have the durability of wartime
restrictions and the role of different governmental institutions changed over time?
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Review of Relevant Literature
The primary body of literature to which this treatise contributes—wartime repression of
civil liberties in the United States—is quite voluminous. Much of this literature, however, is
relatively narrow in focus, with most works centering on an individual crisis. Literature of this
type, used in this treatise, includes Freedom’s Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and
American Civil Liberties by James Morton Smith; The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and
Civil Liberties by Mark E. Neely, Jr.; and World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the
United States by Paul L. Murphy. Even more narrowly, a number of books focus on the effects
of wartime repression on certain targeted groups. This is the case in Michal R. Belknap‘s Cold
War Political Justice, which examines McCarthy-era repression of the Communist Party.
Although valuable in their contribution to the literature, these works do not, for the most part,
reference or examine patterns in wartime repression over time. Hence, they provide an
incomplete window into the lessons that can be learned from past crises.
A related weakness in this body of literature is that a very large proportion of recent
crisis-specific works examine the restriction of civil liberties during the early years of the War on
Terror, while relatively few focus on past crises.2 For example, in a protracted search for texts
examining wartime repression in the United States, I found over twenty-one books written about
the War on Terror, but only a few written about the Civil War. Of these, only Mark E. Neely‘s
The Fate of Liberty approached Civil War political repression in a comprehensive and objective
manner.

2

Lost Liberties: Ashcroft and the Assault on Personal Freedom, ed. Cynthia Brown; More Secure, Less Free?:
Antiterrorism Policy & Civil Liberties After September 11, by Mark Sidel; The War on our Freedoms: Civil
Liberties in an Age of Terrorism, ed. Richard C. Leone and Greg Anrig, Jr.; Terrorism and the Constitution:
Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security, by David Cole and Jack Dempsey; Freedom Under
Fire: U.S. Civil Liberties in Times of War, by Michael Linfield. The list goes on.
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Another difficulty in researching American wartime repression, is that a number of works
in this body of literature, particularly those published in recent years, are somewhat polemical
and at times alarmist. Bias is often evident even in the titles of books, such as Bill of Wrongs:
The Executive Branch’s Assault on America’s Fundamental Rights; Lincoln’s Wrath: Fierce
Mobs, Brilliant Scoundrels and a President’s Mission to Destroy the Press; and Who Killed the
Constitution?: The Fate of American Liberty from World War I to George W. Bush.
In short, little scholarship comprehensively examines the restriction of civil liberties
during multiple national military crises. The few works that do include Security v. Liberty:
Conflicts Between Civil Liberties and National Security in American History edited by Daniel
Farber; Civil Liberty in War Time: The Civil War and the World War by Elihu D. Ryden;
Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to 1976 by Robert Justin Goldstein; and
Perilous Times, Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism
by Geoffrey Stone. Of these, only Geoffrey Stone‘s Perilous Times examines repression in every
major national military crisis in American history. Although he provides an excellent assessment
of evolutionary changes in wartime repression, he leaves unaddressed important developments in
the twentieth century. In particular, the increasing use of covert forms of repression and the
apparent shift in the nature of threats to American national security. This treatise contributes to
the existing literature by addressing those developments, while also accounting for the
evolutionary changes that Stone examines.
Methodology and Sources
In order to establish, as this treatise asserts, that certain twentieth century developments
in the nature of threats to American national security and in government capabilities to monitor
and covertly repress dissent have militated against positive evolutionary changes in wartime
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repression, this treatise relies largely on secondary source material. Where relevant, primary
source material such as relevant legislation and presidential directives is used to supplement the
secondary source material.
Overview of Chapters
This treatise treats the first five national crises in American history as case studies. Each
of the first five chapters analyzes one of these crises: the Quasi-War with France at the end of the
18th century, the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. For each crisis, the
chapter examines relevant background information, explores wartime restrictions of Americans‘
civil liberties, and assesses the degree to which forms of wartime repression outlasted the crisis.
Based on these case studies, Chapter VI analyzes changes in the nature of wartime repression
and the durability of wartime restrictions over the course of American history.
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I. QUASI-WAR WITH FRANCE (1798-1800)
The first major national military crisis to test the United States‘ commitment to civil
liberties was the Quasi-War, known alternatively as the Half-War or the Undeclared War with
France. While often forgotten as a distinct major national crisis, the repressive laws that it
produced, the Alien and Sedition Acts, are commonly remembered for spurring the first national
debate over the appropriate boundaries of Americans‘ civil liberties during wartime.
Background of the Crisis
The international events that led to the Quasi-War and the reaction of American
policymakers and the public to those events provide the context for understanding the restriction
of civil liberties during the crisis. To a large degree, the repression of dissent during wartime
resulted from differing views on behalf of the two dominant political parties at the time with
regard to the meaning of the French Revolution of 1789, the ultimate trigger of the crisis. In
general, the public was unified in support of a stridently defensive response to French
aggression. At the same time, however, views toward the Revolution, and by extension the
French, broke solidly on partisan lines, with the supporters of each party identifying their
opposition with that which they feared. As a result, the Democratic-Republican Party, whose
supporters were more inclined than were the Federalists to view the French in a favorable light,
was the major target of wartime repression.
Trigger of the crisis
The French Revolution, a protracted period of intense ―religious conflict, civil war, and
economic chaos‖ gave rise to a war between France and surrounding pro-monarchist European
countries that entangled the United States, despite the efforts of American policymakers to
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maintain neutrality between two of the warring belligerents, France and Britain.3 In combination
with the political and social turmoil it produced, the French Revolution sent shockwaves
throughout Europe, spreading fear of contagion even to the geographically isolated United
States, because it led to the establishment of a government that ―sought to suppress dissent, deChristianize the nation, and impose a rigid system of economic egalitarianism.‖4
Shortly after the beginning of the French Revolution, in April of 1792, the Legislative
Assembly of France declared war on Austria in order to preempt threats of invasion by the
monarchies of Europe. The Legislative Assembly also apparently assumed that war would
cement the Revolution at home and that the subjects of the European monarchies would welcome
them as liberators.5 The decision to declare war on Austria led France into two protracted wars
with different coalitions of pro-monarchist European countries. The First Coalition (1793-1797)
included England, Spain, Austria, the Netherlands, and Prussia.6 The French army suffered initial
defeats, but by mid-1794, the tide of war had turned and France was secure from the threat of
invasion.7 By 1795, the war had become a war ―of conquest,‖8 rather than a preemptive war of
self-defense, as French armies under General Napoleon Bonaparte advanced throughout Europe,
seizing ―modern-day Belgium, the Rhineland, and the Italian peninsula‖ by 1797.9
In the midst of this European crisis, the United States government sought to maintain
neutrality ―between England and France, despite its economic dependence on the former and its

3

Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), p. 21.
4
Stone, Perilous Times, p. 21.
5
Alan Forrest, The French Revolution (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), pp. 110-115.
6
Stone, Perilous Times, p. 21.
7
Forrest, The French Revolution, p. 120.
8
Forrest, The French Revolution, p. 132.
9
Stone, Perilous Times, p. 21.
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treaty obligations to the latter.‖10 In doing so, the U.S. ―incurred the enmity of both,‖ leading to
an aggressive British naval campaign to block American trade with France by seizing American
ships and forcing American seamen into the British navy.11 To prevent further British aggression
and to avoid war, President George Washington sent a prominent Federalist, John Jay, to
negotiate a peace treaty with Britain.12 Although the treaty that arose from the negotiations, the
Jay Treaty, secured peace with Britain, it provoked severe hostility from the French government
because its strict requirements against American trade with France appeared ―evidence of an
American-British entente.‖13 As a result, shortly after the signing of the Jay Treaty, the French
government began its own aggressive naval campaign against American trade, which quickly
―eclipsed the British depredations of 1793.‖14 According to Geoffrey Stone, in Perilous Times:
Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism, the French
captured 316 American ships during the period from June 1796 to June 1797.15
Seeking to end French aggression, Federalist President John Adams (elected in 1796)
sent a diplomatic mission consisting of John Marshall, Elbridge Gerry, and Charles Pinckney to
negotiate with French Minister of Foreign Affairs Charles Talleyrand. At the same time,
Congress authorized Adams to call upon 80,000 militiamen and ordered the strengthening of
harbors and the completion of three warships.16 When the American diplomatic mission arrived
in Paris to negotiate with the French, three agents of Talleyrand‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in
an incident that became known as the XYZ Affair) demanded a substantial cash bribe and

10

James M. Smith, Freedom’s Fetters: the Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1956), p. 5.
11
Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, p. 5; Stone, Perilous Times, p. 21.
12
Stone, Perilous Times, 21.
13
Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, p. 5.
14
Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, p. 5.
15
Stone, Perilous Times, 21.
16
Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, p. 6-7.
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American loans to the French government as necessary conditions for negotiations. The
American mission refused and returned home to an outraged citizenry in March 1798.17
In the months after the XYZ Affair, the U.S. entered a state of quasi-naval warfare with
France. From April to June, the Adams administration and Congress outlawed the sale of arms,
expanded the army and navy, reestablished the Marine Corps, put the navy on offensive against
French attacks, authorized ―armed merchantmen to repel French searches and depredations,‖ and
recalled former President George Washington to command the army.18 Further, Congress
suspended trade with France and renounced all treaties with the French government.19
Reaction to the crisis
Perhaps to a greater degree than in other major national military crises, the response of
American policymakers and the public to the crisis and the international events that precipitated
it dictated the nature of wartime repression. This was especially true of the different ways in
which each of the dominant parties, the Federalists and the Republicans, viewed the French
Revolution.20 According to James Smith, in Freedom’s Fetters: the Alien and Sedition Laws and
American Civil Liberties, the Federalists viewed the French Revolution in terms of polar labels
such as ―anarchy versus order, licentiousness versus authority, the masses versus the classes, and
atheism versus religion.‖21 In contrast, the Republicans saw the French Revolution as ―pitt[ing]
liberty against oppression, republicanism against monarchy, and democracy against a decadent
aristocracy.‖22

17

Stone, Perilous Times, p. 21.
Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, pp. 7-8.
19
Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, pp. 7-8.
20
At the time of the Quasi-War, the supporters of the Democratic-Republican Party referred to themselves as either
Republicans or Democrats. For the sake of simplicity, the supporters of that party are referred to as Republicans
throughout this treatise while the party itself is referred to as the Democratic-Republican party.
21
Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, pp. 11-12.
22
Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, pp. 11-12.
18
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With the development of war in Europe during the early 1790s, the rift between the
Federalists and the Republicans over the meaning of the French Revolution grew even wider,
with both the Federalists and the Republicans increasingly coming to identify the opposition
party with that which they feared. According to Stone:
Republicans feared that Federalists wanted to mimic British conventions and entrench
formal class distinctions in the United States; Federalists feared that Republicans sought
to plunge the nation into an American reign of terror in which the unthinking masses
would seize political power, confiscate private property, and corrupt religion.23
Given the different perspectives of the two parties on the French Revolution and the growing
tendency of the members of each party to see the worst in their political opponents, the QuasiWar was bound to dramatically exacerbate the division and tension between the Federalists and
the Republicans.
As the Adams administration and Congress put the nation on a war footing after the XYZ
Affair, this rift became a chasm. Increasingly, the Federalists began to exploit the crisis in an
attempt to cement ―their dominance in politics, economics, religion, and society.‖24 From the
XYZ Affair on, the Federalists sought to link the Republicans with the French and ―to equate
opposition to the government‘s policy with sedition and near treason.‖25 Republicans were
forced to defend themselves against Federalist accusations of disloyalty that were both sweeping
in nature and devastating in effect. At the same time, they accused the Federalists of ―cynically
inflating the threat to American interests in order to further their partisan ends.‖26
To be sure, the battle raging between Federalists and Republicans to assert dominance
and to define the appropriate response to French aggression was not just the realm of
policymakers, but also of the public. The vicious attacks and counterattacks of Federalist and
23

Stone, Perilous Times, pp. 25-26.
Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, p. 21.
25
Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, p. 21.
26
Stone, Perilous Times, p. 27.
24
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Republican-leaning newspapers no doubt found fertile ground. Nevertheless, at least initially, the
American public was unified in opposition to the French and in support of a stridently defensive
response to French aggression. Indeed, upon learning of the XYZ Affair, the public was broadly
swept up in a wave of patriotic fervor.27 As during crises that followed, it was in that context that
the ―nation‘s commitment to civil liberties was quickly rationalized out of existence.‖28
Restriction of Civil Liberties
During the Quasi-War, the restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties was narrower in scope
than during any other major national military crisis. In large part, the relatively narrow scope of
repression was a function of the period. At the time of the Quasi-War, the Supreme Court had
not yet established firmly its power of judicial review and the federal government was both
smaller and weaker. Further, the technologies that would be a prerequisite to the monitoring and
suppressing of dissent in the 20th century were not yet available. Indeed, even the telegraph was
not yet in existence.
However, while narrow in scope, the restriction of civil liberties during the Quasi-War
was more strongly related to partisan politics than the repression of dissent during any other
national crisis in American history. As discussed in the previous section, the strongly partisan
political nature of wartime repression was largely a product of the international events that
triggered the crisis and the differing views of Federalist and Republicans with regard to those
events. The partisan nature of repression, which especially targeted the Republicans, can be seen
in four key aspects of the Quasi-War: restrictions enacted at the federal level, restrictions enacted
at the state or local levels, the tone set by the executive branch toward civil liberties, and the
deference of the Supreme Court to the executive and legislative branches.

27
28

Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, pp. 8-9; Stone, Perilous Times, p. 25.
Stone, Perilous Times, p. 25.
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Federal restrictions
The restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties during the Quasi-War was relatively narrow
in that it was accomplished primarily at the federal level, rather than at the state or local levels.
Further, during the crisis, the federal government restricted civil liberties through only a few of
the available avenues of repression. The narrow scope of federal repression was evident in four
key components of the federal government‘s response to the Quasi-War: repressive legislation
enacted by Congress, presidential directives relating to civil liberties, federal efforts to control
political discourse, and efforts on behalf of the federal government to monitor and suppress
political dissidents.
Legislation
Today, the Quasi-War is best remembered for four pieces of repressive and overtly
political legislation, each enacted shortly after the XYZ affair and known collectively as the
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. These include the Naturalization Act, the Alien Friends Act, the
Alien Enemies Act, and the Sedition Act.
The Naturalization Act, voted into law on June 18, 1798, was meant to strike at
―domestic dissension and disaffection‖ and to rob the Democratic-Republican Party of one of its
bases of support—foreign-born citizens, the majority of whom tended to vote DemocraticRepublican.29 To do so, it made it significantly harder for foreigners to become American
citizens and expanded government control over immigrants. The law toughened the
naturalization process by increasing the residence requirement for immigrants to obtain
citizenship from five years to fourteen years, as well as by requiring foreigners to declare their
intention to become naturalized citizens at least five years before applying.30 Additionally, it

29
30

Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, p. 22.
Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, pp. 22-23, pp. 33-34.
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barred enemy aliens (residents born in countries with which the United States was at war, or
otherwise in conflict) from applying for citizenship. To strengthen government control over
aliens, the law required new immigrants to register with the ―clerk of the district court, or with an
authorized registrar of aliens, within forty-eight hours of their entry.‖31 Further, it required aliens
already living in the United States to register within six months of the bills‘ enactment and
directed the State Department to develop a centralized record of all foreigners registered.32
The second major piece of legislation was the Alien Friends Act (known alternatively as
An Act Concerning Aliens), enacted by Congress only seven days after the repressive
Naturalization Act. Set to expire on the last day of President Adams‘ term in office, it gave the
President the unilateral authority to order the deportation of any foreign-born resident of the
United States.33 Under its provisions, the President could order the deportation of any alien who
he deemed dangerous or believed was engaged in treason merely by setting a date at which that
person would be required to leave the country.34 Those who refused to leave were to be ―forcibly
deported or tried for violation of the president‘s expulsion order.‖35 Sentences for conviction on
that charge included three years imprisonment and a permanent ban from applying for
citizenship.36 Additionally, the Alien Friends Act specified that any alien ordered to leave the
United States could not return without the explicit approval of the President.37

31

―Naturalization Act," Naturalization Act Vol. 1 Iss. 1 (4 Jan. 2009): p. 1, Academic Search Premier, EBSCO,
Connecticut College, New London, CT, 27 Feb. 2009
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Although foreigners whom the President chose to deport were allowed to appeal the
expulsion order, they could not do so until after it had already been issued. Further, they were
required to present their defense directly to the President. If a foreigner was successful in this
regard, the Alien Friends Act directed the President to issue a license specifying where and for
how long that person could stay. Violation of that license resulted in the same penalties as those
described above for refusal to obey an order of expulsion.38
In addition to placing aliens at the mercy of presidential fiat and specifying an appeal
process that lacked constitutional safeguards, the Alien Friends Act further tightened government
control over foreigners by requiring shipmasters to file a record of the number of foreigners
aboard their ships immediately upon docking. This record was used to verify compliance with
the provisions of the Naturalization Act.39 Ultimately, although no foreigner was ever deported
under its provisions, the Alien Friends Act ―had a corrosive effect,‖ helping to bring about the
departure of ―apprehensive French immigrants‖ and stemming ―the flow of immigrants into the
United States.‖40
The third law affecting Americans‘ civil liberties was the Alien Enemies Act. Passed on
July 6, this law was the only piece of legislation enacted during the crisis that was contingent
upon a declaration of war. When first drafted, it gave rather broad authority to the President to
govern the treatment of enemy aliens during wartime. During congressional debate over the bill,
however, the Alien Enemies Act was narrowed and made more moderate.41 Thus, the bill
emerged as relatively uncontroversial, largely because it significantly overlapped the previously
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enacted, but temporary, Alien Friends Act.42 In its final form, the Alien Enemies Act authorized
the President, in the case of war, to manage American policy toward enemy aliens, ―deciding
whether they should be permitted to reside in the United States and on what security, and
designating the method of removal of those not permitted to remain should they refuse or neglect
to depart.‖43 In the event that the President ordered certain groups of enemy aliens to be
deported, he was directed to specify a reasonable time by which they would be required to leave.
In contrast to the Alien Friends Act, the Alien Enemies Act stipulated that enemy aliens whom
the President chose to deport should receive a full hearing from the ―state courts having criminal
jurisdiction‖ to ascertain whether they posed a danger to the state.44
The final, and most notorious, piece of legislation enacted was the Sedition Act (known
alternatively as An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States). Passed
on July 12, the law was applicable in peacetime and set to expire on the last day of President
Adams‘ term in office. Ostensibly, the act was intended to protect the U.S. against the threat of
internal subversion by punishing those who sought ―to impede the operation of federal laws‖ or
to bring the American government into ill repute.45 In reality, however, it was meant largely to
shield the Adams administration and the Federalist Party from criticism and to enable the
Federalists to gain political advantage by lashing out at prominent Republicans as treasonous and
then prosecuting them on that basis.
Like the Alien Enemies Act, the Sedition Act of 1798 emerged from congressional debate
a narrower and more moderate bill than when it was first drafted. Two alterations are particularly
relevant to the nature of wartime sedition prosecutions and both demonstrate the patently
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political motivations behind the bill‘s creation. First, from first draft to final form, the Sedition
Act was made narrower in the way it defined seditious speech. Initially, the bill defined seditious
speech as libelous or scandalous words. However, this definition was ultimately changed to
―‗false, scandalous, and malicious‘‖ words ―spoken or written with a ‗bad intent‘‖ as a result of a
revision drafted by leading Federalist Robert Harper. 46 This modification was important as it
made ―the tendency of the words and the intent of the speaker‖ the test of seditious speech, rather
than the much broader definition established earlier of seditious speech as any words that were
defamatory or shocking in nature.47
The second important modification made during congressional debate over the bill was
the extension of its expiration date from one year to the last day of Adam‘s first term in office.48
More than any other, this alteration demonstrated the patently political motivations behind the
Federalists‘ creation of the sedition law by making plain the Federalists‘ intention to deny the
Republicans the Sedition Act as a weapon for securing partisan political advantage in the event
that President Adams was not elected to a second term.
In its final form, the Sedition Act of 1798 contained four sections. The first, according to
Smith, ―punished conspiracies and combinations to impede the operation of federal laws and set
the penalty at not more than five years‘ imprisonment and a fine of not more than $5,000.‖49 The
second punished ―any person, citizen as well as alien, for any ‗false, scandalous and malicious‘
statements against the President, either house of Congress, or the government, made with intent
to defame them, or to bring them into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them the hatred
of the good people of the United States‖ with a ―maximum penalty [of] two years‘ imprisonment
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and a $2,000 fine.‖50 The third authorized truth as a defense against prosecution for sedition and
directed that the defendant receive a trial by jury. Finally, the fourth section specified the
expiration date of the legislation—March 3, 1801.51
Even today, due to the way in which it was applied and the fact that it was the first
peacetime sedition law, the Sedition Act is still considered one of the worse examples of political
repression in American history. During the Quasi-War, the net effect of this law was to
dramatically intensify the witch-hunt against political dissidents by enabling the Federalists to
prosecute Republican politicians and Republican newspapers for sedition.52
Presidential directives
In contrast to every other national military crisis in American history, there were no
major repressive presidential directives issued during the Quasi-War. Although this may have
been a function of restraint on the part of the President Adams, it was more likely the product of
other factors, particularly the period in which the crisis occurred and the Federalists‘ success in
passing the Alien and Sedition Acts, which could readily be used to advance the party‘s interests.
Efforts to control political discourse
Throughout the Quasi-War, there was no systematic effort by the federal government to
control political discourse, at least not in the same manner as in the First and Second World
Wars. In both of those crises, particularly World War I, the federal government sought to control
political discourse by censoring the press and flooding the marketplace of ideas with progovernment propaganda.
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Although Federalists used the Sedition Act throughout the Quasi-War to lash out at
political dissidents, most notably prominent Republican newspaper editors, the Adams
administration did not attempt to censor the press directly. The reason for this was that the
Federalists subscribed to a particular approach to the freedom of the press that reached back to
English common law, as elucidated by the famous English legal theorist William Blackstone in
his Commentaries on the Laws of England. The English common law approach to freedom of the
press was that ―no restraints could be laid upon writings prior to their publication,‖ but that ―the
most vital or the most harmless discussion of public policy could be punished if it was obnoxious
to the authorities.‖53 For this reason, the Federalists chose to prosecute members of the press
whose writings or speech they found to be seditious, rather than censoring their words directly.
Efforts to monitor and suppress dissidents
The last aspect of the Quasi-War that should be considered in assessing the degree to
which the federal government restricted Americans‘ civil liberties is whether there were any
attempts, at the federal level, to monitor and suppress political dissidents, either through direct
prosecution, surveillance, deportation and denaturalization campaigns, or loyalty laws. In
contrast to other major national military crises, the Adams administration and the Federalists did
not attempt to keep watch on, deport, denaturalize, or subject to loyalty laws those whom they
considered subversive.
However, they did prosecute political dissidents quite heavily on an intensely partisan
basis, largely using the Sedition Act of 1798. During the Quasi-War, ―Federalist enforcement
machinery ground out at least seventeen verifiable indictments,‖ with fourteen of these
indictments applying the Sedition Act and the other three applying common law.54 The overtly
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partisan political nature of these indictments was evident in two respects. First, wartime
prosecutions for sedition were concentrated to a very large degree in ―areas that were either
thoroughly Federalist, as in New England, or in states where Federalist supremacy was
threatened by the rising Republicans, as in New York and Pennsylvania.‖55 Second, these
indictments were targeted entirely at vocal supporters of the Democratic-Republican Party.
Victims of Federalist repression included prominent Republican newspapers, Republican
politicians, and obscure political dissidents indicted for criticizing President Adams and the
Federalists.
The largest, and in some ways most important, target of Federalist ire during the QuasiWar were Republican newspapers and newspapermen. The desire of Federalists to destroy the
opposition party was so strong that two indictments were issued even before Congress passed the
Sedition Act. These were directed against Benjamin Franklin Bache of the Philadelphia Aurora,
―the most powerful of all the Republican editors,‖ and the New York Time Piece.56 Once
Congress passed the Sedition Act, the Adams administration and the Federalists began to
campaign more actively against seditious speech. This campaign was particularly evident in the
roughly six months leading up to the election of 1800, when Secretary of State Pickering
―launched a campaign to prosecute every one of the leading Republican papers‖ not yet
convicted for sedition. This campaign resulted in the indictment of four of the five major papers
targeted.57
The editors of less well known Republican newspapers were also indicted for sedition,
including Anthony Haswell of the Vermont Gazette, Charles Holt of the New London Bee, and
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William Durrell of the Mount Pleasant Register.58 The prosecution of Vermont Gazette editor
Anthony Haswell provides a flavor of the type of material on which indictments for sedition
were returned. In part, Haswell was indicted for republishing a paragraph of an article originally
published in the Philadelphia Aurora that attacked President Adams. Entitled ―British Influence,‖
the article charged that Adams‘ political appointments demonstrated affection for Tories (British
loyalists).59
Although less prominent, the most egregious target of the Federalist campaign of
repression was individual Republican (or Republican-leaning) politicians. The first, and most oft
discussed, politician subjected to the wrath of the Federalists was Vermont Congressman
Matthew Lyon. Lyon was indicted under the Sedition Act for attacking President Adams as a
power-hungry despot and writing that Adams had ―an unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp,
foolish adulation, and selfish avarice.‖60 Similarly, Jedidiah Peck, a heavily Republican-leaning
Assemblyman from New York, was indicted for sedition after he circulated a petition against the
Alien and Sedition Acts.61
More obscure political dissidents were also occasionally indicted as a result of the
Federalist campaign to prosecute seditious speech. These included David Brown, Benjamin
Fairbanks, Nathaniel Ames, and Luther Baldwin.62 The first three of these men were all arrested
subsequent to an incident in Dedham, Massachusetts in which local Republicans, galvanized by a
speech delivered by ―vagabond radical‖ David Brown, erected a liberty pole in protest of
Federalist repression.63 The prosecution of Luther Baldwin represented the most comedic
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incident of repression during the Quasi-War, while also demonstrating the extent to which the
Federalists were willing to go to prosecute individuals for writing or speech they considered
seditious. Luther Baldwin was ―convicted for drunkenly observing that he didn‘t care if the local
cannon, which were giving President Adams a sixteen-gun salute, ‗fired thro‘ his a—.‘‖64
State and local restrictions
In direct contrast to the active efforts of the Adams administration and the Federalist
Party to prosecute political dissidents for sedition, there were no major incidents of state or local
repression during the Quasi-War. However, indicative of the tone of states toward dissent was
the reaction of certain states to the Sedition Act. In the fall of 1798, the Kentucky and Virginia
legislatures adopted resolutions that opposed the Sedition Act and argued the right of states to
reject repressive federal legislation that infringed on states‘ rights. No other states chose to adopt
similar resolutions and, in response to an invitation to do so, ten expressly condemned the
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions.65 This hostile response suggested a general lack of concern
on behalf of state, and presumably local, governments for the civil liberties of political
dissidents. Nevertheless, perhaps because the Adams administration was perceived to be
effectively handling the threat posed by seditious speech, state and local governments did not
enact sedition laws or other forms of repressive legislation.
Executive tone toward civil liberties
In addition to the restriction of civil liberties by federal, state, and local governments, the
tone set by the executive branch toward individual liberty is also relevant in assessing the degree
to which civil liberties were restricted. The tone set during the crisis was important because it
influenced the willingness of policymakers throughout the federal government to respect the

64
65

Stone, Perilous Times, p. 66.
Stone, Perilous Times, pp. 44-45.

24
constitutional rights of dissidents. In general, the tone set by President Adams during the QuasiWar ranged from indifference to hostility and can be seen both in his actions and statements
during wartime (partly reflected through his wife) as well as those of Secretary of State Timothy
Pickering.
President Adams‘ approach to and treatment of two pieces of legislation—the Alien
Friends Act and the Sedition Act—combined with his wife‘s stance toward Republicans, provide
a flavor of the tone that he helped to set toward civil liberties. In general, although he had
reservations about its use, Adams supported the repressive Alien Friends Act. Indeed, he set the
tone for its creation through frequent anti-alien public addresses and he readily approved it upon
its passage by Congress. To his credit, he resisted somewhat the efforts of the Federalists to bring
the law to its full realization and never used it to deport foreigners living within the United
States.66 Nevertheless, while he may have attempted to restrain its use, the President generally
agreed with the repressive intent embodied in the law. For example, though he did not use the
Alien Friends Act to deport objectionable foreigners, he was enthusiastic about the voluntary
departure of French-born aliens that the law‘s enactment brought about.67 Further, he
occasionally commented that certain people ought to be deported on its basis, including
Philadelphia Aurora editor William Duane, and ―gladly signed warrants for the seizure‖ of a few
individuals pursuant to its provision.68 Finally, after his term in office, he defended the Alien
Friends Act with claims of military necessity, arguing that ―French spies then swarmed in our
cities and our country; some of them were intolerably imprudent, turbulent, and seditious.‖69
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President Adams also wholeheartedly embraced the practice of using the Sedition Act to
strike at opponents of his administration. Though not directly responsible for the law‘s creation,
he approved of its use throughout the two years in which it was in force and often ―specifically
authorized its use against his critics.‖70 Further, he refused to entertain any petitions for pardon
that he received from persons convicted for sedition.71
Aside from his treatment of those two laws, Adams‘ tone toward civil liberties was also
reflected in his wife Abigail‘s vehement attacks on the Republicans and on political dissent in
general. Abigail Adams ―rarely failed to act as her husband‘s eyes and ears.‖72 She routinely
attacked Republican-leaning newspapers as ―the offspring of faction…nursed by sedition‖ and
lashed out at Republicans throughout the crisis by referring to their party as the ―French Party.‖ 73
Further, she probably campaigned more actively for the strict enforcement of the Sedition Act
than did anyone else.74
Secretary of State Pickering was less important in setting the tone for repression.
However, his overt hostility toward dissent certainly encouraged wartime prosecutions. To a
greater degree than Adams, Pickering sought to ensure the vigorous suppression of individuals
whose speech and writing he deemed seditious. He ―closely scrutinized Republican newspapers
for any hint of sedition and vigorously encouraged a network of spies and informers to keep him
personally apprised of their suspicions.‖75
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Deference of the U.S. Supreme Court
The last aspect of the crisis that should be considered in assessing the degree to which
civil liberties were restricted during the Quasi-War was the U.S. Supreme Court‘s deference to
the executive and legislative branches. The Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the
Alien and Sedition Acts during the Quasi-War. In large part, the reason for this was that the
Court had not yet established firmly its authority to declare unconstitutional acts of the President
and Congress, which it did explicitly in the 1803 cases of Marbury v. Madison and Stuart v.
Laird.76 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court had already begun to establish its power of judicial
review during the preceding ten years. By the beginning of the Quasi-War, justices of the
Supreme Court, acting in their responsibility as circuit court judges, had engaged in what could
be characterized as judicial review, with the first known case occurring in Hayburn’s Case of
1792. So too had the Supreme Court, acting as a whole, in the 1796 case of Hylton v. United
States, in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Carriage Tax Act of 1794.77
Consequently, at least in theory, the Supreme Court could have ruled unconstitutional the actions
of President Adams and the Federalist-dominated Congress.
Given the tenuousness of its power of judicial review and the fact that the nation was at
war, it is still debatable whether the Court could have checked the executive and legislative
branches had it been willing. But even if its authority had been clear and well-established, three
aspects of the crisis suggest that the Supreme Court would have ruled in favor of the federal
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government had a case arisen relating to Americans‘ civil liberties. First, at the time of the
Quasi-War, the justices of the Supreme Court were generally considered sympathetic to the
Federalists.78 Second, throughout the crisis, the Supreme Court justices, acting in their
responsibility as circuit judges, regularly went out of their way ―to charge grand juries with the
duty of inquiring into all offenses against the Sedition Law.‖79 Second, throughout the crisis,
federal courts were more than willing to prosecute political dissidents and indeed, according to
Stone, ―were unanimous in upholding [the Sedition Act].‖80
Return to “Normal”
To a greater degree than in any other major national military crisis in American history,
the restriction of civil liberties during the Quasi-War ended with the end of the crisis. This is
evident both from the way in which the crisis ended and the degree to which wartime restrictions
outlasted the end of the crisis.
End of the crisis
The Quasi-War officially ended with the Mortefontaine Convention of September 1800
in which the U.S. and French governments agreed to cease hostilities. However, the crisis had
begun to subside much earlier as popular fear of French invasion, along with the ability of the
Federalists to exploit the crisis for political advantage, started to diminish in the latter half of
1798 (not long after Congress enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts).81 Although fears of French
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invasion ran particularly rampant during the spring of 1798, the French government ―did not
want war with the United States.‖82 Rather, it sought to ―reorient American foreign policy‖
through its aggressive naval campaign against American shipping.83 In late 1799, after the
French Directory experienced multiple coups d’etat and the French military suffered ―setbacks in
Europe, the Middle East, and the Caribbean,‖ the newly elected First Consul Napoleon
Bonaparte (brought to power in a coup he staged on November 9, 1799) ―anxiously sought peace
with the United States.‖84 On November 3, 1799, President Adams accepted an offer by French
Minister of Foreign Affairs Talleyrand to renew negotiations with the U.S. by sending an
American diplomatic mission to Paris, even though this meant taking extremely heavy criticism
from the more hawkish members of his own party.85 These negotiations were ultimately
successful and definitively ended the crisis months before the Alien Friends Act and the Sedition
Act were set to expire.
With the onset of negotiations for peace between the United States and France, and later
with President Adam‘s decision in early May of 1800 to demobilize the army, the wartime
hysteria truly subsided.86 The Federalists, who were no longer able to use the threat of French
invasion ―as a rallying cry for military expenditures‖ and the suppression of Republicans, turned
inward, attacking Adams as soft on national defense and generally unfit to be president.87 From
that point on, the Federalist Party deteriorated dramatically, leading to the election of Republican
Thomas Jefferson and a large Republican majority in the House of Representatives in 1800.88
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During his inaugural address, Jefferson sought to sow unity, declaring ―Every difference of
opinion is not a difference of principle...We are all Republicans—we are all Federalists.‖89
Duration of restrictions
In general, wartime restrictions on Americans‘ civil liberties did not outlast the end of the
Quasi-War, as evidenced by two aspects of wartime repression: the prosecution of political
dissidents and the longevity of wartime legislation. The prosecution of political dissidents during
the Quasi-War ended approximately with the end of the crisis. Indeed, the last indictment under
the Sedition Act was issued to Thomas Callendar on May 24, 1800. Callendar was prosecuted for
the seditious act of circulating a pamphlet entitled ―The Prospect Before Us‖ that attacked
President Adams‘ handling of hostilities with the French and advocated the election of
Republican Thomas Jefferson. It is noteworthy that this final indictment was issued months after
the President decided to renew diplomatic negotiations with France and slightly after he decided
to demobilize the army.
Although the last sedition prosecution was initiated roughly four months before the
official end of the Quasi-War, the Alien and Sedition Acts themselves remained in force beyond
the end of the crisis. The Naturalization Act, which made it more difficult for aliens to become
naturalized citizens and expanded government control over aliens, was repealed on April 14,
1802, when Congress passed a naturalization law that restored the residency requirement to its
pre-war level of five years.90 In contrast, the Alien Friends Act, which authorized the President to
deport aliens unilaterally and tightened government control over foreigners, expired on the last
day of Adams‘ term in office. The Alien Enemies Act, which gave the President authority to
89
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govern the treatment of enemy aliens during wartime, was the only piece of legislation to remain
―a permanent part of American wartime policy.‖91 To this day, wartime presidents could act on
its provisions. The final piece of legislation enacted during the Quasi-War, and the most violative
of Americans‘ civil liberties, was the Sedition Act. Like the Alien Friends Act, the Sedition Act
expired on the last day of President Adam‘s term in office. From that point, it quickly fell into
deep disrepute, with successive generations of Congressmen disavowing its use. After the
election of 1800, President Jefferson pardoned everyone convicted under the Sedition Act and
discontinued the prosecution of all others awaiting trial.92 Later, in 1804, the House of
Representatives voted to impeach Justice Chase for his conduct in the trial of Thomas Callender.
However, the bill did not receive the two-thirds majority necessary for impeachment.93 Much
later, on July 4, 1840, Congress officially renounced the Sedition Act and authorized reparations
to cover the legal fees of all those indicted.94
Conclusion
The Quasi-War was a crisis of limited duration involving a conventional, non-ideological
threat to American national security. In comparison with the major national military crises that
followed, the restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties that it produced was narrow and limited.
This was true in a number of respects. First, wartime repression was exclusively the province of
the federal government, rather than also of state and local governments. Second, the repression
of dissent was overt and accomplished chiefly through legislative means, i.e. the enactment of
repressive legislation and the prosecution of dissidents. Third, the restriction of Americans‘ civil
liberties during wartime was of short duration, ending approximately with the end of the crisis.
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Yet while wartime repression was narrow and limited, the Adams administration and the
Federalists targeted their opponents extensively using the repressive legislation that had been put
in place. In large part because it had not yet firmly established its power of judicial review, the
U.S. Supreme Court did not perform a role in checking the executive and legislative branch
campaign against the Democratic-Republican Party and dissent in general.
In part, the narrow scope of wartime repression and the insignificant role of the Supreme
Court was a function of the fact that the country was young. The federal government was small
and weak at that time, leaving the Adams‘ administration with limited means to suppress dissent.
Additionally, many of the avenues of repression open to policymakers during later crises were
not yet available. Most importantly, before the crisis, there was no body of laws on which to
build a campaign of repression before the enactment of the Alien and Sedition Acts. Those acts
created precedents, which would be built on in later crises.
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II. CIVIL WAR (1861-1865)
The Civil War was a crisis like no other in American history. The second major national
military crisis to test the United States‘ commitment to civil liberties, the Civil War presented a
threat to the U.S. government that was internal, rather than the external threat presented by the
Quasi-War or the national crises that followed the Civil War. Instead of defending the country
against foreign aggression, Lincoln‘s challenge was to hold it together despite the efforts of the
Southern States to secede. In the context of the incredible tensions unleashed by this conflict and
given the difficult balance that Lincoln had to maintain in order to defeat the South without
alienating the Border States, the restriction of civil liberties was inevitable.
Background of the Crisis
To understand the context in which civil liberties were restricted during the Civil War, it
is essential to understand both the issues and events that triggered the crisis and the reaction of
the public to the outbreak of war. Although important in their own right for the context they
provide, these aspects of the crisis are also important because they suggest or make obvious the
conditions that fostered the heavy restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties during the crisis—the
long-held tensions between the North and the South and the sharply divided loyalties between
the people of each region.
Trigger of the crisis
At its core, the Civil War resulted from election to the presidency in 1860 of a Northern
Republican, Abraham Lincoln, who opposed the extension of slavery to new states and
territories, and from the subsequent secession of Southern States from the Union. The roots of
this crisis, however, were much deeper than this simple explanation suggests. The most
important, and most widely known, cause of the Civil War was slavery itself. During the Civil
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War, the cotton industry formed the backbone of the South. In the year of Lincoln‘s election the
United States exported roughly 191 million dollars worth of cotton, which amounted to fiftyseven percent of the value of the entire nation‘s exports. Given that the cultivation of cotton, a
heavily labor intensive crop, was made profitable at the time only through the exploitation of
slave labor, slavery was of immense economic importance to the Southern economy. Beyond
their importance in the cotton industry, slaves were of great economic importance in their own
right, as is evident by the fact that the nation‘s slaves were ―worth at least two billion dollars‖ in
1860.95 It should not be surprising then, that most Southerners viewed slavery ―not [as] an evil,
but [as] the essential basis of peace and prosperity.96 For this reason, they ―resented the moral
condemnation of slavery as an insult to Southern honor.‖97
In addition to slavery, the Civil War was the result of two other factors: regional social
and economic differences between the North and the South and the resultant differences in
perspective on the proper role of government. By the election of 1860, states in the North were
industrializing, developing systems of transportation and finance, and were experiencing a
tremendous influx of immigrants, whereas states in the South were more rural, received few
immigrants, and, were significantly less industrial. In short, the North was more dynamic, while
the South was more static. These regional social and economic differences also helped to
produce another major difference that drove the Northern and Southern States to the point of
war—differing views of government‘s appropriate role. Largely because of the differing
structure of their economies, Northerners came ―to clamor for all sorts of aid and protection from
the federal government,‖ while Southerners believed that ―the national government must keep its
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hands off as many things as possible.‖98 To provide an example, Northern entrepreneurs ―who
were developing new industries demanded protection from cheap European imports,‖ while
Southerners, who exported their chief product (cotton), ―wanted as many cheap European
imports as [they] could get.‖99
Beyond slavery, regional social and economic differences, and differing views with
regard to the proper role of government, a number of events prior to the election of 1860 helped
to serve as catalysts for the Civil War by exacerbating tensions between the North and the South.
First, the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 created the territories of Kansas and
Nebraska and repealed the Missouri Compromise of 1820 (which admitted Missouri as a slave
state, while establishing that no additional slave states could be created north of Missouri‘s
southern border). This led to great turmoil and violence in Kansas between Northern settlers
determined to win Kansas as a free state and Southern settlers equally determined to make
Kansas a slave state. Second, the Supreme Court‘s 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, in
which Chief Justice Taney declared that Scott could not sue for his freedom because he was
property rather than a citizen, further helped to galvanize Northerners against slavery. Third,
John Brown‘s 1859 attempt, to incite a widespread slave rebellion starting at Harper‘s Ferry,
West Virginia seemed to confirm the fear of many Southerners that Northerners wished to incite
―a servile insurrection, with unlimited bloodshed and pillage.‖100
With the 1860 election, tensions were high between the North and the South and, as a
result, the slavery question was squarely before the American people. In the months before the
election, the Republican Party nominated Abraham Lincoln for president. On the issue of
slavery, Lincoln was a moderate who did not specifically advocate the abolition of slavery in
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states where it already existed. However, he still represented a threat to Southerners because the
Republican Party platform ―embodied the political and economic program of the North,‖ thereby
endangering ―Southern interests.‖101 Like the Republicans, the Democratic Party chose to
nominate a relative moderate, Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas. Despite Douglas‘ relative
centrism, his selection caused a regional split in the Democratic Party, with most Southern
Democrats voting for John Breckinridge, rather than for Senator Douglas, ―whose support of
popular sovereignty would have left their interests in doubt by allowing new states to reject
slavery.‖102 A third party, the Constitutional Union Party, which expressly advocated the
importance of restoring peace and maintaining the ―union of the states,‖ also arose to challenge
the Democratic and Republican presidential nominees.103 Given these developments, Republican
Abraham Lincoln won the election by a plurality of forty percent of the popular vote. His support
was ―limited almost entirely to the North and the West.‖104
Even before his inauguration, Abraham Lincoln faced the threat that Southern States
might secede, a threat which became evident when the two U.S. Senators from South Carolina
resigned their seats on November 10, 1860 and was realized when the governor of South
Carolina announced his state‘s secession on December 24, 1860.105 Soon after, other lower
southern states followed South Carolina‘s lead. In the midst of this growing movement on behalf
of the Southern States to secede, lame duck President James Buchanan did little to stem the rapid
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escalation of the crisis. By February of 1861, a month before Lincoln‘s inauguration, ―prosecessionist forces [had] seized most of the federal forts in the South‖ and ―South Carolina,
Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana‖ had established the Confederate States
of America.106 On April 11, 1861, Confederate forces signaled the beginning of the Civil War by
firing on Fort Sumter, a federal fort that stood at the entrance of the Charleston harbor in South
Carolina.107 For the next four years, ―the twenty-three states of the Union and the eleven states of
the Confederacy were locked in one of history‘s most brutal conflicts.‖108
Reaction to the crisis
In addition to the issues and events that triggered the crisis, the reaction of the public to
the outbreak of war reflected regional loyalties and the long-held tensions between the North and
the South, conditions that would help to ensure the restriction of civil liberties during wartime.
Similar in respects to the reaction of the public in other crises such as the Quasi-War, the
American public was broadly in support of war between the North and the South, at least when
the crisis first began. Upon learning of the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, Americans,
Northerners and Southerners alike, were swept up in a ―hysterical wave of emotion‖ such that
―war actually seemed to be welcomed, as if a tension which had grown completely unendurable
had at last been broken.‖109 According to Bruce Catton, ―grim knowledge of the reality of war
would come quickly enough, but right at first unsophisticated people surged out under waving
flags with glad cries and with laughter, as if the thing that had happened called for rejoicing.‖110
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Restriction of Civil Liberties
As the events that triggered the crisis and the reaction of the public to those events
suggest, Americans‘ civil liberties were severely restricted throughout the crisis. In contrast to
the Quasi-War with France, and many crises that followed, wartime repression was less targeted
at suppressing dissent than it was oriented toward advancing military goals. As in the previous
chapter, the degree to which civil liberties were restricted can be seen by looking at federal
repression, state and local repression, the tone set by the executive branch toward civil liberties,
and the deference of the Supreme Court to the executive and legislative branches.
Federal restrictions
The Civil War is often seen as one of the worst periods in the history of American civil
liberties, although that is often excused because of the nature of the conflict. However, despite
the fact that wartime repression occurred largely at the federal level, the restriction of civil
liberties by the federal government was relatively narrow in scope, occurring through few of the
potential avenues of repression and not typically involving questions of a partisan political
nature. This is evident in four key aspects of the federal government‘s response to the crisis,
which include repressive legislation enacted by Congress, presidential directives relating to civil
liberties, federal efforts to control political discourse, and efforts on behalf of the federal
government to monitor and suppress political dissidents.
Legislation
Perhaps because of the legacy of political repression during the Quasi-War, though
probably more importantly because of the Lincoln administration‘s intention not to exacerbate
sharply divided loyalties or alienate the Border States, no federal laws against seditious speech or
writings were enacted during the Civil War. Throughout the whole conflict, Congress passed
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only one major piece of legislation seriously restricting Americans‘ civil liberties: the Habeas
Corpus Act, which was passed by Congress on March 3, 1863. Though it did not clarify whether
Lincoln had the authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus prior to its passage, the Act
effectively sanctioned Lincoln‘s earlier wartime suspensions of habeas corpus in that it
authorized him, from that point on, to suspend the writ as he deemed necessary to guarantee the
public safety.111 Given that it was enacted after Lincoln had already issued numerous
proclamations suspending the writ (with the first suspension, as discussed below, issued on April
27, 1861), the Habeas Corpus Act simply recognized a fait accompli.112
Ultimately, since President Lincoln had already suspended the writ of habeas corpus and
would have continued to do so regardless of whether Congress chose to legitimize his actions,
the practical effect of this law on Americans‘ civil liberties was relatively small. The law did not
authorize the restriction of civil liberties any more than the President had already ordered.
Although the Habeas Corpus Act was relatively unimportant in terms of its practical effect, the
law was of greater importance for its symbolic value. It demonstrated the general tenor of the
crisis, Congress‘ support for Lincoln‘s repressive policies, and the extent to which repressive
policies of that type had come to be seen as legitimate.
Presidential directives
Given that the only major federal legislation restricting civil liberties simply legitimized
Lincoln‘s repressive policies, the more important facet of the federal government‘s response to
the crisis came in the form of repressive presidential directives. During the Civil War, Lincoln
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issued at least nine presidential proclamations and executive orders suspending the writ of
habeas corpus, and, in some cases, also authorizing the imposition of martial law.113
The sequence and content of those directives demonstrate two central points with regard
to the restriction of civil liberties by the federal government. First, Lincoln‘s directives were
issued in an unsystematic manner. Rather than revealing a methodical effort by the President to
extend the suspension of habeas corpus ―by slow degrees or steady geographical expansion‖
across the country, the sequence in which the directives were issued demonstrate that ―the
[Lincoln] administration lurched from problem to problem drafting hasty proclamations and
orders to meet the objective of the moment.‖114 This was particularly evident in the somewhat
redundant nature of a few of the directives issued, as well as the fact that three of President
Lincoln‘s proclamations and executive orders simply formalized significant restrictions on
Americans‘ civil liberties that had already been implemented by lower-ranking authorities.
Second, the content of those directives demonstrated that, in issuing them, the Lincoln
administration sought to advance military objectives rather than political goals: ―the orders and
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proclamations were usually provoked by problems of military mobilization—first by
obstructions of the routes to the underprotected capital and later by draft resistance.‖115
The presidential proclamations and executive orders issued by President Lincoln during
the Civil War fell into three basic categories: directives suspending the writ of habeas corpus
along military lines to the capital, Washington D.C.; directives targeted at specific areas or, in
the case of one directive, a specific individual; and directives suspending the writ of habeas
corpus nationwide under certain circumstances.
The first category, directives suspending the writ of habeas corpus along military lines to
Washington D.C., included three directives issued within a six-month period near the beginning
of the war. The first directive of this type, and President Lincoln‘s first suspension of habeas
corpus, was issued on April 27, 1861, just two weeks into the war. It was meant to protect the
nation‘s capital by establishing a route to Washington D.C. along which Northern military troops
could travel unimpeded. The directive was issued in response to rioting and bridge burning in
Baltimore, Maryland that threatened to cut off the capital from Northern troop reinforcements. It
authorized General-in-Chief Winfield Scott, the commander of the Union Army, to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus as he deemed necessary ―at any point on or in the vicinity of any military
line, which is now or which shall be used between the City of Philadelphia and the City of
Washington.‖116
Less than two months later, on July 2, 1861, President Lincoln effectively extended the
range of his first directive by authorizing Scott to suspend the writ of habeas corpus ―at any
point, on or in the vicinity of any military line which is now, or which shall be used, between the

115

Neely, The Fate of Liberty, pp. 90-92.
Roy Basler, III, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 3 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
1953-1955), p. 347, qtd. in Neely, The Fate of Liberty, pp. 8-9.
116

41
City of New York and the City of Washington.‖117 Still later, on October 14, 1861, Lincoln
amended his July 2 order by authorizing Scott to suspend the writ on military lines between
Bangor, Maine and Washington D.C.118
Directives in the second category—those targeted at specific areas or individuals—were
issued throughout the war, beginning with a directive issued in mid-1861 and ending with a
directive issued in mid-1864. The first directive of this type was issued on May 10, 1861. It
authorized the U.S. military commander responsible for the Florida coast to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus as he saw necessary to enforce ―the laws & constitution of the United States‖ on
―the Islands of Key West, the Tortugas, and Santa Rosa.‖119 In doing so, the proclamation
―simply recognized a fait accompli‖ in that Colonel Harvey Brown, the military commander of
the Department of Florida, had already suspended the writ and ―union officers on the Florida
coast had for some time been acting as though the local citizens had abdicated their rights.‖120
The second directive of this type, issued little over a month later on June 20, authorized Generalin-Chief Scott to suspend the writ of habeas corpus so far as necessary to arrest one particular
individual, Major Chase of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, allegedly guilty of treason. Very
ambiguous, the order did not specify the location in which Major Chase would be found, nor did
it supply his first and middle names.121
The third and fourth directives of this type were targeted at specific states, rather than at a
specific region or a specific person. The third, issued on December 2, 1861, authorized General
Halleck, Commander of the Western Department, to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and to
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impose martial law ―within the limits of the military division under [his] command.‖122 This
order was issued in response to a state of severe rebellion in Missouri, characterized as ―the
scene of widespread popular revolt, guerilla violence, and military campaigns‖ in which local
commanders were heavily restricting civil liberties without official authorization.123 Even before
Lincoln‘s directive was issued, military commanders responsible for Missouri had suspended the
writ of habeas corpus and imposed martial law. Further, on at least one occasion, General
Ulysses S. Grant had ―authoriz[ed] the confiscation of a newspaper‘s press and the arrest of its
editor.‖124 Lincoln‘s final directive, issued on July 5, 1864, focused on the state of Kentucky. It
both urged enforcement in Kentucky of an earlier directive issued on September 15, 1863, which
suspended habeas corpus nationwide to prevent interference with the mobilization of the
military, and authorized the imposition of martial law in that state.
The third category, directives suspending the writ of habeas corpus nationwide in certain
circumstances, represented the culmination of Lincoln‘s practice of issuing presidential
proclamations and executive orders during the Civil War. Like the other types of directives, these
demonstrate that military objectives were foremost in his mind. The first such directive was
issued on September 24, 1862 and was intended to enforce the Militia Act of July 17, 1862,
which officially, though quite indirectly, authorized the first national military draft in American
history in response to the Lincoln administration‘s difficulty in maintaining and expanding the
military. It authorized the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the military trial of
individuals resisting, or advocating resistance to, the draft. However, like two of his earlier
directives, this proclamation simply made official a significant wartime restriction on
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Americans‘ civil liberties already authorized by a lower-ranking authority. At Lincoln‘s request,
Secretary of the War Department Edwin Stanton had issued a series of orders six weeks earlier
on August 8 that suspended habeas corpus and directed the military trial of civilians for
effectively the same reasons.125 The second nationally applicable directive, issued on September
15, 1863, was slightly broader. It sought to prevent state court judges from issuing ―writs of
habeas corpus that interfered with the draft and the punishment of deserters‖ by suspending the
writ of habeas corpus throughout the nation in any ―cases where military or civilian authorities
of the United States held persons under their command or in their custody.‖126
Efforts to control political discourse
Although heavy-handed, particularly with regard to the wartime military arrest of
civilians (discussed below), the restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties throughout the Civil War
was relatively narrow in scope and generally did not involve questions of a partisan or otherwise
political nature. While the Lincoln administration did work to control political discourse during
the crisis, it did so unenthusiastically and in an unsystematic and largely ineffectual manner. As
with presidential directives issued, the scattered efforts on behalf of the federal government to
control political discourse demonstrated that military objectives, rather than political goals, were
foremost in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief. Throughout the Civil War, there was a very
real risk that the disclosure of sensitive information by members of the press might harm the
military. This often happened as Confederate generals, including Robert E. Lee, frequently
scanned Northern newspapers for information that gave away the intentions of Union Army
generals. Nevertheless, press correspondents and newspapers were accorded wide latitude to
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publish as they saw fit. To the extent that the Lincoln administration did seek to restrict the press,
however, its efforts were incomplete and largely ineffectual.127
During the Civil War, the Lincoln administration attempted to censor the press in two
ways—by assuming control of the telegraph wires and by suppressing newspapers directly.
Immediately after the war first began in April of 1861, the federal government assumed
exclusive control of ―the telegraph lines from Washington‖ and barred the transmission of ―all
telegraphic messages from Washington relating to ‗the civil or military operations of the
government.‘‖128 By August of 1861, after receiving criticism from newspapers and Congress
over this program, the Lincoln administration attempted to establish a gentlemen‘s agreement
with the press whereby the federal government would lift censorship of the telegraph lines if
press correspondents censored their own dispatches. However, the agreement broke down by
February of 1862, at which point the Lincoln administration ordered the ―military supervision of
all telegraphic lines in the United States‖ by the War Department, rather than the State
Department as was the case in the administration‘s earlier attempt at censorship.129 Under that
program, which remained in effect until the end of the war, ―all telegraphic communications
touching military matters not authorized by the Secretary of War, or the commanding general of
the district, were forbidden.‖130 Although restrictive, the program was largely ineffectual in
censoring the press as correspondents were able to transmit information by telegraph and were
also able to send dispatches freely by mail.131
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In addition to censoring every telegraph line throughout the country, the Lincoln
administration occasionally attempted to censor the press more directly by prosecuting editors,
―excluding correspondents from the [military] lines, withholding facilities for news-gathering,
denying the privilege of the mails, prohibiting the circulation of papers, seizing an edition, and,
in extreme cases, suppressing the paper[s].‖132 Further, mob violence against Democratic
newspapers on behalf of ―Union soldiers and ‗loyal‘ citizens‖ often went unpunished.133 In the
early months of the war, the Lincoln administration appears to have campaigned against the antiwar press by ordering the exclusion of certain newspapers from the mails, including two of the
most prominent anti-war papers (the Journal of Commerce and the New York Daily News), and
subjecting the editors of certain papers to military arrest for periods that usually lasted no longer
than a month.134 In general, however, the Lincoln administration was relatively lenient in its
treatment of anti-administration newspapers, as evidenced by the unrestrained attacks of some of
the most antagonistic newspapers, for which, at the time, the ―suppression or the arrest of their
editors seemed but mild forms of punishment.‖135 In the words of James Randall, the efforts of
the Lincoln administration to censor the press during the Civil War had ―but slight effect upon
the whole problem of news control.‖136
While the federal government did work to censor the press during the Civil War, there
was no systematic effort to flood the marketplace of ideas with government propaganda, as was
the case in World War I with the Committee on Public Information (CPI) and, to a significantly
lesser extent, in World War II with the Office of War Information (OWI). Overall, then, the
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Lincoln administration exercised relatively minimal, or at least relatively ineffectual, control
over political discourse during the Civil War.
Efforts to monitor and suppress dissidents
The last aspect of the federal government‘s response to crisis that should be considered in
assessing the degree to which Americans‘ civil liberties were restricted is whether there were any
attempts, at the federal level, to monitor or suppress political dissidents. During the crisis, there
were no significant attempts to surveil or deport and denaturalize those considered subversive,
but there were a tremendous number of military arrests made. However, as those arrests were
intended primarily to advance military objectives, rather than political goals, they should not be
branded generally as political repression. Additionally, there was also an effort by Congress to
screen alleged subversives from the federal government.
The government‘s program of military arrest represents the most egregious abuse of
Americans‘ civil liberties during the Civil War. The nature of that program is evident both from
its operation over the course of the conflict and its outcome (in terms of the number and type of
individuals that it affected). Two aspects of the way in which it operated are particularly worth
considering: the program‘s evolution and the repression of dissent by Union military authorities.
There were two distinct periods in the evolution of the federal program. For the first ten months
of the war, State Department Secretary William Seward was responsible for directing the
program of military arrests and accounting for all arrests made. On February 15, 1862, the
Lincoln administration transferred responsibility for the control of all military arrests from the
Department of State to the Department of War, under Edwin Stanton, which subsequently
maintained control until the end of the crisis.137
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Two important points emerge from Seward‘s tenure as chief authority responsible for
directing the government‘s program of military arrest. First, the Department of State did not
administer an efficient or harsh program of repression against Lincoln‘s critics. Rather, it was
extremely disorganized and lacked firm control over the execution of arrests. This was evident
from the ignorance of Department authorities of the causes of most arrests, as well as their
inability to execute arrests that they initiated. Exacerbating the effects of its disorganization, the
State Department lacked solid control over military arrests because the Lincoln administration
never made it publicly clear that responsibility for the handling of such arrests belonged to the
Department of State. As a result, throughout this initial period, military generals, state officials,
and the Departments of War and the Navy made arrests on their own authority. By February
1862, authorities outside the State Department had initiated at least 60 percent of all military
arrests.138
The second point that emerges is that the military arrests made were, for the most part,
not political in nature. This was evident from certain characteristics of arrest records from the
period. In particular, the places of residence of those arrested and the reasons for their arrest
strongly suggest that the various authorities who influenced the program sought primarily to
advance military objectives. Of an estimated 864 people arrested during the period, nearly onethird were residents of Southern States, and another seven percent, roughly, were residents of
other countries, leaving approximately forty-three percent from the Border States (not including
the District of Columbia) and only fourteen percent from the Northern States, a relatively small
percentage that amounted to less than one person each month. Although not conclusive in and of
itself, the geographical distribution of those arrests provides some weight to the conclusion that
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the goal of the government‘s military arrest program was not, at least primarily, to suppress
dissent.139
More telling, however, were the reasons for which individuals were subjected to military
arrests during that early period. Of those who resided outside of the Union, a large percentage of
those arrested were either Southern sailors who landed in the North after the start of the war,
sailors who attempted to run the Northern naval blockade of the South (a majority of whom,
Neely estimates, were British), or other foreigners not guilty of blockade-running whose lack of
knowledge with regard to American laws made them especially susceptible to arrest. Of those
who resided inside the Union, most do not appear to have been arrested for reasons related to
political dissent, although there were instances in which individuals were subjected to military
arrest for reasons that violated the freedoms of speech and of the press. For example, a
Connecticut man was arrested after he raised a secession flag over his house. Additionally, at
least fifteen owners, publishers, and editors of Democratic and Republican newspapers were
imprisoned during Seward‘s control of military arrests.140
After February 15, 1862, the Department of War, under Secretary of War Edwin Stanton,
assumed responsibility for the handling of all military arrests. Compared with the earlier period,
the rate of arrests increased, as did the number of arrests that were, at least somewhat, more
political in nature. Although that shift in the nature and number of arrests partially resulted from
changing conditions on the ground, it resulted more largely from the evolution of War
Department policy over the course of the conflict. Two different sets of orders, issued exactly
one month apart, explain the change.
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On August 8, 1862, the Department of War issued a set of orders that suspended the writ
of habeas corpus nationwide and ordered the military trial of civilians ―who may be engaged, by
act, speech, or writing, in discouraging volunteer enlistments, or in any way giving aid and
comfort to the enemy, or in any other disloyal practice against the United States.‖141 The orders
were meant to enforce the Militia Act of July 17, 1862, which authorized the suspension of
habeas corpus and the military trial of individuals resisting the draft; however, their effect was
much broader. They produced a ―period of sweeping and uncoordinated arrests‖ in which ―petty
functionaries [decided] without any legal guidelines one of the highest matters of state: precisely
who in this civil war was loyal or disloyal.‖142 The weeks following the issuance of those orders
represent one of the lower points in the history of American civil liberties. In the one-month
period before they were rescinded, 354 civilians were arrested in the North, a far higher rate of
arrests than in any earlier one-month period. Ultimately, although the August 8 orders were
meant to aid military mobilization (which they indeed achieved), their vague language invited
the arrest of anyone critical of the Lincoln administration or the federal government in general.143
Exactly one month later, on September 8, 1862, Judge Advocate Major Levi Turner, who
assumed to a large degree and apparently on his own initiative the responsibility for overseeing
the program of military arrests, disseminated an order stating that ―the necessity for stringent
enforcement of the orders of the War Department in respect to volunteering and drafting no
longer exists.‖144 The order further directed that future arrests be made only on his authority or
the authority of ―the military commander or Governor of the State in which such arrests may be
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made.‖145 From that point on, the most serious types of abuse produced by the War Department‘s
August 8 orders began to diminish ―in frequency as higher authorities took control.‖146 With the
orders of September 8, 1862, the evolution of the federal government‘s program of military
arrests was complete:
From the autumn of 1862 to the end of the war, persons who discouraged enlistments,
impeded the draft, or afforded aid and comfort to the enemy were theoretically subject to
martial law: arrest, trial, and punishment by the U.S. Army. Once imprisoned, these
persons might have no recourse to civil courts, for the writ of habeas corpus was
suspended for any such person. Trials by military commission were fully established.
Moreover, martial law applied to all the cases mentioned in the proclamation and the
categories of offenses were vague enough, in effect, to have placed the whole of the
United States under martial law.147
In addition to its evolution, the nature of the government‘s program of military arrest is
also evident in the repression of dissent by Union military authorities. Throughout the Civil War,
the residents of certain states found their civil liberties restricted by local military authorities to a
greater degree than the Lincoln administration intended. The conditions in two states provide an
idea of the occasional heavy-handedness of some Union commanders. In April 1863, General
Ambrose Burnside, the Union Commander of the Department of Ohio, ordered the imposition of
martial law and issued General Order no. 38, which criminalized treasonous speech. He
subsequently and unilaterally directed Union soldiers to arrest Democratic Congressman
Clement Vallandigham, an action (described later) that set off a bipartisan firestorm of protest.
Later, and again on his own initiative, Burnside ordered Union soldiers to close the Chicago
Times for publishing what he felt to be treasonous writing, an action for which he was
subsequently rebuked by President Lincoln.148
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In Missouri during the early months of the war, without guidance from President Lincoln,
Commander of the Western Department John Fremont declared martial law in St. Louis County
and ordered the trial of civilians by courts-martial. As in other states, the abuse of civil liberties
was not confined to the highest-ranking local military authorities. During his time in Missouri,
General Ulysses S. Grant ―authoriz[ed] the arrest of civilians and the taking of civilian hostages,‖
as well as ―the confiscation of a newspaper‘s press and the arrest of its editors.‖149
The operation of the government‘s program of military arrest described above
demonstrates a number of important points about the degree to which the federal government
sought to suppress political dissent during the Civil War, points that are also demonstrated in the
assessment below of the outcome of the program. First, and perhaps most fundamentally, the
evolution of the federal program throughout the crisis demonstrated that there was no systematic
effort to repress opposition to the Lincoln administration and the federal government. Second,
the preceding analysis clearly indicated that military objectives, rather than political goals, were
foremost in the minds of those who directed and accounted for the program. Third, to the extent
that the program gave rise to and made possible political repression, its evolution demonstrated
that its excesses were largely the result of disorganization, lack of control, or incompetence by
those responsible for its administration. For example, the vague language of the August 8 orders
and their subsequent modification only one month later suggest that the War Department did not
anticipate how broadly those orders would be applied and the degree to which they would be
used to suppress dissent.
To a greater degree than the program‘s operation over the course of the conflict, its
outcome provides valuable insight into the nature of federal military arrests. It is perhaps
impossible today to identify concretely the number of civilians subjected to military arrest during
149
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the Civil War. Nevertheless, the range of historical estimates is indicative of the scope of the
program. Estimates of the number of civilians arrested vary tremendously, from a low of 13,535
to a high of 38,000, with most leaning toward the latter figure. Clearly, the program had a
massive footprint on American society.
As estimates of the number of people affected range broadly, the reasons for which
civilians were arrested provide more valuable insight. As mentioned above, most arrests did not
involve political dissent. Some individuals were arrested for disloyal speech, but most were
―men of obscurity, whose outbursts hardly threatened the war effort‖ and most of those
individuals were released shortly after their arrest.150 There were two particularly notable
instances, however, in which prominent individuals were arrested on the basis of their political
positions or affiliations—the arrest of Ohio Democratic Congressman Clement Vallandigham
and the earlier, less well-known, sweeping arrest of alleged Maryland secessionists.
The arrest of Clement Vallandigham by General Ambrose Burnside, the Union
Commander of the Department of Ohio, represented one of the most well known and one of the
most overt instances of political repression during the Civil War. In 1863, acting on his own
authority, General Burnside unilaterally ordered the arrest of Congressman Vallandigham for
expressing ―sympathy for those in arms against the government of the United States, and
declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions with the object and purpose of weakening the power
of the government in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebellion.‖151 On this basis,
Vallandigham was convicted by military commission and punished with imprisonment. Lincoln
later commuted that sentence to banishment from the Union. The arrest and military trial of
Vallandigham has rightly been cited as an egregious excess of the government‘s program of
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military arrest; however, this instance of abuse far from exemplified that program. In fact, the
bipartisan backlash against Burnside‘s action, as well the backlash against Lincoln‘s cautious
support of the arrest, proved as much, demonstrating that the event was indeed an outlier.152
Less well known than the arrest and eventual banishment of Vallandigham, the arrest of
Maryland secessionists in early September of 1861 represented an equally, if not more, egregious
instance of political repression. In mid-September, fearing that Maryland might secede from the
Union in ―a secret, extra, and illegal session of the legislature‖—a devastating prospect for the
Lincoln administration given that the District of Columbia partially lies within that state—
Secretary of War Simon Cameron ordered a local Union General to prevent, by arrest if
necessary, ―the passage of any act of secession by the legislature of Maryland.‖153 Subsequent to
that and related orders, at least twenty-five alleged secessionists were arrested, including ten
members-elect of the Maryland state legislature, one Congressman from Maryland, at least two
newspaper editors, and the chief clerk of the Maryland state senate.154
In his memoirs, Union General George McClellan wrote that the arrests thoroughly upset
―whatever plans the secessionists of Maryland might have entertained.‖155 Even today, the origin
of the administration‘s belief that members of the Maryland legislature were planning to secede
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remains unclear. The Lincoln administration never divulged its motivations and by late
September, ―the secessionist impulse seemed spent.‖156 It seems unlikely that the threat of
secession was manufactured out of whole cloth or that the administration‘s primary motivation
was to strike at Maryland Democrats since the arrests received support from both Democrats and
Republicans.157 Regardless, the sweeping arrest of Maryland secessionists by the Lincoln
administration certainly constituted a major instance of political repression.
While cited frequently, the examples above were outliers and, hence, did not exemplify
the government‘s wartime program of military arrest. The true nature of the program lay in the
types of people arrested over the course of the conflict. Of those Southerners imprisoned in the
North, the majority were not arrested for political reasons. The most common Southerners
arrested appear to have been civilian refugees fleeing the Confederacy and petty contrabandists
(individuals guilty of violating the blockade or otherwise being involved in contraband trade).
Although less common, Southerners also ended up in Northern prisons for three other reasons.
First, some individuals were arrested due to the erosion, at least in the eyes of Northern military
authorities, in the distinction between combatants and non-combatants over the course of the
war. Many Southern noncombatants were arrested merely because they were suspected of aiding
Confederate forces. Second, Confederate deserters were often held as political prisoners in
Northern prisons because of fears that they might be spies. Third, a number of Southerners were
arrested simply because Union military authorities believed that they harmed the Union Army.
For example, some Southerners were arrested for selling liquor to Union soldiers, which was not
at the time illegal.158
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As was the case with Southern occupants of Northern prisons, the most common types of
Northerners imprisoned and held during wartime were businessmen, entrepreneurs, and peddlers
arrested for fraud and corruption harmful to the Union. Such arrests were most often for charges
such as:
forging discharge papers, selling passes, financial fraud committed while employed in an
army or government bureau, buying or selling government property, posing as a
government detective in order to accomplish fraud or theft, stealing wood from
government piles or reserves, and taking bribes to exempt men from enrollment in
conscription.159
Northerners were imprisoned less commonly for two other reasons. First, a number of arrests
involved anti-Semitism on behalf of Northern military authorities. For the most part, those
arrests were for charges of fraud and corruption. Although those arrested seem legitimately to
have committed fraud and corruption against the Union, it appears that Jews were more
susceptible to arrest than were Christians. Second, a number of Northerners were arrested on
suspicion of desertion, some of whom were subsequently tortured.160
Aside from federal military arrests, the effort on behalf of Congress to root out disloyal
employees should also be considered in assessing efforts to monitor and suppress dissent. In the
early months of the war, the Potter Committee met to investigate charges of disloyalty against
five hundred federal employees. At the time, ―Washington…was a nest of Southern sympathizers
and many of them were fired or forced to resign their jobs as the result of the Committee‘s
hearings.‖161 While such a program may have been necessary given the nature of the conflict, the
Potter Committee‘s loyalty investigations certainly constituted a violation of individual civil
liberties. Even if the dismissal of federal employees for expressing disloyal sentiments is not
seen as repressive, programs of that type inevitably harm some individuals wrongly.
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State and local restrictions
During the Civil War, there were no major laws enacted and few important prosecutions
initiated directly by state or local authorities. Although the residents of some states found their
civil liberties restricted particularly severely by heavy-handed Union commanders, it appears that
state and local governments did little to suppress dissent.
Executive tone toward civil liberties
The tone set by the executive branch during national crises dictates to a large degree the
willingness of policymakers throughout the federal government, as well as state and local
governments, to respect the constitutional rights of dissidents. This truth was particularly evident
in the approach of President Lincoln and his Secretary of State, Edwin Seward, to Americans‘
civil liberties during the Civil War. President Lincoln‘s approach to civil liberties reflected a
pragmatic approach to issues of national security rather than strict adherence to the principles of
the Constitution. This point was evident in his approach to three separate issues: the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus, political dissent, and slavery. Throughout the crisis, Lincoln
consistently defended suspension of the writ of habeas corpus as necessary to the mobilization of
the military and, consequently, as necessary to holding together and restoring the Union. For
example, in response to criticism of his proclamations suspending habeas corpus, Lincoln
remarked, in the spring of 1862, ―that a limb must sometimes be amputated to save a life, but
that a life must never be given to save a limb.‖162
Lincoln was also consistent throughout the Civil War in his approach to the First
Amendment freedoms of speech and of the press. Although he chose to support certain instances
of political repression (such as the arrest of Congressman Vallandigham by General Burnside),
Lincoln generally deferred to these rights. His general tolerance of dissent, however, was
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probably not so much motivated out of respect for the principles enshrined in the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights as much as by his suspicion that the repression of newspapers and
individuals ―needlessly polarized opposition to the war.‖163
Lincoln‘s generally pragmatic approach to civil liberties was also demonstrated in his
treatment of slavery. Although he wished to end slavery (as evidenced by his pre-war refusal to
allow the extension of slavery to new states and territories despite the threat of succession), he
passed up an early opportunity to begin to do so.164 As mentioned earlier, Lincoln rebuked
Western Department commander Fremont for issuing a little emancipation proclamation in
Missouri in the early months of the war. At the time, the President feared that the proclamation
might ―scare slaveholding Kentucky out of the Union.‖165 Just a year later, when he judged the
moment to be more opportune, Lincoln issued an emancipation proclamation of his own, one that
was applicable nationwide.166 While these three issues provide a window into the President‘s
approach to civil liberties, the more important point that they demonstrate was his pragmatism,
even despite his personal beliefs. Lincoln sought to maintain the Union; all other objectives were
secondary.
The other person who should be considered in assessing the tone set by the executive
branch toward civil liberties was Secretary of State Edwin Seward. He was popularly demonized
as having crushed dissent during the Civil War. However, this reputation seems to stem more
from his rhetorically harsh approach to dissent before the crisis began than from his tenure as
head of the Department of State or from his control of the government‘s program of military
arrest early in the war. With regard to his role as Secretary of State, Seward did not crush dissent
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because of constraints on his time, as well as his inability to actually implement an effective
program of repression. As stated earlier, Seward‘s State Department was extremely disorganized
in handling military arrests and initiated probably less than forty percent of the arrests made.
Thus, despite his reputation, Seward did not zealously suppress dissent nor enthusiastically
restrict Americans‘ civil liberties, though this was less a function of willingness than ability.
Ultimately, the executive branch did not set a tone for the vigorous protection of civil
liberties. However, while President Lincoln was willing to restrict civil liberties if beneficial to
the cause of holding together and restoring the Union, he often kept in check the efforts of lowerranking authorities to repress dissent.
Deference of the U.S. Supreme Court
The last aspect of the crisis that should be considered in assessing the degree to which
Americans‘ civil liberties were restricted during the Civil War was the degree to which the U.S.
Supreme Court deferred to the executive and legislative branches. Although the Supreme Court
as a whole did not technically rule on wartime restrictions implemented by the Lincoln
administration or enacted by Congress, the role of the Supreme Court in the crisis was evident in
the cases of Ex parte Merryman and Ex parte Vallandigham.
The case of Ex parte Merryman arose when John Merryman, a cavalryman arrested by
the military for allegedly burning bridges and destroying telegraph wires during the April 1861
riots in Maryland, sued for a writ of habeas corpus.167 Upon learning of Merryman‘s arrest,
Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Taney traveled to Baltimore specifically to issue that writ,
which he did, acting directly in his capacity as Chief Justice.168 On May 26, 1861, Taney ruled
that the Lincoln administration‘s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was unconstitutional
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and therefore ―commanded that General George Cadwalader, who was in charge of Fort
McHenry and who had custody of Merryman‖ release him to be sentenced in the local district
court.169 However, Cadwalader, citing Lincoln‘s April 27 order suspending the writ of habeas
corpus, refused to do so.170 Consequently, Taney was forced to reduce his opinion in the case, as
well as of Cadwalader‘s refusal to obey his authority, to writing. He then mailed this opinion to
the President, which Lincoln subsequently ignored.171
The refusal on behalf of Cadwalader to release Merryman, which represented the refusal
of the Lincoln administration to obey the authority of the Chief Justice, spurred no meaningful
public backlash and had little long-term effect. Lincoln continued to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus for the duration of the crisis, in direct disregard of Taney‘s decision in the case.172 Thus,
though the first decision of the crisis involving the Supreme Court (or rather a member of that
court) was not in favor of the Lincoln administration, it had no practical effect as the Lincoln
administration chose simply to ignore it.
The second case involving the Supreme Court during the Civil War was Ex parte
Vallandigham. Vallandigham, as discussed at various points in this chapter, was a Democratic
Congressman from Ohio arrested by a local Union Army commander for allegedly making
disloyal remarks. Subsequent to his arrest, Vallandigham was tried by military commission and
sentenced to prison for the remainder of the crisis. Shortly after, President Lincoln commuted
this sentence to banishment from the Union. After his trial, Vallandigham petitioned the
Supreme Court to issue a writ of certiorari; however, the justices declined to review the case
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because of a somewhat trivial technicality.173 Thus, in the second major case related to
Americans‘ civil liberties during the Civil War, the Supreme Court chose to defer to the
President. Ultimately then, the Supreme Court exercised little, if any, restraint on the Lincoln
administration and Congress during the Civil War.
Return to “Normal”
The durability of wartime repression depends in part on the way in which a crisis ends.
Unlike the Quasi-War, which ended rather neatly with the election of Thomas Jefferson as
President in 1800, the Civil War ended in a more untidy manner and left open an enormous rift
between the two belligerent nations, whose closing would ensure the continued restriction of
Americans‘ civil liberties. Partly for this reason, the restriction of civil liberties introduced
during wartime outlasted the end of the crisis.
End of the crisis
The Civil War effectively ended on April 9, 1865 with the surrender of Confederate
General-in-Chief Robert E. Lee to Union Army Commander Ulysses S. Grant at the town of
Appomattox Court House in Virginia. The war had been winding down for months, as the Union
Army gained increasing military advantage over Confederate forces, and Lee‘s surrender was all
but a foregone conclusion. Following Lincoln‘s wish, Grant offered Lee liberal terms of
surrender. He pledged that Confederate forces would not thereafter be ―disturbed by Federal
authority‖ if they laid down their arms and returned home.174 The offer was intended to be the
first step toward reuniting the two belligerent nations and securing a lasting peace. Five days
after that first step toward peace, enraged actor John Wilkes Booth shot and killed President
Lincoln at the Ford Theatre in Washington D.C. However, Lincoln‘s assassination did not
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change the war‘s outcome. Over the next month, other leading Confederate generals surrendered
their troops and, on May 10, the Union Army finally captured and imprisoned Confederate
President Jefferson Davis.175 Although it was not officially declared until April 2, 1866, the Civil
War was over:
The war had lasted for four years and it had consumed hundreds of thousands of lives and
billions of dollars in treasure. It had destroyed one of the two American ways of life
forever, and it had changed the other almost beyond recognition; and it ended as it had
begun, in a mystery of darkness and passion.176
Before his assassination, Lincoln told his generals his post-war vision that ―the broken
halves of the Union could be fitted together without bitterness and in a spirit of mutual
understanding and goodwill;‖ he wanted a peace that would be ―broad enough and humane
enough to mean some sort of gain for everyone in the land.‖177 Unfortunately, that vision largely
died with him both because the events surrounding his assassination roused Northern demands
for revenge against the South and because his death left the Radical Republicans, who rejected
his conciliatory approach to reunification, in near complete control of the Federal
Government.178 After Lincoln‘s death, it fell to President Andrew Johnson and later to President
Ulysses S. Grant, as well as the Republican-dominated Congress, to direct the reconstruction of
the Union.
Reconstruction, which lasted roughly twelve years, was a period in which Radical
Republicans, who dominated the former states of the Confederacy, sought to dramatically
redesign the state governments of the South through legislative reform. In the early years of
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Reconstruction, President Johnson emulated Lincoln‘s approach to reunification somewhat by
stressing the importance of Southern self-determination. In advocating this conciliatory
approach, however, Johnson was in the minority of his own party. His fellow Republicans,
particularly the Radical Republicans, sought to ―remake the economic, social, and political
framework, not merely of the South, but of the entire nation.‖179 They almost immediately set
about to accomplish this goal, even over the regular vetoes of President Johnson.180
Over the twelve years after the end of the Civil War, home rule gradually returned to the
South as the dominance of the Radical Republicans over Southern state governments slowly
faded, with South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida the last states ―delivered from this
domination.‖181 In the years that followed, the Southern states did away with the liberal reforms
implemented by the Radical Republicans and established ―an absolute fiction of ‗natural‘ white
supremacy, by means of state laws that circumvented the application of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments in particular and the entire Bill of Rights in general [as it applied] to
Negroes.‖182 The changes of this period were not wiped away entirely, however; by the end of
Reconstruction, the Radical Republican-dominated Congress had managed to ―entrench Northern
commercial-industrial interests as the principal power in national politics as well as in the
national economy.‖183 By the end of Reconstruction, many of the issues that had initially spurred
the development of war, except for slavery, remained unsolved; ―questions of state versus federal
sovereignty, Executive versus Legislative authority, industrial versus agrarian interests, [and]
labor versus capital‖ continued to divide Americans in the North and in the South.184
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Duration of restrictions
To a greater degree than in the Quasi-War (though to a lesser degree than in future
crises), the restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties outlasted the end of the Civil War. The
durability of these wartime restrictions can be attributed particularly to three factors: the
longevity and legacy of federal legislation, the deference of the U.S. Supreme Court after the end
of the crisis, and the durability of the government‘s program of military arrest.
Throughout the entire Civil War, the only major piece of legislation enacted by Congress
that related to American‘s civil liberties was the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, which effectively
sanctioned President Lincoln‘s practice of suspending the writ of habeas corpus by presidential
directive. While it had no expiration date, this piece of legislation was written to be applicable
only during the Civil War. As such, it did not outlast the end of the crisis. Nevertheless, this
legislation had a lasting effect as it helped to make possible at least two pieces of repressive
legislation enacted during Reconstruction: the Reconstruction Act and the Ku Klux Klan Act.
The Reconstruction Act, voted into law by Congress on March 2, 1867, authorized Union
military authorities operating in the South to prosecute civilians by military commission, despite
the fact that the war was over and the civil courts were functioning.185
The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, also known as the Civil Rights Act, sought to prevent the
Ku Klux Klan from ―intimidating newly enfranchised blacks and those Southern citizens, black
or white, who cooperated with northern ‗carpetbag‘ leaders gone south‖ by authorizing the
President to ―suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus‖ as necessary to overthrow
conspiracies formed by ―two or more persons within any State or Territory of the United States‖
to deprive ―any person or any class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
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privileges or immunities under the laws.‖186 Thus, although the Habeas Corpus Act did not
outlast the end of the crisis, it legitimized the suspension of the writ and thereby helped to pave
the way for Congress to authorize its suspension after the Civil War had ended.
In addition to the longevity and legacy of federal legislation, the limited check exercised
by the U.S. Supreme Court after the end of the crisis should be considered in assessing the
durability of wartime restrictions placed on Americans‘ civil liberties. During the years after the
end of the Civil War, the Court issued only one major decision relating to the restriction of civil
liberties during wartime—Ex parte Milligan. The case of Ex parte Milligan arose when Lambdin
Milligan was arrested on October 5, 1864 for ―allegedly conspiring to engage in criminal acts to
aid the Confederacy,‖ tried by military commission, and subsequently sentenced to death. 187
Shortly before he was to be hung, Milligan petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. His petition
eventually reached the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case. On April 3, 1866, well
after the end of the Civil War, the Supreme Court ruled that President Lincoln ―had acted
unconstitutionally in instituting trial by military commission during the war in areas where the
civil courts were open and functioning.‖188
In no uncertain terms, the Supreme Court condemned Lincoln‘s practice of subjecting
civilians to trials by military commission. Nevertheless, the short- and long-term effects of this
decision were minimal. In the short-term, as discussed below, trials by military commission
continued for at least the next four years, despite Ex parte Milligan. Although often cited as a
valuable moral guide to future presidents during times of war, the long-term effects of Milligan
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may be equally small given that no wartime President ―seems to have given it the slightest
thought in determining the scope and form of his martial powers.‖189
The last aspect of the crisis to consider in assessing the degree to which the restriction of
civil liberties outlasted the end of the Civil War was the government‘s program of military arrest.
Although the Habeas Corpus Act expired at the end of the crisis (April 2, 1866) and the Supreme
Court condemned trials by military commission in 1866, such trials continued in the South
during Reconstruction until 1870. From the end of the war until 1870, it is estimated that there
were 1,435 trials by military commission.190 The majority of these trials occurred between May
1, 1865 and the end of the year, while the last trials occurred in Texas and Missouri during 1869
and 1870. For the most part, these trials ―did not involve any sharply defined political or racial
issues;‖ they often served to ―[restrain] an undisciplined soldiery occupying pacified territory‖ or
to guarantee ―better justice to freedmen than they would receive at the hands of Southern
whites.‖191 Thus, trials by military commission occurred after the end of the Civil War, but their
use declined gradually as the necessity for such trials also declined. While Ex parte Milligan may
have helped to limit the use of trials by military commission, the decision did not end their
use.192
Conclusion
Like the Quasi-War, the Civil War was a conventional, non-ideological crisis of limited
duration.193 Unlike that crisis, however, the wartime restrictions that were established were
meant to advance military objectives, rather than partisan political goals. During the Civil War,
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the Lincoln administration restricted civil liberties in an overt manner, primarily by presidential
directive and through the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the imposition of martial law,
and the resultant arrest and trial of civilians by military commission. State and local governments
did not play a major role in the restriction of civil liberties. That would change significantly
during the First World War.
To a greater degree than the previous crisis, the restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties
outlasted the end of the Civil War. Just as the Red Scare ensured the maintenance of wartime
restrictions following the end of World War I, so too did Reconstruction provide new
justifications for continued repression. Despite Ex parte Milligan, in which the U.S. Supreme
Court condemned the Lincoln administration‘s use of trials by military commission where
civilian courts were open and functioning, the military arrest and trial of civilians continued for
years after the end of the Civil War. Additionally, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 and Lincoln‘s
wartime suspensions of the writ served as precedents for the enactment of similarly repressive
laws after the crisis had ended.
In some respects, the Civil War represents an anomaly to some of the broad evolutionary
changes identified in the Introduction to this treatise. In particular, the laws established during
the Quasi-War did not establish precedents or form the bases of Civil War-era legislation
restricting civil liberties. Further, the Civil War left no precedents that were applied after
Reconstruction. Although the Supreme Court was ineffectual in its efforts to check repression, at
least with regard to Ex parte Merryman and Ex parte Milligan, it did begin to assert the power of
judicial review that it had established in its 1803 decision in Marbury v. Madison.
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III. WORLD WAR I (1917-1918)
From a civil liberties perspective, the First World War is often seen as one of the worst
national crisis in American history. President Wilson‘s challenge was to drum up and to maintain
support for war. That was especially difficult as most Americans were strongly isolationist and
rejected involvement in foreign conflicts that did not directly and clearly involve American
interests. To a greater degree than in any other crisis, federal, state, and local governments
actively campaigned against dissent, with the objective of achieving support for the war. It is for
that reason that World War I has earned its reputation for restricting civil liberties.
Background of the Crisis
To understand the context in which civil liberties were restricted during World War I, it is
important to understand the events that triggered the crisis and the reaction of American
policymakers and the public to those events. In addition to providing context, to a significant
degree these aspects of the crisis explain the types of individuals whose civil liberties would be
violated most directly and seriously: those whose loyalty to the United States was most open to
challenge.
Trigger of the crisis
The First World War was the result of a number of different factors, including the
insecurities of and power rivalries between European nations; the lack of a defined process of
international arbitration; and the striking intensification of the race to develop ever more
powerful armaments and militaries over the sixty years preceding the war. However, the event
that actually precipitated war was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the
throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in June of 1914 by a small group of terrorists affiliated
with a Serbian nationalist organization, the Black Hand. Enraged, the Austro-Hungarian Empire
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almost immediately sought to punish Serbia for its involvement in the assassination. In doing so,
it sought German support for forming an alliance with Bulgaria and Turkey to take action against
the Serbs. Russia then pledged support to Serbia.194 Within the next month and a half, thanks in
large part to the ―net of interlocking and opposed understandings and mutual assistance treaties‖
among the nations of Europe, the relatively narrow crisis surrounding the Archduke‘s
assassination had degenerated into a general European war that pitted the the Allies (Britain,
France, and Russia) against the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary).195
During the early years of the war, the United States remained on the sidelines since most
Americans were isolationists and wished to avoid any entanglement in the European war.196
Isolationism was so strong in the U. S. at that time that the theme of President Woodrow
Wilson‘s 1916 reelection campaign was ―He kept us out of war.‖197 Despite a strong preference
for non-involvement, the United States eventually entered the war. The central issue that finally
precipitated this entrance was the German submarine blockade against the Allies, which began in
the early months of 1915 and resulted in the sinking of numerous American and foreign
merchant ships, with significant loss of American lives. For example, on May 7, 1915, German
submarines sank the Lusitania, which resulted in the death of 1200 passengers, including 128
Americans.
To a greater degree than other attacks, the sinking of the Lusitania enraged the American
public, provoking such hostility toward Germany that the German government subsequently
restricted the scope of it naval blockade against the Allied nations.198 Nevertheless, President
Wilson began to take steps toward preparing the country for war, although he publicly continued
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to oppose American involvement. The German policy of restricting its submarine blockade
lasted until January of 1917, at which point the German government announced that it would
resume its blockade of England and France ―in order to limit the continued shipment of
munitions and supplies to the Allies.‖199 Shortly thereafter, despite campaign promises to the
contrary and against the wishes of a great number of Americans, President Wilson sought a
declaration of war against Germany, which Congress passed on April 6.200 From that point on,
the United States was locked in one of the deadliest and most horrific wars the world had yet
seen.
Reaction to the crisis
The international events that triggered the First World War and precipitated American
involvement in that war provide the context for understanding the restriction of civil liberties
during the crisis. To understand the targets of wartime repression, it is necessary to understand
the reaction of American policymakers and the public to the war. Three aspects of that reaction
were particularly important: the development of the preparedness movement, the shift leftward
of the pacifism movement, and President Wilson‘s reaction to the crisis. These three aspects
make clear the types of individuals who continued to oppose involvement in the war even after it
was declared. Further, they demonstrated, from the beginning, the way in which dissent would be
treated. In general, as the United States grew closer to becoming involved in the war in Europe,
opposition by well-established Americans seems slowly to have lessened, leaving opposition to
the war in large part the domain of individuals or groups whose loyalty was potentially open to
question. These included pacifists, Socialists, and members of the Industrial Workers of the
World (IWW), a radical labor organization.
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As mentioned above, at the start of the war in Europe, most Americans were quite
isolationist, believing that the war did not ―implicate vital interests of the United States.‖201
Nevertheless, a movement to prepare the country for war began to develop immediately after its
outbreak and gained traction after the sinking of the Lusitania by German U-Boats in 1915.202
With strident rhetoric, the advocates of the preparedness movement, particularly those ―drawn
from the business community,‖ sought to portray the opponents of American involvement as
disloyal.203 At the time, the anti-war movement included ―large numbers of Irish- and GermanAmericans, Socialists, and other political radicals, as well as pacifists and a number of
progressives,‖ who ―feared that shifting national priorities toward involvement in a foreign war
would inevitably result in downgrading further‖ progressive social, political and economic
reforms.204 As the United States slowly moved closer to war, such inflammatory rhetoric by the
preparedness movement increasingly began to take hold, setting the tone for the repression of
dissent that followed U.S. entry into the war.205
Equally important, the pacifism movement shifted dramatically leftward during the years
before the United States entered the European war. Upon the outbreak of the war, significant
players in the traditional pacifist movement, including the American Peace Society and the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, shifted 180 degrees from the position that all war
was destructive to the position that American involvement in the European war would ultimately
be beneficial. For these groups, ―Prussianism was the enemy of peace and until it was destroyed
by military might, hopes for a truly peaceful world were remote, if not nonexistent.‖206 That
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ideological shift fractured and effectively transformed the pacifism movement. Thereafter, the
anti-war pacifist coalition was much more liberal. It consisted of ―social workers, publicists,
activist peace crusaders, feminists, social-gospel clergymen and church leaders, with a scattering,
here and there, of antiwar Socialists.‖207 Thus, the new anti-war pacifism movement was made
up of individuals and groups who could more easily be attacked as disloyal and, therefore, not
truly American.208
In addition to the development of the preparedness movement and the shift leftward of
the pacifism movement, President Wilson‘s reaction to the crisis also shaped the form of the antiwar movement and the way in which its supporters would be treated. The President appears to
have been legitimately opposed to war throughout the early years of the conflict in Europe. After
the sinking of the Lusitania, however, his stance toward the war began to shift.209 As early as
mid-1915, Wilson began to support the preparedness movement. For example, in his State of the
Union address in that year, he stressed the importance of rearmament and the need to suppress
disloyalty. Further, he began to more broadly foster a ―national defense mentality.‖210
Although, at least publicly, President Wilson continued to oppose American involvement
in the war in Europe, over the next two years, he seems to have sought to ensure that the United
States would be prepared to enter the war and that his administration would be politically able to
do so if such involvement became necessary. His administration appears to have managed
political opposition in three ways throughout the period. First, the President worked to placate
progressives, many of whom opposed involvement in the war, by tying his support for the
preparedness movement and his openness to the possibility of war ―to an avowed commitment to
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ongoing liberal reform.‖211 Second, he undermined radical opponents of the war by savaging
them as disloyal. For example, in his 1915 State of the Union address, Wilson told Congress:
The gravest threats against our national peace and safety have been uttered within our
borders. There are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born under other flags,
but welcomed by our generous nationalization laws…who had poured the poison of
disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life.212
Finally, shortly before Wilson sought a declaration of war, his administration formed an informal
compact with the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in which ―the AFL agreed to support the
government‘s war policies, the government agreed to support pro-AFL labor policies, and both
joined together ‗into an alliance to crush radical labor groups such as the IWW.‘‖213 Thus, in its
efforts to build support for the war, the Wilson administration set the tone for repression and
helped to define the groups of individuals who would later become the targets of that repression.
Restriction of Civil Liberties
During the First World War, Americans‘ civil liberties were restricted severely
throughout all levels of government and through every available avenue of repression discussed
in this treatise. As the reaction of American policymakers and the public to the outbreak of war
and the eventuality of American involvement suggests, the targets of wartime repression were
primarily those individuals who, for reasons of ethnic identity or political or religious ideology,
were not yet fully accepted into American society. These points were evident in four key aspects
of the crisis: restrictions enacted at the federal level, restrictions enacted at the state and local
levels, the tone set by the executive branch toward civil liberties, and the deference of the Court
to the executive and legislative branches.

211

Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States, pp. 61-62.
Stone, Perilous Times, p. 144; Harry Scheiber, The Wilson Administration and Civil Liberties, 1917-1921
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 6, qtd. in Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, p. 100.
213
Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, pp. 121-125.
212

73
Federal restrictions
For a number of reasons, but especially because President Wilson needed to build and
maintain support for American intervention in Europe and because he could tolerate little
criticism of his policies, the First World War represented a particular low point in the history of
this country in terms of the restriction of civil liberties by the federal government. The harsh
repression of dissent by the Wilson administration was evident in four aspects of the federal
government‘s response to the crisis—repressive legislation enacted by Congress, presidential
directives relating to civil liberties, federal efforts to control political discourse, and efforts on
behalf of the federal government to monitor and suppress political dissidents.
Legislation
During the First World War, the federal government sought to suppress dissent on behalf
of those deemed potentially subversive, as policymakers feared that such criticism would make it
politically impossible to engage in the war. The enactment of repressive legislation was
instrumental in making the suppression of dissent possible. In contrast to the Quasi-War and the
Civil War, the enactment of repressive legislation at the federal level began even before
Congress passed President Wilson‘s resolution for war, with the passing of two relevant pieces
of legislation. The first was an immigration law passed by Congress on February 5, 1917. In
addition to subjecting aliens entering the country to a literacy test, it made it easier to deport
foreigners for obnoxious political beliefs and affiliations. To do so, the law eliminated ―the time
limit for the deportation of aliens for political reasons after their entry into the U.S‖ and
criminalized ―advocacy of ‗unlawful destruction of property.‘‖214 The latter provision was meant
specifically to enable suppression of the IWW. The second, passed on February 14, 1917, made
threats against the President illegal. Although seemingly quite innocuous, the law was used
214
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throughout the crisis to prosecute at least sixty individuals for reasons that were often ―clearly
ludicrous.‖215
But the bulk of repressive legislation passed by Congress was enacted after President
Wilson‘s declaration of war against Germany. Four pieces of legislation were particularly
important; the Espionage Act, the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Anarchist Exclusion Act, and
the Sedition Act.
The first piece of legislation was the Espionage Act, which became law on June 15, 1917.
Although primarily concerned with preventing espionage and protecting the military, the law
made it illegal during wartime:
For any person (a) willfully to ‗make or convey false reports or false statements with
intent to interfere‘ with the military success of the United States or ‗to promote the
success of its enemies‘; (b) willfully to ‗cause or attempt to cause insubordination,
disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States‘;
or (c) willfully to ‗obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States.‘216
Punishable by up to twenty years imprisonment and a fine of 10,000 dollars, the law also
directed the Postmaster General to exclude from the mails any publications that advocated
―treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the United States.‖217 In other words,
the Espionage Act made possible the prosecution of individuals for speech or writings potentially
injurious to the war effort and authorized the exclusion of subversive material from the mails. In
some respects, the law was similar to the type of legislation that might have been drafted during
the Civil War had not the Lincoln administration simply issued presidential directives to ensure
mobilization of the military.
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In comparison with legislation that would come later, the Espionage Act of 1917 was
relatively narrowly tailored. During debate over the bill, Congress made certain emendations that
mitigated or removed its more repressive provisions. For example, the House defeated a
provision relating to press censorship that would have made it illegal to publish information the
President had deemed potentially valuable to the enemy. In addition, Congress narrowed
language in two other provisions that related to inciting disaffection with the military and the
Postmaster General‘s authority to exclude publications from the mails. Given these emendations,
it is clear that Congress originally intended the Espionage Act to have a more limited focus than
its actual use during wartime would suggest.218
Enacted not long after the Espionage Act, the Trading with the Enemy Act was the
second major piece of legislation passed by Congress once the United States became involved in
the war in Europe. Among other things, that legislation, which became law on October 6, 1917,
required all foreign language newspapers, except those exempted directly by the President, ―to
submit to the Post Office for approval, before mailing, translations of all material concerning the
government and the war.‖219
The third piece of legislation enacted after Congress passed President Wilson‘s resolution
for war against Germany was the Anarchist Exclusion Act (known alternatively as the
Immigration Act or the Alien Act). The Anarchist Exclusion Act, which was passed by Congress
on October 16, 1918, ―extended the concept of guilt by association‖ by authorizing the
deportation of ―all persons who were members of organizations which advocated unlawful
destruction of property, or the forceful or violent overthrow of the government—a provision
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aimed squarely at the IWW.‖220 Further, the law made the deportation process ―administrative in
nature,‖ meaning that potential deportees no longer received a hearing to determine their guilt.221
They also lost the right of appeal.222
The last, and most egregious, piece of legislation passed by Congress after the U.S.
entered the First World War was the Sedition Act of 1918, which was actually an amendment to
the Espionage Act of 1917. In legal and practical effect, the Sedition Act criminalized a wide
range of dissent from the policies of the United States government. For example, the law made it
illegal during wartime:
To willfully utter, print, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language
about the form of government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United
States, or the military or naval forces of the United States, or the flag of the United States,
or the uniform of the Army or Navy of the United States.223
As a further example of the overtly repressive nature of the bill, the Espionage Act made it a
crime for any person ―by word or act to support or favor the cause of any country with which the
United States is at war or by word or act to oppose the cause of the United States.‖224
In criminalizing criticism of the government, the Sedition Act of 1918 mirrored closely
the Sedition Act passed by Congress in 1798 during the Quasi-War, which was widely and
roundly condemned after the end of that crisis. However, one major difference separates the two
pieces of legislation. Whereas the Sedition Act of 1798 provided truth as a defense of one‘s
speech and required the government to prove the intent of the speaker to cause harm, the
Sedition Act of 1918 contained neither of these tests.225 Therefore, under its provisions, an
individual could be arrested if his or her speech or writing could be construed as having done
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some type of harm to the United States government, regardless of whether the criticism was true
and regardless of whether he or she intended to cause harm.
Presidential directives
Complementing the repressive legislation enacted at the federal level, President Wilson
issued at least two major presidential proclamations and executive orders affecting Americans‘
civil liberties. First, on April 6, 1917, in the proclamation in which he declared war against
Germany, President Wilson, acting pursuant to the authority granted to him during wartime by
the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, established a number of regulations governing the treatment of
enemy aliens for the duration of the conflict. The President‘s proclamation ―made all aliens
subject to summary arrest‖ for offenses ranging from owning a firearm or other ―implement of
war‖ to being within a half mile ―of any Federal, or State fort, camp, arsenal, aircraft station,
Government or naval vessel, navy yard, factory, or workshop for the manufacture of munitions
of war or of any products for the use of the army or navy.‖226 One of the more repressive
regulations established forbid enemy aliens to ―write, print, or publish any attack or threats‖
against the federal, state, and local governments of the United States.‖227
Later, in the fall of 1917, President Wilson issued another presidential proclamation that
modified and supplemented the regulations established in April. Wilson‘s second proclamation,
which, like the first, concerned ―all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of Germany‖ above
the age of fourteen and residing within the United States, tightened the travel restrictions already
imposed on enemy aliens, empowered the Attorney General to tighten such restrictions further as
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he deemed necessary, and required all enemy aliens to register with the government. 228 The
proclamation stipulated that ―an alien enemy shall not change his place of abode or occupation or
otherwise travel or move from place to place without full compliance with any such regulations
as the Attorney General of the United States‖ might authorize.229 As an example of the repressive
nature of the proclamation, the sixteenth regulation barred enemy aliens from ―ascend[ing] into
the air in any airplane, balloon, airship, or flying machine.‖230 While these proclamations may
have been intended to protect and to ensure the success of the U.S. military, they were excessive
and represented an unnecessary infringement on individual liberty (although they did not apply
to American citizens).
Efforts to control political discourse
In addition to repressive legislation and presidential directives regarding enemy aliens,
the Wilson administrations‘ attempted to control political discourse both by censoring the press
and by flooding the marketplace of ideas with government propaganda. During World War I, the
Wilson administration actively censored the press using the Espionage Act and the Trading with
the Enemy Act, both of which were passed within the first six months of American involvement
in the war in Europe. Throughout the crisis, Postmaster General Albert Burleson used the
―nonmailability‖ provision of the Espionage Act of 1917, which authorized him to exclude
publications from the mail that advocated ―treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law
of the United States,‖ to censor a wide range of publications that he deemed subversive.231
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Although the Congress that passed the Espionage Act did not intend it to be used to censor the
press, or at least sought to limit the extent to which it could be used to do so (as evidenced by the
significant emendations made to the bill), Burleson chose to narrowly define the range of
acceptable speech.232
By the end of the war, he had applied the Espionage Act to at least 75 different
newspapers. The most notable targets of Burleson‘s program of censorship were anarchist,
communist, black, and Irish publications; however, the Postmaster General also applied the
Espionage Act to a range of other publications. These included the Jeffersonian (whose editor
intended to challenge the constitutionality of conscription), the Rebel (―which, coincidentally,
had exposed the eviction of tenant farmers and their replacement by unpaid tenant labor in land
Burleson owned‖)233, and pamphlets produced by the National Civil Liberties Bureau (NCLB)
that ―[deplored] mob violence and [explained] the beliefs of conscientious objectors.‖234
In contrast to the Espionage Act, which was used to censor a variety of publications, the
Trading with the Enemy Act was directed more narrowly against German-language newspapers.
It contained a provision stipulating that all foreign language newspapers, except those exempted
by the President, must submit to the Post Office translations of material to be published before
that material could be sent through the mails. That legislation, coupled with widespread public
hostility by Americans to Germany, not only forced German-language newspapers to adopt a
deferential tone toward the government but resulted in the closing, by the end of 1919, of
roughly forty-seven percent of the German newspapers operating in the United States. The
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ultimate damage was even more severe in that the circulation of the remaining publications
dropped by roughly two-thirds.235
Complementing its efforts to censor the press, the Wilson administration sought to flood
the marketplace of ideas with government propaganda through the creation of the Committee on
Public Information (CPI) on April 14, 1917.236 A unique invention in the history of wartime
repression, the CPI worked to cultivate ―public support and patriotic fervor‖ for involvement in
the war in Europe by producing and widely disseminating ―pamphlets, news releases, speeches,
newspaper editorials, political cartoons, and even motion pictures.‖237 Throughout the crisis, the
CPI, under the direction of publicist George Creel, ―concentrated on two main themes: feeding
hatred of the enemy and promoting loyalty to the nation.‖238 With these goals in mind, the
Committee on Public Information attacked all things German, producing war movies that
―depicted unspeakable German atrocities‖ and writings that ―included vitriolic attacks on
German culture, false charges that Germans and German Americans were orchestrating criticism
of the Wilson administration and incendiary attacks on the loyalty of those who questioned the
war.‖239 For the CPI, these vicious attacks were extremely successful as they fed into and spurred
nativist sentiments on behalf of the American people and ―unleashed new demands for
conformity and blind allegiance.‖240
The activities of the Committee on Public Information during the First World War were
not unconstitutional and there are certainly those who would not consider its actions a violation
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of Americans‘ civil liberties. Nevertheless, as Geoffrey Stone points out, in Perilous Times, there
is certainly some danger to free speech posed by excessive government propagandizing. The
question of whether the Committee on Public Information crossed the ―line between responsible
advocacy and irresponsible manipulation of public opinion‖ is certainly arguable.241
Nevertheless, it is clear, at the very least, that the CPI was heavy-handed in its efforts to convey
to the American people the position of the United States Government. For example, while Frank
Barnette found that the CPI was effective, he wrote that ―for modern tastes [it] was too zealous,
too indifferent to the nuances of the first amendment, and too prone to overstate (even fabricate)
the ‗Atrocities of the Hun.‘‖242
Efforts to monitor and suppress dissidents
Finally, the federal government attempted to monitor and suppress political dissent
through direct prosecution, surveillance, deportation, denaturalization, and loyalty laws and by
encouraging the formation of quasi-vigilante patriotic groups such as the American Protective
League (APL).
As was the case during the Quasi-War, the prosecution of political dissidents by the
Wilson administration was heavily political in nature, with most individuals arrested for voicing
opposition to the war rather than for committing overt acts, such as demonstrations. By the end
of the war, at least 2,100 people had been indicted under the Espionage and Sedition Acts, with
over 1000 of those arrested subsequently convicted, and at least 100 of these eventually
―sentenced to jail terms of ten years or more.‖243
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Wartime prosecutions were directly chiefly at three groups—the Industrial Workers of
the World (IWW), the Socialist Party of America (SPA), and, to a lesser degree, the People‘s
Council of America for Peace and Democracy. Throughout the crisis, the federal government
sought ―to smash‖ the radical IWW for its ―unwilling[ness] to accept the progressives‘ dream of
class harmony‖ through an intensive campaign of repression.244 Efforts to suppress the group
included strike-breaking by federal troops, an investigation of the IWW by the Justice
Department, and raids on the IWW‘s Chicago headquarters and union halls throughout the
country, as well as raids on the homes of members of the IWW (commonly known as
―Wobblies‖). The first major group of indictments against the IWW occurred in September of
1917, when over 166 Wobblies were indicted by a federal grand jury on the grounds that the
organization‘s strikes constituted ―a criminal conspiracy to interfere with the war effort and that
IWW members had conspired to obstruct the draft and violate the espionage act.‖245 Subsequent
to that indictment, another 137 members of the IWW were arrested under the Espionage and
Sedition Acts in Kansas, Oklahoma, California, and Nebraska, with arrests continuing
throughout the war. By the time the First World War drew to a close, ―virtually all persons who
had played any important part in IWW affairs had been arrested.‖246
In addition to the IWW, the Socialist Party of America (SPA) was also a major target of
federal repression throughout the crisis. As was the case with the IWW, the war provided an
excuse for the Wilson administration to lash out at the political ideology represented by the
Socialist Party. In advance of the congressional election of 1918, federal agents raided the SPA‘s
Chicago headquarters and began to arrest leading Socialists, including an SPA candidate for
Congress, an SPA gubernatorial candidate in New Jersey, an SPA mayoral candidate in
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Cleveland, and three SPA leaders in Ohio. After ―tremendous socialist gains‖ in the 1918
election, the federal campaign against the SPA became significantly more severe, with the
federal government returning indictments for sedition ―against virtually every major SPA
leader,‖ including Eugene Debs.247
The last major group targeted by the federal government during the First World War was
the People‘s Council of America for Peace and Democracy, which, as its name suggests,
opposed American involvement in the war in Europe. Although a major target of repression, the
People‘s Council was a lesser focus of the government‘s campaign than either the IWW or the
SPA. During the crisis, activities on behalf of the federal government to repress the People‘s
Council included an investigation of its activities by the Justice Department, a raid of its
headquarters by federal agents, and the scattered prosecution of individuals who spoke at its
meetings or distributed its propaganda.248
The government‘s program of prosecuting dissent was marked, throughout the crisis, by
the inability of ―high-ranking federal officials‖ to control their subordinates. Thus, Attorney
General Thomas Gregory occasionally discovered that agents in his own department had
launched raids of dissident groups on their own initiative, as was the case in September of 1918,
when ―Justice Department agents acting without Gregory‘s approval sacked the offices of the
[National Civil Liberties Bureau].‖ The inability of federal authorities to control lower-ranking
officials was perhaps best demonstrated by the treatment of conscientious objectors (CO‘s).
Despite the fact that Secretary of the Department of War, Newton Baker, wished to treat CO‘s
with leniency, CO‘s, who were interned in military camps for the duration of the war, were
subjected to extremely harsh treatment. CO‘s were ―severely beaten, placed in solitary
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confinement, handcuffed for hours to cell bars, fed only bread and water, pricked with bayonets
and/or immersed head first in the filth of camp latrines.‖249 The treatment of conscientious
objectors was so harsh that by the end of the war only 3,989 of the 20,873 CO‘s interned
―refused to accept any kind of military duty.‖250
Complementing its efforts to suppress dissent by prosecuting individuals under the
Espionage and Sedition Acts, the Wilson administration also ordered the organized surveillance
of enemy aliens and dissident political groups for the first time in the history of American
national crises. In the months before President Wilson sought from Congress a declaration of war
against Germany, the Justice Department ordered the creation of custodial detention lists, lists of
aliens ―to be arrested immediately in the event that war was declared,‖ and urged ―local police
chiefs and federal marshals‖ to keep tabs on enemy aliens residing within their jurisdiction.251
Later, after war was declared, the Wilson administration massively expanded the strength and
scope of the federal internal security agencies. For example, the military intelligence agencies
expanded in size from two officers in 1917 to thirteen hundred officers and civilian employees
over the course of the war. After their expansion and throughout the crisis, the military
intelligence agencies engaged in the unprecedented surveillance of a wide range of groups
considered to be subversive, such as the IWW, the SPA, and the NCLB.252
The Wilson administration also engaged in an extensive campaign to deport and
denaturalize enemy aliens and political dissidents. In its campaign to deport subversive aliens,
the Wilson administration applied two pieces of immigration legislation that resulted from
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mounting nativist sentiment and the perceived need to suppress political ideologies advocating
for (or even leaning toward) anarchism and communism, such as the IWW.
The first piece of legislation, entitled ―Regulating Immigration of Aliens to, and
Residence of Aliens in, the United States‖ (discussed earlier) was an immigration law passed
months before the President‘s declaration of war against Germany. It subjected aliens entering
the United States to a literacy test and made it easier to deport foreigners for political reasons.253
The second was the Anarchist Exclusion Act of 1918, which made it even easier to deport
foreigners based on their political beliefs and affiliations by authorizing the deportation of aliens
enrolled in groups that advocated the illegal destruction of property or the overthrow of
government. Further, to achieve the same end, the law eliminated the judicial aspect of the
deportation process, thereby removing the potential deportee‘s right to a hearing and an
appeal.254 By the end of the war, 687 aliens had been arrested and 60 deported pursuant to these
two laws. Of the 687 arrested, 162 aliens had their orders cancelled, while another 88 people
awaited deportation by November of 1918.255
Although much less frequent, there were also instances during the war when the federal
government attempted to denaturalize naturalized American citizens by arguing that these
individuals had not been sincerely attached to the principles enshrined in the United States
Constitution at the time of their naturalization. For example, a German immigrant had his
citizenship revoked on the grounds that his refusal to contribute to the Red Cross and the YMCA
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for political reasons (he believed that to do so would ―harm his native land‖) demonstrated that
he had had ―a mental reservation‖ about becoming an American when he renounced his German
citizenship thirty-five years earlier.256
On top of efforts to monitor and suppress dissent by prosecuting, surveilling, and
deporting or denaturalizing those deemed to be subversive, the Wilson administration was also
responsible for instituting a loyalty program designed to filter out and block ―disloyal‖
individuals from employment with the federal government. On April 7, 1917, the day after he
declared war against Germany, President Wilson ordered the creation of a loyalty program to
remove any federal employee deemed harmful to the public welfare because of their ―conduct,
sympathies or utterances, or because of other reasons growing out of the war.‖257 Further, he
authorized the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to refuse employment applications from disloyal
individuals. That loyalty program resulted in frequent dismissal of federal employees throughout
the crisis and refusal by the CSC to accept the employment applications of nearly 900 people.258
One last aspect of the Wilson administration‘s wartime efforts to monitor and suppress
dissent, which was, at the time, unique in the history of American national crises, was its role in
encouraging the creation and supporting the activities of civic organizations ―dedicated to
informing the authorities of possible disloyalty.‖259 Groups of that type that were formed during
the war included the American Protective League, the ―Knights of Liberty, the Boy Spies of
America, the Sedition Slammers, and the Terrible Threateners.‖260 Although these organizations
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were created to inform the authorities of disloyalty, their activities often stretched far beyond that
relatively limited mandate, verging on vigilantism.
The largest, most powerful, and most recognized of these civic groups was the American
Protective League (APL), which was endorsed by the Department of Justice.
The official purpose of the APL…was to help the government with such matters as food
rationing and putting the conscription machinery into operation, along with specific
intelligence operations such as investigating the loyalty of soldiers and governmental
personnel and…investigating the loyalty of Americans who wished to leave the country
for any reason.261
Throughout the war, the APL met these objectives through a variety of illegal practices that the
Justice Department tacitly condoned for much of the crisis. In differing degrees, APL agents
made arrests, ―instigated attacks on radicals and disrupted meetings of unionists and socialists,‖
―infiltrated radical organizations,‖ and even ―burglarized, wiretapped, bugged, and opened the
mail‖ of radical groups.262
Today, the American Protective League is perhaps best remembered for its participation
in slacker raids, in which federal, state, and local authorities indiscriminately interrogated
American males in an effort to catch draft dodgers. As an example of the excesses and the
general inefficiency of these raids, Goldstein discusses a raid in Chicago that lasted three days
and resulted in the interrogation of 150,000 people. Of these, 16,000 were arrested, with 1,465
found guilty of dodging the draft either by failing to register or by deserting the military. Thus, in
an intensive three-day raid, less than one percent of the 150,000 people interrogated were found
guilty of evading the draft. By the end of the war, 40,000 draft dodgers had been arrested in the
course of slacker raids led or assisted by the APL. If a similar rate of arrests to interrogations
held stead, roughly 400,000 people were interrogated for desertion during the war. Despite its
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excesses, Attorney General Gregory did not ―impose even minimal controls on APL activity
until late 1918.‖263
State and local restrictions
During the First World War, the restriction of civil liberties by the federal government
was mirrored by state and local governments to a fairly large extent. State and local governments
enacted and implemented legislation to repress dissent, created patriotic anti-radical
organizations known as Councils of Defense, and, in some instances, tacitly condoned mob
violence against individuals deemed subversive. The first major state or local law passed to
suppress dissent was a criminal syndicalism law enacted in Idaho on March 14, 1917, less than a
month before President Wilson declared war against Germany. The law followed strong IWW
growth in the Idaho lumber industry. It made it illegal to advocate, or to be a member of a group
advocating, ―crime, sabotage, violence or other unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political ends.‖264
After the United States became involved in the war in Europe, more state and local
governments began to pass repressive legislation. By the end of 1918, ―seven states and
territories‖ had enacted criminal syndicalism or sedition laws and eleven states had enacted laws
barring displays of opposition to the war that ―rang[ed] from speaking against the war to
attempting to persuade people not to work in war-related industries and not to enlist in the
army.‖265 At the local level, a number of cities passed legislation that outlawed sedition, banned
the display of the red flag, made criminal syndicalism a punishable offense, and restricted, or in
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some cases forbade, public assembly. These laws were particularly concentrated in the West,
where the IWW was strongest.266
The number of people arrested during wartime pursuant to these laws is unclear.
However, the arrest records of Montana and Idaho provide insight into the scope of their
application. In Montana, laws enacted at the state and local level against criminal syndicalism
and sedition resulted in the arrest of 134 people and 52 convictions. In Idaho, the criminal
syndicalism law enacted in 1917 (discussed above) resulted in over 200 arrests and 31
convictions.267 Although the records of Montana and Idaho may not be representative given the
strength of the IWW in those states, they demonstrated the willingness of state and local
governments to punish dissent.
While the enactment of legislation designed to repress dissent represented the most
blatant form of repression committed by state and local governments, the Councils of Defense
were the largest and most effective instruments of repression at that level. Authorized by the
governor of each state, and in some cases given broad authority by state legislatures, the state
and local Councils of Defense represented ―a network of officially sponsored patriotic
organizations‖ with wide-ranging activities, often bordering on repression.268 For example,
Councils of Defense in Minnesota, Iowa, and Wisconsin advocated the expulsion of Wisconsin
Senator Robert La Follete from the U.S. Senate. In Fairview, Oklahoma, the local Council of
Defense sold the car of a man who had not bought enough war bonds and then gave him ―thirty
days to either claim the bonds or see them given to the Red Cross.‖269 In many cases, state and
local Councils of Defense specifically sought to suppress certain groups or political ideologies,
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such as the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and the Non-Partisan League (NPL), a
radical farmer‘s organization that leaned toward socialism. For example, the state Council of
Defense in Minnesota ―organized a private military force of fifty thousand men who led a
vigilante campaign against Wobblies and other non-conformists,‖ while the state council of
North Dakota ―virtually outlawed strikes and IWW organizational activity.‖270
Aside from passing and applying legislation meant to suppress dissent, and creating
repressive Councils of Defense, state and local governments were also responsible, for tacitly
supporting mob violence against subversives. According to records from the National Civil
Liberties Bureau, there were 164 incidents of mob violence against political dissidents from
April 1917 to April 1919. The most frequent targets of violent attacks were German-Americans,
members of the IWW, the SPA, the People‘s Council, and the NPL. Although not all of these
incidents of violence constituted state or local repression, there were many incidents in which
local authorities ―either participated or stood by while violence occurred.‖271
Executive tone toward civil liberties
In addition to repression at the federal, state, and local levels, the third facet of the crisis
that should be considered in assessing the degree to which Americans‘ civil liberties were
restricted during the First World War, is the tone set by the executive branch with regard to the
protection of civil liberties. While the restriction of civil liberties by federal, state, and local
governments makes clear the nature of repression during the crisis, the tone set by the executive
suggests more broadly the degree of deference accorded Americans‘ civil liberties. This tone
determines to a large degree the willingness of policymakers throughout the federal government
to respect the constitutional rights of dissidents. Most broadly, the Wilson administration set the
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tone for repression in that it built and maintained support for the war by attacking foreigners and
political dissidents as disloyal and potentially injurious to the cause of the United States.
In general, President Wilson was none too concerned with the protection of Americans‘
civil liberties. Throughout the crisis, he sought to ―squelch disharmony that might impede his
mission of making ‗the world safe for democracy‘‖ and consistently suppressed concern for civil
liberties with ―invocations of patriotism and accusations of disloyalty.‖272 Although he might not
have anticipated the effect of his words, his efforts to silence dissent ―fed the natural fears of a
nation under stress.‖273 Wilson‘s general approach to dissent demonstrated his belief in the
subservience of protecting civil liberties to advancing broad military goals. This was evident in a
number of his actions and statements before and during the period of American involvement in
the war in Europe.
Even before he declared war against Germany in early 1917, President Wilson actively
decried dissent from the policies of his administration as injurious to the cause of the United
States. In doing so, he laid the foundation for repression to come. As early as 1915, President
Wilson stressed the need for legislation to suppress political dissidents. In his State of the Union
address of that year, he declared, ―there are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born
under other flags, but welcomed by our generous naturalization laws…who have poured the
poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life.‖274 Later, in September of 1916, he
declared that ―certain groups and combinations‖ of foreigners living within the United States had
―injected the poison of disloyalty into our most critical affairs, laid violent hands upon many of
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our industries and subjected us to the shame of divisions of sentiment and purpose in which
America was condemned and forgotten.‖275
The prospect of war became imminent in the early months of 1917 after Germany
announced that it would renew its earlier unrestricted naval campaign against commercial
shipping to the Allies. Although he seemed reluctant to enter the war (despite what his more
inflammatory rhetoric might have suggested at the time), President Wilson sought a declaration
of war against Germany. In his speech to Congress on April 2, 1917, he asserted that Germany
had ―filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of government with spies and set
criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and
without, our industries and our commerce.‖276 Disloyalty, he announced, would be crushed ―with
a firm hand of stern repression.‖277 With his speech to Congress, the President continued his
practice of using strident and inflammatory rhetoric to mute critics of his administration.
After the President committed the country to war in Europe, his administration began to
implement the laws and institutions of wartime repression, particularly the Committee on Public
Information (CPI) and the Espionage Act of 1917. These provided insight into Wilson‘s
approach to civil liberties and dissent, demonstrating some concern for civil liberties, but an even
greater concern for ensuring that his administration would be able to commit to the war
unchecked by criticism. Shortly after declaring war against Germany, President Wilson
authorized the creation of the CPI in hope that it would build ―public support and patriotic
fervor‖ for the war and ―arouse Americans to enlist, contribute money, and make the many other
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sacrifices war demands.‖278 But, in doing so, he expressed to Attorney General Gregory unease
about the effect that the organization might have in fanning hatred and intolerance.279
The president also went out of his way to advocate directly before Congress for the most
repressive provisions of legislation. As originally presented to Congress by the Attorney General,
the Espionage Act contained three provisions that were potentially injurious to Americans‘ civil
liberties. During debate over the bill, two of these provisions were modified to narrow the
language used, while the third, which would have authorized the Wilson administration to censor
the press, was removed entirely.280 Before the third provision was defeated, however, President
Wilson appeared before Congress to advocate its inclusion in the final bill, asserting that the
―authority to exercise censorship over the press…is absolutely necessary to the public safety.‖281
Although President Wilson was most responsible for laying the groundwork for
repression during the First World War, Attorney General Gregory also played a major role in
shaping the administration‘s tone toward the protection of individual liberty. In general, Gregory,
like Wilson was not overly concerned with defending the sanctity of Americans‘ civil liberties.
His approach to civil liberties and dissent was evident in a few actions taken and statements
made during the period of American involvement in the war. Most prominent among these was
his encouragement and use, throughout the crisis, of patriotic civic organizations dedicated to
suppressing disloyalty. In the first month after Wilson‘s declaration of war, Gregory encouraged
Americans ―to report their suspicions [of disloyalty] directly to the Department of Justice.‖282 In
doing so, he undoubtedly helped to fan the patriotic fervor that gave rise to voluntary patriotic
groups such as the American Protective League. Later in the crisis, he employed those groups to
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round up draft-dodgers. Despite their obvious excesses, Attorney General Gregory neglected to
even attempt to restrain their activities until late in the war.283
Gregory‘s encouragement and use of patriotic groups dedicated to suppressing dissent
most blatantly represented his lack of deference to the constitutional rights of political dissidents.
However, this lack of deference was also evident in other, more obscure actions and statements
that he made over the course of the war. For example, when Wilson expressed discomfort with
the mission of the Committee on Public Information, Gregory assured him that the Justice
Department needed the services of organizations of that type.284 Later, after the enactment of the
Espionage Act, the Attorney General complained to the American Bar Association that ―most of
the teeth which we tried to put in it were taken out.‖285 Further, in another statement reflecting
his lack of concern for civil liberties, Gregory expressed admiration for a resolution adopted by
the Bar Association of Illinois that ―declar[ed] that it would be unpatriotic and unprofessional for
a lawyer to defend an alleged draft evader.‖286
Deference of the U.S. Supreme Court
The U.S. Supreme Court‘s deference to the executive and legislative branches also
affected the degree to which Americans‘ civil liberties were restricted. The Court did not rule on
the constitutionality of wartime repression until after the end of the First World War. However,
the deference of the federal courts suggested that the U.S. Supreme Court would probably have
ruled in favor of the Wilson administration had such a case arisen. During the crisis, the federal
courts were largely ―a product of the times,‖ as most judges, with the notable exception of
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justices George Bourquin, Charles Amidon, and Learned Hand, succumbed to ―the mounting
pressure for [the] suppression‖ of dissent.287 The deference of federal court judges was, at least
in part, the result of two aspects of the wartime climate with regard to the protection of civil
liberties. First, at the time of World War I, civil liberties were not seen as universal and basic,
but, rather, solely as the province of ―respectable, law-abiding citizens.‖ Second, at that time, a
―deeply rooted commitment to civil liberties within the legal profession‖ had not yet evolved.288
Return to “Normal”
The restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties during the First World War should have
ended roughly with the signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918, as the end of the crisis
meant that the Wilson administration no longer needed to suppress dissent. At the same time,
policymakers in federal, state, and local governments could no longer exploit the crisis to destroy
objectionable political ideologies. This did not occur, however, because the Red Scare occurred
shortly after the cessation of hostilities in Europe. Although the balance between civil liberties
and national security had begun to shift back to a more normal state in the months after the
signing of the armistice, the Red Scare fostered new pressures for repression. These pressures
were realized in part because of the tone set during wartime toward civil liberties, as well as the
laws and institutions of repression created during the war. Like the First World War, the new
crisis, which lasted from early 1919 to mid-1920, left a swath of destruction across the social and
political landscape of the United States. Only when it began to decline did Americans begin to
see a return to ―normal.‖ Thus, the Red Scare effectively extended by at least two years the
duration of wartime restrictions on Americans‘ civil liberties.
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End of the crisis
The arrival of American soldiers on European fields in 1917 had little impact initially on
the balance between the Allied and Central Powers. However, as the war progressed, the
accretion of American troops (three million soldiers by 1918 and almost four million by war‘s
end) eventually helped to shift momentum to the Allies.289 The balance shifted in the middle to
late 1918, not only as a result of the buildup of American troops, but also a result of the
unsuccessful German spring offensive, a successful French counter-offensive, and a series of
successful Allied offensives.290 With the armistice in November, 1918, fighting on the western
front between the Allied nations and Germany ended. Nevertheless, fighting continued in other
areas of Europe, as ―the defeat and collapse of three great empires created conditions of anarchy
and revolution in their former territories.‖291
Although the First World War effectively ended when the armistice was signed, the war
was not officially over until the Paris Peace Conference in June of 1919, which produced five
separate peace treaties (with Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire)
and created President Wilson‘s League of Nations. Without a doubt, the most important of these
agreements was the Treaty of Versailles, which was signed on June 28, 1919 (exactly five years
after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand). Although it could have been more
punitive, the treaty punished Germany by disarming its military, seizing portions of its territory,
subjecting it to commercial and economic restrictions, and requiring the country to pay
reparations to the Allies. In doing so, it helped to create the conditions that would later lead to
the ascendance of Adolf Hitler and the outbreak of another devastating European war. Beyond
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the Treaty of Versailles, the Paris Peace Conference was generally unsuccessful, at least in the
long term, in that it failed to address sources of tension that had originally led to the war‘s
outbreak.292 Nevertheless, with the signing of the armistice in November of 1918 and the Paris
Peace Conference in June of 1919, the First World War came to its end. The war had:
Ended the lives of ten million human beings, tortured the emotional lives of millions
more, destroyed the benevolent and optimistic culture of the European continent and
left…a legacy of political rancor and racial hatred so intense that no explanation of the
causes of the Second World War can stand without reference to those roots.293
Duration of restrictions
To a greater degree than in either the Quasi-War or the Civil War, the restriction of
Americans‘ civil liberties during the First World War outlasted the end of the crisis. It is difficult
to discuss the duration of these restrictions, as the Red Scare followed so closely on the heels of
the end of the war in Europe, with its roots stretching to the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in
1917 and even earlier to preexisting popular suspicion of the labor movement. Repression during
the Red Scare was partly the result of the tone set toward civil liberties during wartime and was
made possible, to a large degree, by the laws and institutions of repression created during the
war.
The Red Scare, which began in early 1919 and waned in mid-1920, was the result of a
number of domestic and international factors, that included domestic turmoil, the mounting
threat of communism abroad, and a tremendous upsurge in ―radicalism and militant unionism‖
within the United States after the war. Sources of domestic turmoil in the year after the armistice
was signed included race riots in the summer of 1919, rampant inflation (which reduced real
income by over ten percent in 1919 alone), a large crime wave, the deadly Spanish flu epidemic,
―a brief but sharp economic recession in late 1918,‖ and a ―tremendous wave of strikes‖
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throughout the period.294 Further frustrating popular ―desire for a return to ‗normalcy‘‖ after the
war was popular fear that the Treaty of Versailles would ―[keep] the U.S. embroiled in European
affairs.‖295
In addition to domestic turmoil, the Red Scare was the product of a dramatic resurgence
of radicalism and a significant leftward shift by labor unions. After the end of the First World
War, there was a general reemergence of radicalism; ―talk of a major ‗reconstruction of
American society was commonplace and support for major and fundamental reforms was
widespread among progressives, labor, clergymen, social workers and intellectuals.‖296 In
addition, spurred on by recent immigration and aided by the fact that wartime repression was
beginning to diminish, the Socialist Party of America made strong gains between mid-1918 to
mid-1919. Undoubtedly feeding into popular fear of the communist threat, two radical left-wing
splits formed from the SPA in September of 1919—the Communist Party (CP) and the
Communist Labor Party (CLP). At the same time, the labor movement was also becoming more
radical. After the end of the war, when the ―deal‖ between the American Federation of Labor and
the United States government (mentioned in the background section of this chapter) broke down,
the AFL, hoping to retain its gains during wartime, began to become more militant. During that
period, the labor movement grew rapidly and became much more active in its efforts to better the
welfare of workers, as evidenced by the fact that there were 3600 ―strikes involving four million
workers‖ in 1919 alone.297
The last, and most crucial, factor that helped to give rise to the Red Scare of 1919-1920
was the growing threat of communism abroad. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia had already
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occurred in 1917; however, after the end of the war, ―Bolshevism seemed to be sweeping Austria
and Germany.‖298 At the same time, many European countries were in a state of turbulence and
European socialist parties ―were being driven to the extreme left.‖299
What finally sparked the beginning of the Red Scare was a series of incidents occurring
in the first half of 1919. These included the Seattle General Strike, which stirred popular fear of
―a communist revolutionary plot;‖ the May Day Riots, in which ―police and bystanders‖ attacked
―radicals who were peacefully celebrating the traditional labor holiday‖ in major cities
throughout the country; and the simultaneous bombing of ―the homes of public officials and
private businessmen‖ in eight cities on June 2, 1919, including the home of U.S. Attorney
General A. Mitchell Palmer.300 Before the June 2 bombings even occurred, state and local
governments had already begun to heavy-handedly suppress radicals. During the months
between the end of the war and these bombings, a number of state and local governments passed
criminal syndicalism laws, red flag laws, and laws directed against anarchism and sedition.
According to one estimate, cited by Goldstein, 1400 people were arrested and 300 convicted
pursuant to these laws. In addition, the New York state legislature created the Lusk Committee to
investigate ―‗seditious activities‘ in the state.‖301 The committee was similar in many respects to
the House Un-American Activities Committee created later.
The federal government did not fully begin to repress radicals until the latter half of 1919.
However, there were some scattered instances of repression before the June 2 bombings. For
example, in the first half of the year, the Secretary of Labor announced a plan to deport aliens
eligible for deportation under the 1918 immigration act. In addition, Congress reacted to fears of
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the red menace by dismantling a great deal of progressive economic legislation enacted during
the war. After June 2, members of the federal government, led by Attorney General Palmer,
began to engage in an active campaign to suppress all forms of radicalism. Congress provided
special appropriations to the Justice Department in July to prosecute radicals, and the Attorney
General created the General Intelligence Division (GID) in August, under J. Edgar Hoover, to
investigate radicalism in America. Immediately thereafter, Hoover and the GID began to collect
and catalog information on radicals and infiltrate radical organizations. The GID ―[fostered] the
Red Scare through its practice of sending out sensationalized charges against radicals to major
organs of the media.‖302 Around the same time, Military Intelligence began to resume its wartime
efforts to collect information on radicals, which had been suspended entirely in January of
1919.303
Between September and November of 1919, a number of incidents further intensified the
clamor for repression during the Red Scare: the Boston Police Strike, the Great Steel Strike, and
the Coal Strike of November. They further reinforced the popular view of ―all unions and strikes
as revolutionary conspiracies.‖304 These incidents led to the climax of the Red Scare—the Palmer
Raids. The first raids occurred on November 7, when ―federal agents raided the offices of the
Union of Russian Workers (URW) in twelve cities across the country‖ and arrested
indiscriminately, and mostly without warrants, those associated with or even ―in the vicinity of‖
the URW.305 A week later, Attorney General Palmer asked the Senate for and was granted a
sedition law applicable in peacetime. Still later, in December, 242 radical aliens, including
prominent anarchists Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman, were deported en masse. The
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surge in the repression of radicals by the federal government inspired additional repression at the
state and local level. Preceded and followed by minor raids, the ―climactic event of the Red
Scare‖ was a series of raids that occurred on January 2, 1920 in thirty cities throughout the
country.306 These raids resulted in the indiscriminate arrest of five to ten thousand alleged Alien
CLP and CP members. Thousands were freed immediately because the government lacked any
evidence of wrongdoing, while many others were prosecuted under criminal syndicalism laws.307
After the raids on January 2, the Red Scare gradually began to wane. Four factors helped
to bring about the end of the crisis. First was the growing opposition of the press, the business
community, and the public to the government‘s campaign of repression. Second, a variety of
events occurred that proved embarrassing to the government, such as the expulsion of five
socialist politicians from the New York Legislature. Third, perceptions of the threat of
international communism diminished at the same time that there was greater economic and social
tranquility at home. Fourth, most of the radical movement had been destroyed by repression at
the federal, state, and local levels.308
To a significant extent, the repression of radicalism during the Red Scare was made
possible by the restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties during the First World War, resulting in
part from the hostile tone set toward civil liberties by the Wilson administration and the laws and
institutions of wartime repression. Although the Red Scare was a distinct crisis in its own right, it
was also important in assessing the degree to which wartime restrictions outlasted the end of the
First World War and resulted in additional political repression. Three aspects were of particular
significance in assessing the durability of wartime restrictions: the longevity and legacy of
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federal legislation; the durability of the government‘s efforts to monitor and suppress political
dissidents; and the deference of the U.S. Supreme Court after the end of the crisis.
Longevity and legacy of federal legislation
The two most important pieces of civil liberties-related wartime legislation were the
Espionage and Sedition Acts of 1917 and 1918, respectively. In terms of their longevity, the
Espionage Act continues to be in effect, while the Sedition Act was repealed by Congress on
December 13, 1920, after the end of the Red Scare.309 Both of these pieces of legislation, but
particularly the Sedition Act, paved the way for other forms of repressive legislation. For
example, January, 1920, the Senate passed a sedition law applicable in peacetime. Further,
throughout 1919, a number of states passed laws against sedition.310 Thus, it is clear that
legislation enacted during the First World War restricting Americans‘ civil liberties significantly
outlasted the end of the crisis and eased the way for later similarly repressive laws.
Durability of efforts to monitor and suppress dissidents
Four factors are particularly relevant to assessing the durability of efforts on behalf of the
federal government to monitor and suppress dissidents: the prosecution of dissent; the
surveillance of radical organizations; federal efforts to deport and denaturalize; and the state of
loyalty tests after the war. A number of notable Espionage and Sedition Act prosecutions,
initiated in wartime, continued after the end of the crisis. However, hundreds of prosecutions
were abandoned in the six months after the end of the war and the federal government granted
clemency to a number of individuals already imprisoned. Further, enemy aliens imprisoned in
internment camps during the war were set free, as were a number of conscientious objectors
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imprisoned during wartime.311 In March, 1919, as Attorney General Gregory left office, to be
replaced by A. Mitchell Palmer, he recommended and Wilson approved ―the release or reduction
in sentence of two hundred prisoners then in jail‖ under the Espionage and Sedition Acts.312
Years later, in 1921 (after the end of the Red Scare), President Warren G. Harding pardoned
well-known socialist Eugene Debs (something President Wilson had refused to do before leaving
office that same year) along with twenty-four others arrested during the war. After Harding‘s
death, President Calvin Coolidge authorized the discharge of all individuals, arrested during
wartime, who remained in prison. Still later, in 1933, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
officially pardoned all those arrested and convicted for violation of the Espionage and Sedition
Acts.313
By the end of the crisis, wartime prosecutions under the Espionage and Sedition Act, as
well as the suppression of dissent through legislation and other avenues, had dealt a heavy blow
to the principal targets of repression—the IWW, the People‘s Council, the SPA, the NPL, and
the Anarchist Movement. The Industrial Workers of the World, in particular, was ―dead as an
effective factor in American society;‖ its spirit had been ―crushed, the ‗victim of the most
systematic campaign of extermination in American history.‘‖314 The SPA was not similarly
crushed: it was ―severely weakened and its geographical and national composition…severely
distorted.‖315 Like the IWW, the organized anarchist movement, however, was effectively put to
rest by wartime repression, as well as by the deportation, during the Red Scare, of prominent
anarchists Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman.316
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To a greater degree than the prosecution of wartime violations of the Espionage and
Sedition Acts, the surveillance of political dissidents diminished after the end of the First World
War. In the months after the signing of the armistice in November 1918, Attorney General
Gregory ordered the American Protective League, which had wreaked so much havoc during the
war, to disband and directed the Bureau of Investigation (the predecessor of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation) to reduce its activities to pre-war levels. Around the same time, Military
Intelligence began to reduce its investigation of radicalism and, on January 24, its agents were
ordered to end their investigations. As mentioned earlier, the reduction in the surveillance of
radicalism after the end of the war lasted only a short time until fear of the communist menace
restored the perceived need to monitor political dissidents. In 1924, well after the end of the First
World War and the Red Scare, Attorney General Harlan Stone ordered the Bureau of
Investigation to end its practice of surveilling radicals.317
As prosecutions initiated during the war were gradually being dropped and as
government surveillance of radicalism was declining, the federal government began to release
individuals, particularly members of the IWW, arrested and detained for possible deportation. By
the end of 1919, most of these persons were released. With the end of the war, the efforts on
behalf of the federal government to screen ―disloyalty‖ from the federal government were mostly
terminated, at least until the Red Scare inflamed popular fears of radicalism once more. For
example, in November and December of 1918, a Senate committee dismissed charges of
disloyalty leveled during wartime against Senate Robert La Follette.318
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Deference of the U.S. Supreme Court after the war
The last aspect of the crisis that should be considered in assessing the degree to which
wartime restrictions on Americans‘ civil liberties outlasted the end of the crisis is the deference
of the U.S. Supreme Court to the executive and legislative branches. In seven major decisions
delivered over the two years following the First World War, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in
favor of the Wilson administration‘s wartime restrictions of civil liberties and against political
dissidents. This was the result of two factors. First, in the years after the signing of the armistice,
the Court was ―in firmly conservative hands,‖ such that most justices on the Court were not
inclined to protect the liberties of ―anarchists, socialists, and other ‗radical‘ dissenters.‖319
Second, the most important cases decided by the Court relating to the restriction of civil liberties
during wartime were decided during the Red Scare. Thus, it should not be surprising that the
Court ruled in favor of the Wilson administration in each major case that came before it.320
Of the seven major decisions, the most important came in March and November of
1919—Schenck v. United States, Frohwerk v. United States, Debs v. United States, and Abrams
v. United States. In Schenck, decided in March, the Court upheld the conviction of a group of
individuals indicted for conspiring to obstruct military recruitment by distributing a pamphlet
that opposed the draft to newly drafted men. Shortly later, in Frohwerk, the Court upheld the
conviction of a copy editor of the Missouri Staats Zeitung for ―conspiring to cause disloyalty,
mutiny, and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces of the United States‖ through his role
in developing material that advocated against the war and the draft.321
In the last major civil liberties-related decision of that month, the Court ruled in Debs that
prominent socialist Eugene Debs was guilty of violating the Espionage Act because of a speech
319
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he gave in Canton, Ohio in which, among other things, he praised three local socialists arrested
under the Espionage Act for voicing opposition to the war. The final important case relating to
wartime repression decided by the Court in 1919 was Abrams v. United States. In Abrams, the
Court upheld the conviction, under the Sedition Act, of a group of Jewish immigrants from
Russia who were arrested for distributing pamphlets that called for a general strike. After
Abrams, in 1920, the Court continued to uphold wartime convictions under the Espionage and
Sedition Acts in the cases of Schaefer v. United States, Pierce v. United States, and Gilbert v.
Minnesota.322
Conclusion
The First World War was a conventional, non-ideological conflict of limited duration
among the nations of Europe. When this war began, the United States was strongly isolationist.
To build and maintain support for the war in a reluctant nation, Wilson himself set a tone for the
restriction of civil liberties, even going before Congress to advocate the suppression of dissent.
He also employed a range of repressive practices to squelch any dissent that might undermine
support for his war policies and impede the war effort. The abuse of Americans‘ civil liberties
was inevitable if he was to achieve his goals. Throughout the crisis, the Wilson administration
and the federal government restricted civil liberties in both overt and covert ways, using nearly
every available avenue of repression, with the exception of congressional investigations. State
and local governments essentially mirrored that repression of dissent. The U.S. Supreme Court
did not have a chance to rule on the constitutionality of wartime repression during the crisis.
When it finally did, during the Red Scare, the Court ruled in favor of the President.
Following the war, both the range of methods of repression that continued to be in place
and the length of time that they were in place was greater than during any previous crises. In
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large part, the greater durability of wartime repression was the result of the Red Scare, which
provided new justifications for the restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties. That durability was
evident in the longevity of wartime legislation such as the Sedition Act and in the surveillance of
dissent. Indeed, the surveillance of radicals by the Bureau of Intelligence, which had been
formed in the early 1900s, did not end until 1924.
From an evolutionary perspective, the First World War drew on the precedents
established during past crises and set numerous precedents used in the future. Indeed, in 1918,
Congress reenacted the Sedition Act of 1798, making it more severe. Later, during World War II,
Congress reenacted the Espionage Act of 1917, making it applicable in peacetime. As in the
Civil War, the U.S. Supreme Court exercised its power of judicial review, although it upheld
wartime convictions as late as 1920. Additionally, the First World War saw the emergence of
new approaches to repression such as the surveillance of dissent, as well as the use of federal
intelligence agencies as agents of wartime repression.
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IV. WORLD WAR II (1938-1945)
The Second World War is often uniformly seen as a ―good‖ war with the restriction of
Americans‘ civil liberties during the crisis forgotten, or papered over as an anomaly. In large
part, this perception is certainly due to the unquestionable virtue of the Allied cause in going to
war against Hitler and Hirohito. In comparison with the gross excesses of the First World War
and with the major exception of the arrest and internment of 120,000 people of Japanese ancestry
living within the United States, the Second World War had a relatively mild effect on
Americans‘ civil liberties. However, these are unacceptable points of reference as the First
World War and the wartime internment of individuals of Japanese descent represent two of the
lowest points in the history of American civil liberties. In truth, although the restriction of
Americans‘ civil liberties was more modest than in the earlier crisis, wartime repression, during
and in the years before the Second World War, was substantial given the comparatively small
amount of opposition to American involvement in the war in Europe.
Background of the Crisis
The degree to which civil liberties were restricted during the Second World War can be
understood by examining the international events that triggered the crisis as well as the reaction
of American policymakers and the public to those events and to other developments at home that
fostered a climate for repression. Beyond providing context, they also help to explain variations
in the extent of repression over the course of the crisis.
Trigger of the crisis
At its simplest, the Second World War was triggered by the German invasion of Poland
on September 1, 1939, an act of aggression that convinced Britain and France that appeasement
had failed and that it was the necessary to go to war against Germany. Over the next year and a
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half, Germany overran Norway, Denmark, France, and the Low Countries. Meanwhile, the
Soviet Union, which had signed a non-aggression pact with Germany in August of 1939, began
to move into Poland and the Baltic states. On the other side of the world, in 1937, Japan had
invaded parts of China. Particularly in the years following the invasion of Poland, Japan began to
extend its influence throughout Southeast Asia as the imperiled and distracted European colonial
powers increasingly became unable to defend their holdings in the region.323
Central to the underlying causes of the Second World War was the fact that it was in
many ways a continuation of the First World War. It grew out of the punitive treaties of the Paris
Peace Conference in 1919 (especially the Treaty of Versailles). It also grew out of the failure of
the disarmament movement in the years after the end of the war, the unwillingness (or inability)
of the major powers to check the first instances of aggression by Germany, Italy, and Japan, and
the related failure of President Wilson‘s brainchild, the League of Nations.
As the rumblings of war began to sound in Europe and Asia, the United States remained
determinedly neutral. After 1938 and 1939, however, it became increasingly impossible for
American policymakers and, perhaps more importantly, the American public, to ignore the
emerging conflict.324 In 1938, German hostility toward Czechoslovakia led to the Munich
agreement, in which France and Britain appeased Hitler by giving Germany the Sudetenland (a
region of Czechoslovakia inhabited mostly by ethnic Germans). The United States government
began to increase spending on defense and to fortify holdings throughout the Caribbean, such as
the Panama Canal, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. After the devastatingly quick defeat of
Poland by Germany in 1939, Congress increased defense spending to an unprecedented level and
enacted the first peacetime draft bill in American history. In 1941, Congress enacted the Lend323
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Lease Act to loan supplies to nations that were critical to American national security (such as
Britain and, after the breakdown of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in June of 1941, the
Soviet Union). During that time, the United States and Germany increasingly began to clash; by
mid- to late-1941, both countries were effectively in a state of undeclared war.325 At the same
time, the U.S. also began to clash with Japan as the Japanese government sought to maneuver
into the position of controlling Southeast Asia. By mid-summer, the Japanese had begun to plan
for war against the United States.326
Although the U.S. was already involved in the emerging global crisis by 1940 and 1941,
strong domestic isolationist sentiment officially kept the country out of the war. The event that
finally precipitated American involvement in the crisis and ―transformed the wars in Europe and
in Asia into one gigantic global struggle,‖ was the bombing of the U.S. Pacific Fleet‘s naval
headquarters at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on December 7, 1941.327 The bombing of Pearl Harbor
effectively did for the Second World War what the sinking of the Lusitania had almost done for
the First World War—instantly galvanize the American public into a state of fervent support for
American involvement in the foreign conflict. Immediately after the bombing, President
Roosevelt declared war against Japan. Shortly later, on December 11, Germany and Italy
responded by declaring war against the United States. American involvement in the Second
World War had officially begun.328 In all, ―the war lasted nearly six years, and by the time it was
over, much of the civilized world lay in ruins, something more than thirty million people had
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been killed, great empires destroyed, and weapons of new and hitherto unimagined potential had
been unleashed upon the world.‖329
Reaction to the crisis
Despite restrictions on civil liberties during the First World War, ―a more expansive view
of free expression began to emerge‖ in its aftermath as ―Americans confronted a broad range of
divisive issues, including Prohibition, contraception, evolution, labor reform, the Sacco and
Vanzetti prosecution, and the economic and social upheaval caused by the Great Depression.‖330
Nevertheless, despite this more expansive approach to individual liberty, a climate for repression
began to emerge as early as 1937 and flowered in the years that followed, especially as
opposition to the war fell away in the months before and after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. This
climate made possible the restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties and the repression of dissent
even before the United States entered the war in December of 1941.
This general climate for repression, directed at the labor movement, liberals, and radicals,
began to develop subsequent to three events in 1937, each unrelated to the emerging global
crisis. These included President Roosevelt‘s scheme to pack the U.S. Supreme Court, the labor
strikes and violence accompanying the Little Steel Strike of 1937, and the economic recession of
the same year (which ―wiped out all of the economic gains made since 1933 and eroded FDR‘s
public image as an economic magician‖).331 In the years that followed, three other developments
helped to cement the climate for repression and to provide the impetus for restricting Americans‘
civil liberties. First, the escalation of the crisis in Europe, particularly after 1939, threatened to
entangle the United States and stimulated severe hatred of the German-American Bund, an
American Nazi organization, giving traction to efforts to repress the group. Second, the growth
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of radicalism within the U.S. (particularly the Communist Party, various fascist groups, and the
German-American Bund) combined with the simultaneous growth of anti-radical groups spurred
the climate for repression to new heights. Third, the Dies Committee (also known as the House
Un-American Activities Committee or HUAC), created in 1938, further ―fostered a repressive
climate‖ through ―continual and irresponsible charges of widespread subversion in the country at
large, and particularly within the federal government.‖332
As a climate conducive to repression emerged, the range of groups opposed to American
involvement in the emerging global war narrowed during the months before and after the
bombing of Pearl Harbor. The first major event that diminished the amount of opposition to
involvement in the Second World War was the breakdown of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression
Pact in June of 1941, which caused the American Communist Party to embrace President
Roosevelt‘s policies with regard to the war (because ―Russia and the U.S. were now allies‖).333
The second major event, the bombing of Pearl Harbor, galvanized Americans in support of
President Roosevelt and his administration‘s war policies.334 Third, upon the outbreak of war, the
American Federation of Labor (AFL), the Congress on Industrial Organizations (CIO) and the
federal government agreed ―to refrain from striking‖ in exchange for government enforcement of
―the ‗maintenance of membership‘ principle,‖ which ensured the strength of the union movement
by making it difficult for union members to leave their union.335
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Restriction of Civil Liberties
During the Second World War, Americans‘ civil liberties were restricted by all levels of
government and using every available means of repression. In comparison with World War I, the
restriction of civil liberties was relatively modest. However, as Goldstein points out, in Political
Repression in Modern America, ―in relation to the amount of dissent voiced,‖ the repression of
dissent during the Second World War was probably worse than in any other major national
military crisis, ―with the possible exception of the 1950-54 period‖ during the Cold War.336 That
said, it should also be noted that the Second World War was the first major national military
crisis in American history in which the U.S. Supreme Court, during wartime, ruled in favor of
political dissidents and against the claims of the President and his administration.
The restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties fell into two distinct periods—from 19381941 and from 1941-1945. The first period spans the time from the creation of the Dies
Committee in May of 1938 to the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The second
period covers wartime, from December 7, 1941 to the official surrender of the Japanese on
September 2, 1945.337 These restrictions were achieved through four primary mechanisms:
restrictions enacted by the federal government, restrictions enacted by state and local
governments, the tone toward the protection of civil liberties set by the executive branch, and the
deference of the U.S. Supreme Court to the executive and legislative branches.
Federal restrictions
In general, Americans‘ civil liberties were restricted less severely at the state and local
level during World War II than during World War I. In part, that was the result of the Roosevelt
administrations‘ post-1940 efforts to centralize the repression of dissent in the federal
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government. Consequently, the degree and nature of the federal restrictions themselves largely
determined the extent of repression during the war. Overall, civil liberties were both heavily and
broadly restricted during the Second World War in relation to the amount of dissent voiced. This
was evident in four key aspects of the federal government‘s response to the crisis—repressive
legislation enacted by Congress; presidential directives that relate to civil liberties; efforts on
behalf of the federal government to control political discourse; and federal efforts to monitor and
suppress political dissidents.
Legislation
The Second World War was unique in the history of American national military crises in
that the enactment of repressive legislation by Congress occurred almost entirely before the
United States entered the war. With only one exception, every major piece of legislation
restricting civil liberties was enacted between 1938-1941, after the establishment of the Dies
Committee and before the bombing of Pearl Harbor. During this period, Congress enacted six
major pieces of repressive legislation, as well as many other laws that contained provisions
variously banning subversives from federal employment or, in the case of one bill, placing new
restrictions on the issuance of visas.
The first two major pieces of legislation related to Americans‘ civil liberties and the
emerging global crisis—the Foreign Agents Registration Act and the Hatch Act—were enacted
prior to the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. Congress passed the first of these,
the Foreign Agents Registration Act, in June of 1938, three months after the German annexation
of Austria, one month after the creation of the Dies Committee, and three months before the
signing of the Munich agreement. This law, which was meant to protect the American public
from the potential impact of foreign propaganda, required all foreign agents to register with the
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federal government and, in doing so, to provide ―information regarding their relationship to the
foreign principal involved.‖338 Although not repressive on its face, the Post Office twisted its
provisions in late 1940 to exclude certain material from the mails.339 Two months later, in
August of 1939 and before the German invasion of Poland, Congress enacted the Hatch Act. The
Hatch Act, which generalized a repressive provision included in the Relief Appropriations Act of
June 1939 (discussed below), barred from federal employment any person belonging to a
―political party or organization [that] advocated the overthrow of our constitutional form of
government in the United States.‖340 In doing so, it sanctified ―the principle of guilt by
association‖ and made it legal to punish American citizens ―for abstract advocacy of
violence.‖341
In 1940, as Hitler gained ever-increasing control over Europe and, more broadly, as the
wars in Europe and Asia looked increasingly likely to entangle the United States, the pace of
enactment of repressive legislation increased. In 1940 alone, Congress enacted four major pieces
of repressive legislation. The first was a reenactment in March, 1940 of the Espionage Act of
1917, making it applicable in peacetime.342 As discussed in Chapter Three, the Espionage Act,
which sought primarily to prevent espionage and to protect the military, contained provisions
that made possible the prosecution of persons for speech or writing that was potentially injurious
to the war effort. It authorized the Postmaster General to exclude writings of this type from the
mails.343
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The second major law, passed in this year, was the Smith Act (also known as the Alien
Registration Act), enacted by Congress on June 28, 1940, three months after the reenactment of
the Espionage Act,. The Smith Act was ―the first peacetime sedition law in American history
since 1798;‖ it effectively made it illegal to champion efforts to overthrow or destroy the United
States government. Further, the Smith Act banned participation or membership in groups
advocating the overthrow of government, made it a crime to incite disloyalty in the military, and
stipulated that aliens could be deported on the basis of their past beliefs or affiliations. In
addition, the Smith Act (as its alternate name suggests) required all aliens to register with the
federal government.344
The third piece of repressive legislation enacted in 1940 was the Nationality Act, which
was passed on October 14. Similar in certain respects to the Smith Act, the Nationality Act
authorized the denaturalization of all individuals who had once belonged to the Communist
Party. Further, it barred aliens from becoming naturalized citizens if they had, within the ten
years before applying, championed efforts to overthrow violently the U.S. government by
circulating petitions or belonging to an organization with such a purpose. More broadly, the law
banned the naturalization of all aliens not sufficiently attached to the principles enshrined in the
U.S. Constitution.
Three days later, on October 17, 1940, Congress enacted the fourth major law, the
Voorhis Act. This law required all organizations dedicated to overthrowing any government
(particularly the United States government) or ―subject to foreign control and engaged in
preparation for military action‖ to register with the federal government and, in doing so, to
provide extensive information about their activities, membership, and organizational structure.345
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In addition to these six major pieces of repressive legislation, after the creation of the
Dies Committee and before the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese, Congress enacted a range
of other laws that contained provisions restrictive of Americans‘ civil liberties. For example,
throughout this period, Congress passed a number of appropriations bills that forbid the payment
of funds to individuals advocating the overthrow of government. Complementing those
appropriations bills, the Selective Service Act, which was passed in September of 1940 and was
―the first peacetime draft bill in American history,‖ contained a provision stipulating that
members of the Communist Party and the German-American Bund could not fill vacancies in
employment created by the draft.346
After late 1941 and until the end of the war in 1945, Congress enacted only one other
major piece of legislation that infringed on Americans‘ civil liberties—the Smith-Connally Act
of June 1943. The lack of legislative activity during this period was due to two simple realities.
First, for reasons discussed earlier, the amount of opposition to involvement in the war dropped
precipitously after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Second, by the time President Roosevelt
declared war against Japan, ―Congress had exhausted most of the repressive possibilities
available.‖347 Less important for Americans‘ civil liberties than some of the laws enacted during
the earlier period, the Smith-Connally Act gave President Roosevelt the power to seize factories
essential to the war effort that were threatened with a stoppage in production. It also criminalized
strike advocacy in seized factories. Further, the law discouraged stoppages in the production of
materials necessary to the maintenance of the war effort by ―requir[ing] union officials to
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observe a thirty-day cooling off period and to obtain a majority vote from union members before
striking in other plants.‖348
Presidential directives
During the period of American involvement in World War II, and in the years preceding
it, President Roosevelt issued a number of presidential directives (in the form of executive orders
and presidential proclamations) that heavily restricted Americans‘ civil liberties. Today, we
remember these directives as the worst abuses of individual liberty to arise out of the Second
World War and, more broadly, as some of the most notable instances of abuse in the history of
American national crises. The most violative presidential directives were issued in the months
after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. However, the restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties by
presidential directive began earlier.
In contrast to the repressive laws enacted by Congress, the bulk of repressive presidential
directives were issued after the bombing of Pearl Harbor and President Roosevelt‘s subsequent
declaration of war against the Japanese. Between 1938 and 1941, Roosevelt issued only one
major presidential directive related to civil liberties and the emerging global war. Responding to
a stoppage in production resulting from a labor dispute at the North American Aviation
Company factory in Inglewood, California, Roosevelt issued an executive order on June 9, 1941
that authorized the Secretary of War to seize the plant and thereby ensure the continued
production of goods necessary to the maintenance of the war effort. Once deployed to break the
strike (which the president somewhat disingenuously portrayed as ―a purely political strike rather
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than a legitimate labor disagreement‖), federal troops ―forbid picketing within a mile of the plant
and in effect established martial law within this area.‖349
The worst of the presidential directives were a series of proclamations, issued on
December 7 and 8, 1941 that established regulations to govern the control of enemy aliens during
wartime and an executive order, 9066, that, among other applications, formed the basis for the
wartime internment of individuals of Japanese descent. These three proclamations—each almost
identical in content, but covering a different country (Japan, Germany, and Italy) called on
enemy aliens to abide by the laws of the United States government. More importantly, however,
Proclamations 2525, 2526, and 2527 established regulations governing the treatment of enemy
aliens during wartime, as per the authority granted the president pursuant to the Alien Enemies
Act of 1798. Similar to the proclamation issued by President Wilson in his 1917 declaration of
war against Germany, these three directives levied travel restrictions on enemy aliens and made
such aliens subject to summary arrest for offenses ranging from possessing firearms, cameras,
short-wave radios, and ―documents or books in which there may be invisible writing‖ to
ascending into the air without the explicit authorization of the Attorney General or Secretary of
War.350 Even more damaging, these proclamations also directed the summary arrest and
internment of enemy aliens ―deemed dangerous to the public peace or safety of the United
States‖ and authorized the Attorney General and Secretary of War to exclude enemy aliens from
areas of military importance.351
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During the course of the war, these directives had two important effects. Most obviously,
they subjected the roughly 890,000 enemy aliens of Japanese, German, and Italian descent living
within the United States to a variety of controls. While the members of all three groups felt the
effects of these restrictions to some degree, the Japanese fared far worse than the Germans, who,
in turn, fared worse than the Italians.352 This resulted from two factors. First, Japanese enemy
aliens experienced the weight of these controls more heavily perhaps because of prejudice and
perhaps because they were more easily targeted. Second, for reasons that are out of the scope of
this treatise (such as prejudice against individuals of Japanese descent and the relatively greater
economic and political importance of German- and Italian-Americans versus JapaneseAmericans), President Roosevelt maintained restrictions placed on the Japanese until the end of
the war, even though he thought it safe to lift the restrictions placed on Italian and German
enemy aliens in 1942, in October and December, respectively.353
In addition to levying restrictions on some 890,000 people living within the United
States, these three directives led to the summary arrest and internment of as many as 16,000
enemy aliens over the course of the war. Immediately after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the FBI
began to arrest and intern enemy aliens ―solely under executive order,‖ arresting 5,100 Japanese,
3,250 Germans, and 650 Italians in the months after the attack.354 Although not required under
the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, which formed the basis for President Roosevelt‘s proclamation
and, as a result, the basis for the wartime arrest of enemy aliens, Attorney General Francis Biddle
insisted upon the establishment of Enemy Alien Hearing Boards to determine whether to release
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interned enemy aliens. By June 1944, these boards had released all but a couple of thousand,
who, it appears, remained in jail for the duration of the war.355
Even more important for civil liberties in the United States than Roosevelt‘s December 7
and 8 proclamations directing the treatment of enemy aliens during wartime was Executive
Order 9066, which authorized the internment of individuals of Japanese descent living on the
west coast, as well as the exclusion from the same area of some 300 others. On February 19,
1942, under pressure from government officials in California and in the War Department,
President Roosevelt authorized the Secretary of War to establish areas of military importance
from which any person or persons could be excluded. In March, the War Department designated
certain areas on the west coast as military areas and ordered the exclusion of all individuals of
Japanese descent from those areas. Initially, those excluded were allowed to move freely
throughout the rest of the country; however, public protest quickly led the Army to establish
temporary prison camps to which all excluded Japanese would be transferred en route to one of
ten permanent ―relocation centers.‖356
In the eight months after Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, 120,000 individuals of
Japanese descent living in California, Washington, Oregon, and Arizona were arrested and
subsequently transferred to those internment camps for the duration of the war.357
Unsurprisingly, the conditions in those camps were extremely harsh; there was extreme
overcrowding and no furniture. Further, internees were not allowed to possess reading materials
or phonograph records and were subject to ―arbitrary searches and harassment.‖358 Even worse,
internees had had to leave behind their homes and all of the possession that they could not carry
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with them to the camps; many ultimately lost everything.359 Eventually, in 1943, the federal
government created a loyalty program by which internees could be released if they swore
allegiance to the United States and disavowed Japan. At least 7,000 internees refused to do so
and were subsequently segregated in a maximum-security internment camp in Tule Lake,
California.360 The general release of those interned did not come until December 1944 (although
the Secretary of War had recommended it would be safe to do so as early as May) in large part,
because President Roosevelt believed that doing so might jeopardize his reelection that year.361
Although far less important than the wartime internment of individuals of Japanese descent, it is
also worth mentioning that Executive Order 9066 also served as the basis for the exclusion of
some 300 other persons from the west coast over the course of the war. In all of those cases, the
individuals who were excluded, arrested, or interned were denied fundamental due process
rights.362
Efforts to control political discourse
Compared to legislation enacted at the federal level and the restrictive, if not outright
repressive, presidential directives issued by President Roosevelt, the efforts of the his
administration to control political discourse, both by censoring the press and by flooding the
marketplace of ideas with government propaganda, were far more modest than those of the
Wilson administration during World War I. In large part, this was due to two factors. First,
unlike his predecessor, President Roosevelt did not need to drum up support for war (at least not
after the attack on Pearl Harbor). Second, the gross excesses of George Creel‘s World War I-era
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Committee on Public Information helped to ensure that its World War II equivalent, the Office of
War Information, would not act in similarly repressive ways.
Although the bulk of wartime censorship began after the Japanese bombing of Pearl
Harbor, censorship of the press began earlier. In late 1940, the U.S. Post Office interpreted the
Foreign Agents Registration Act in such a way as to exclude from the mails foreign propaganda
sent to persons in the U.S. who were not registered as foreign agents or similarly, from persons
abroad who were not registered. In censoring these materials, however, the Post Office
systematically destroyed only material that originated from countries unfriendly to the United
States. Since this form of censorship appears to have been the only type of censorship to have
occurred before the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the degree to which the federal government
censored the press during the period from 1938 to 1941 can be said to have been modest.
However, after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, applying the reenacted Espionage Act of
1917, the Roosevelt administration began to restrict the freedom of the press more actively.
Throughout the war, censorship of the press was accomplished by military intelligence, through
the direct closure of certain foreign publications operating within the U.S., and by the U.S. Post
Office. As is routine during periods of national crisis, upon the outbreak of war and for the
duration, all communications sent to and from the United States were turned over to military
intelligence for censorship.363 In addition to the wartime censorship of international
communications, the Roosevelt administration also seized the presses of certain Japanese- and
German-American publications ―allegedly financed in part by enemy capital.‖364 More
important, however, was the degree to which the Post Office censored the press throughout the
crisis. The bulk of wartime censorship by the Post Office occurred during the first year and a half
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of American involvement in the global war. After mid-1943, for a variety of reasons (which
include the increasing success of the Allied nations in the war, the destruction of the already
insignificant domestic opposition press, and the U.S. Supreme Court‘s increasingly protective
stance for civil liberties), the Roosevelt administration censored few new publications.
Between late 1941 and mid-1943, however, at least seventy different publications were
excluded from the mails temporarily, if not permanently. Publications were excluded if found to
be sufficiently subversive, which Post Office employees decided using a classification system
developed by political scientist Harold Lasswell.365 Although many of the censored publications
were somewhat obscure, two were particularly influential. The most important was Social
Justice, produced by American fascist Father Charles Coughlin. It had a circulation of over onemillion subscribers. After the Post Office revoked mailing privileges for Social Justice, Father
Coughlin attempted to play the role of martyr by offering to defend the verity of the statements
contained in the publication before a grand jury. Recognizing this maneuver, Attorney General
Francis Biddle successfully appealed to the Catholic Church to silence their priest.366 Aside from
Social Justice, the other major publication that the Post Office censored during the war was the
Militant, a weekly journal produced by the Socialist Workers Party.367
During the First World War, the Committee on Public Information (CPI) actively sought
to cultivate support for war by whipping American citizens into a patriotic fervor. In doing so,
the agency spurred nativist hatred of the Germans and intensified demands for the suppression of
dissent. Although the Office of War Information (OWI), created by Roosevelt in 1942,
resembled CPI, it appears to have played no such role in the Second World War. Its purpose was
more narrowly defined to disseminate to the American people information about the progress of
365
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the Allied nations in the war (a purpose the agency struggled to achieve given the unwillingness
of the military to disclose discouraging information in the early years of the war). The OWI did
occasionally act in ways akin to its predecessor, however. Regardless, the life of the Office of
War Information was short, as Congress, concerned with the potential excesses of such an
organization, slashed its budget in mid-1943.368
Efforts to monitor and suppress dissidents
The last aspect of the crisis that should be considered in assessing the degree to which
Americans‘ civil liberties were restricted by the federal government is whether there was any
attempt, at the federal level, to monitor and suppress dissent, either through direct prosecution,
surveillance, deportation and denaturalization campaigns, or loyalty laws. As in World War I, the
Second World War gave rise to efforts to monitor and suppress dissent through each of these
four avenues. In addition, very early on, the emerging crisis prompted the U.S. House of
Representatives to convene the Dies Committee, a special committee established to investigate
broadly un-American activities.
Direct Prosecution
The majority of prosecutions involving political dissidents were initiated after the
bombing of Pearl Harbor. However, as was the case with regard to enacting federal legislation,
issuing presidential directives, and censoring the press, the prosecution of dissent by the
Roosevelt administration began before the official start of American involvement in the Second
World War. Although relatively minimal when compared to the number of wartime prosecutions,
the federal government initiated a number of prosecutions between 1938 and 1941against radical
groups, particularly the Communist Party. For example, in 1940, the federal government brought
charges against the chairman of the Communist Party and the communist leaders of the Fur
368
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Workers Union. Around the same time, in December of 1939 and March of 1940, three alleged
Russian agents were indicted on charges of violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act.
One of the most notable cases during this period was the 1940 prosecution of seventeen
members of the right-wing Christian Front Sports Club on charges of planning to overthrow the
government. The case fell apart months after the indictment was issued when it was disclosed
that a government informant had provided the Christian Front with the arms and ammunition for
which the organization‘s members were being charged.369 Equally if not more notable was the
June 1941 prosecution of twenty-nine members of the Socialist Workers Party on charges of
violating the Smith Act. The trial, known as the Minneapolis Sedition Trial, resulted in the
conviction of eighteen of those charged, of whom twelve were imprisoned370
Two aspects of the crisis are relevant in assessing the extent of the Roosevelt
administration‘s campaign to prosecute dissent—the wartime prosecution of individuals for
sedition and for advocating resistance to the draft and the treatment of conscientious objectors
(COs). During the period from 1941 to 1945, about 200 people were prosecuted for sedition or
for advocating resistance to the draft. Some were prosecuted for offenses committed even before
the attack on Pearl Harbor, while the majority of these indictments were issued in the first year
and a half of American involvement in the global war, from late 1941 to mid-1943. After the
summer of 1943, for reasons mentioned earlier (which include the growing strength of the Allied
powers, the destruction of the opposition press, and the increasingly civil liberties-protective
stance of the U.S. Supreme Court), the Roosevelt administration initiated relatively few new
prosecutions.371
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In general, the Roosevelt administration‘s wartime campaign against dissent resulted in
the indictment of a wide range of obscure political dissidents. Targets of prosecution in that
period included the members of black religious cults such as the Brotherhood of Liberty for the
Black People of America, and pro-Nazi groups such as the Friends of Progress. Other individuals
prosecuted were even more obscure, such as a Wisconsin farmer indicted for urging his brother
to seek discharge from the military and twelve members of a pseudo-religious sect in California.
The general obscurity of those prosecuted demonstrates the magnitude of suppression relative to
the amount of dissent voiced.372
Though most wartime prosecutions involved obscure political dissidents, the Roosevelt
administration‘s campaign against dissent produced a number of more significant prosecutions
that involved prominent American fascists and the two most important sedition trials. During the
war, the federal government levied a number of indictments against prominent native fascists,
including William Kunze, the leader of the German-American Bund (an American Nazi
organization), and William Pelley, the leader of a notable pro-Nazi organization known as the
Silver Shirts. In addition, though not a prosecution per se, Attorney General Francis Biddle
appealed to the Catholic Church to silence outspoken and vehement native fascist Father Charles
Coughlin.373 Conspicuously nonexistent during the period were prosecutions against prominent
members of the Communist Party (CP). Although members of the CP had been targeted earlier in
the crisis that changed when the party shifted to a position of support for American involvement
in the war following the breakdown of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in June of 1941,
which led the Soviet Union to fight on the side of the Allied powers.
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Even more significant than the prosecution of prominent native fascists, the Roosevelt
administration‘s campaign against dissent led to two of the most important wartime sedition
trials, neither of which produced convictions. The first, and most infamous, known as the Great
Sedition Trial, involved an odd group of pro-fascist radicals (including German-American Bund
leader William Kunze) charged in 1942 for conspiring to violate the Espionage Act of 1917 and
the Smith Act of 1940. Without going into detail, the case can most accurately be summed up as
a circus and as a fiasco. It ended in mistrial in 1945 and was dismissed completely upon retrial in
November of 1946. The trial achieved its purpose, however, as it kept about thirty prominent
radicals and critics of the Roosevelt administration locked in legal battles for the duration of the
war. The other major sedition trial during the war involved twenty-four members of the GermanAmerican Bund who were indicted on charges of conspiracy to advocate resistance to the draft.
The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the case in 1945 because of insufficient evidence.374
In addition to the wartime prosecutions of individuals on charges of sedition and
counseling draft resistance, the treatment of conscientious objectors (COs) is also relevant to
assessing the extent of the Roosevelt administration‘s campaign to suppress dissent. During the
war, 6,086 individuals, a great proportion of whom where Jehovah‘s Witnesses, were imprisoned
after the Army refused to grant their petitions for conscientious objector status. As in World War
I, those jailed were subject to extremely harsh treatment that often included beatings, regular
harassment, and solitary confinement. Further, many objectors were fed only bread and water.
Those conscientious objectors whose status the Army upheld were confined in Civilian Public
Service camps for the duration of the war. A few were even detained in those camps until 1947.
The camps were administered by the National Service Board for Religious Objectors (which was
operated by a range of pacifist groups and churches) and effectively amounted to outdoor work
374
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camps in which COs were forced to work fifty hours a week without pay. In general, the
treatment of conscientious objectors during the Second World War was less harsh than in World
War I. That said, the treatment of COs in the United States was still harsher than in Britain or
Canada. 375
Surveillance of dissident groups
Complementing its efforts to suppress dissent by prosecution, the Roosevelt
administration also oversaw a massive increase in surveillance. Between 1938 and 1941 and
between 1941 and 1945, the Federal Bureau of Investigations expanded the size and scope of its
operations dramatically. As early as 1936, J. Edgar Hoover, the first director of the FBI,
instructed his agents to collect a broad range of information related to subversive activities.376 In
1938, the FBI expanded its investigation of subversive activity still further following the explicit
approval of President Roosevelt. In short, from 1936 on, the FBI expanded the scope of its
investigations dramatically.377
By 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investigations was fully mobilized, to levels equivalent to
the period from 1917 to 1920, during the First World War and the later Red Scare. During this
crisis, the FBI‘s investigations ranged quite broadly, from collecting information on fascist,
Communist, German, and Italian sympathizers to members of the isolationist American First
organization and the NAACP. At Roosevelt‘s request, the bureau also investigated opponents of
his policy of Lend-Lease (in which the United States lent military supplies to the Allied nations).
Furthermore, by this time, the FBI had begun to engage in a variety of other programs of dubious
constitutionality, if not outright illegality. Four such programs indicated the growing range of
FBI activities.
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First, beginning in 1939, and lasting until 1973 (if not later), the FBI began to build and
maintain a custodial detention list of individuals to be arrested and imprisoned in the event of
war; this list contained a wide range of Communist, Nazi, fascist, Japanese, and SWP
sympathizers. Second, in 1940, the Bureau established an informer program that placed
informants in factories important to the military to guard against espionage. The Bureau
established a similar program that relied on members of the American Legion to assist with
investigations into subversive activities and espionage. These programs lasted until 1969 and
1954, respectively. Third, beginning in 1940, the FBI began to engage in warrantless wiretapping
of domestic subversives, a practice that continued at least until 1972. The Bureau placed twelve
wiretaps and microphone bugs in 1940 and ninety-two in the next year alone. Fourth, also during
1940, the Bureau launched a program of monitoring (and occasionally opening) first class mail.
The program continued at least until 1966. During those twenty-six years, the FBI opened
approximately 130,000 pieces of mail.378
After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Bureau expanded still further in size and in the
scope of its investigations, as did military intelligence. The FBI continued to monitor the mail
and place wiretaps throughout the war. It also began to engage in ―black bag jobs,‖ in which
agents would break into the offices or residences of targeted subversives to collect information.
During the war, the FBI planted over 600 bugs and 1,800 wiretaps. Further, from 1942 to 1968,
the FBI agents engaged in approximately 240 black bag jobs. However, as it became increasingly
apparent in 1944 and 1945 that the Allies would win the war, the FBI began to restrict the scope
of its intelligence-gathering investigations, limiting its investigations to the leaders of prominent
subversive organizations.379
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Exclusion of foreigners and naturalized citizens
The Roosevelt administration also sought to denaturalize alleged subversives. As early as
March 1940, Attorney General Francis Biddle began to spearhead a denaturalization campaign
that focused particularly on the German-American Bund and, to a lesser extent, the Communist
Party. By the end of 1940, the Roosevelt administration had successfully denaturalized twentyfour people. At that time, 300 other cases were pending and 2,500 other people were the subject
of investigation.380
The Roosevelt administration continued its campaign to denaturalize subversives after the
bombing of Pearl Harbor. This campaign lasted until 1943, at which point the Justice Department
was forced to drop pending cases following the U.S. Supreme Court‘s decisions in Schneiderman
v. U.S. and Baumgartner v. U.S., in which the Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to
denaturalize citizens on the basis of subversive speech. Between March of 1940 and the Court‘s
twin decisions in 1943, the Justice Department had successfully denaturalized approximately 180
citizens, including Fritz Kuhn, a former leader of the German-American Bund. After 1943, the
Roosevelt administration continued its campaign against subversives by employing a provision
of the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 that allowed a president to deport enemy aliens whom he
deemed dangerous to the public safety.381
Loyalty program
Another major aspect of the government‘s response to crisis during the Second World
War was the extent of efforts to screen subversives from federal employment. Although the
bombing of Pearl Harbor brought greater attention to disloyalty, there had been scattered efforts
between 1938 and 1941 to ensure that Americans‘ tax dollars did not pay the salaries of
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subversive individuals. For example, as discussed earlier, Congress enacted a variety of laws
before December of 1941 that contained provisions banning subversives from employment with
the federal government. Partly as a result of these laws, in June of 1939 the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) declared that members of the Communist Party, German-American Bund,
and other fascist or communist-leaning organizations could not be federal employees.382 During
the same period, in October of 1941, the Dies Committee, which sought to attack the Roosevelt
administration by linking the New Deal with Communism, submitted a list of 1,121 allegedly
disloyal federal employees to the Justice Department for further investigation.383
Efforts to screen subversives from roles in the federal government proceeded after the
bombing of Pearl Harbor and throughout the war. Between 1941 and 1945, the Civil Service
Commission, as well as the Justice Department, took additional action to ensure that subversives
did not find employment with the federal government. For example, in March of 1942, the CSC
declared that individuals could be excluded from federal employment if there was ―reasonable
doubt‖ of their loyalty. Around the same time, the Interdepartmental Committee on
Investigations (ICI), an agency created by Attorney General Biddle in April of 1942 to manage
the federal government‘s loyalty program, reported that the Dies Committee‘s October 1941
accusations of disloyalty in the federal government could not be confirmed. However, because
many people regarded the report prepared by the ICI as a ―whitewash,‖ President Roosevelt
created the Interdepartmental Committee on Employer Investigations (ICEI) in February of 1943
to replace the ICI. The ICEI then established procedures for the removal of federal employees, as
well as a hearing process by which employees could appeal unfavorable rulings. Overall, the
Roosevelt administration appears to have been relatively restrained in its efforts to screen
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subversives from the federal government. Throughout the war, 175 employees were dismissed,
while another 1300 were prevented from applying.384
Congressional investigation
Besides for suppression of dissent through means like prosecution, surveillance, and
loyalty laws, Americans‘ civil liberties were also restricted by the Dies Committee and its
irresponsible manipulation of public opinion through wide-ranging investigations of subversion.
Formed on May 26, 1938, the Dies Committee (the World War II precursor to the Cold War
House Un-American Activities Committee, or HUAC) was established to investigate the nature
and extent of un-American activities in the United States. In general, although it investigated
issues of legitimate concern, the Dies Committee acted in an irresponsible manner and ―proved
that in reckless hands legislative investigating committees can do untold damage to innocent
persons and national values.‖385
During the period from 1938 to 1941, the Dies Committee focused its investigations on
prominent pro-Nazi organizations, such as the German-American Bund and the Silver Shirts, and
certain pillars of the left wing, most notably the Communist Party, the Congress on Industrial
Organizations (CIO), and the Roosevelt administration. When formed, the Dies Committee
originally intended to center its attention on the activities of the German-American Bund. The
Bund was of particular concern at that time because the organization had grown substantially in
membership during the two preceding years. By 1939, the organization had grown so much that
it was able to attract as many as 32,000 supporters to a rally at Madison Square Garden in New
York City.386 This growth and the increasing instability in Europe in those years made the Bund

384

Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, pp. 277-279. Quotes in this paragraph taken from this
source.
385
Stone, Perilous Times, p. 245.
386
Stone, Perilous Times, pp. 245-246.

134
a natural initial target of the Dies Committee. In describing the organization, Congressman
Martin Dies, the committee chairman, condemned the Bund as a threat to the United States and
demanded that the FBI investigate members of the Bund employed in the defense industry.
Around the same time, partly motivated by pressure from Dies, the Justice Department launched
an investigation into whether members of the Bund had violated any laws and whether they
could be denaturalized.387
While the German-American Bund was in part the focus of the Dies Committee‘s
investigations into un-American activities, in greater part, Martin Dies sought to destroy the left
and ―to portray the New Deal as part of a vast communist conspiracy.‖388 Similar to the tactics of
Senator McCarthy during the Cold War, Congressman Dies ―used public disclosure as a political
tactic,‖ announcing in October of 1939 that he possessed a list of approximately 2,000 of the
4,700 Communists living and working in Chicago.389 The list actually contained the names of
government employees listed in the membership roles of the American League for Peace and
Democracy, a left-wing anti-war group. As part of his continuing campaign to convince the
American public of widespread subversion in the U.S. government, Dies also submitted a list of
1,121 allegedly subversive federal employees in 1941 to the Justice Department for
investigation. Upon review, the FBI found no evidence to support Dies claim.390 During the same
period, the Dies Committee also condemned the Federal Theater Project and the Federal Writers
Project as subversive, which, in the summer of 1939, led Congress to cut funding for the former
and to eliminate funding entirely for the latter.391
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In many cases, the activities of the Dies Committee were even more blatantly related to
partisan politics. For example, before the congressional elections of 1938, the Dies Committee
heard allegations that Democratic candidates in California and Minnesota who supported the
New Deal were affiliated with communists. Later, Dies demanded the resignation of numerous
members of the Roosevelt administration, including the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of
Labor, and the Works Progress Administrator. Even more telling of Congressman Dies‘
campaign to destroy Roosevelt was the title and content of a book Dies published in 1940, The
Trojan Horse in America. In the book, Dies linked the Roosevelt administration with
Communism and argued that ―the greatest financial boon which ever came to the Communists in
the United States‖ was the Works Progress Administration.392
When war came, the Dies Committee continued to investigate the nature and extent of
un-American activities in much the same manner as it had during the preceding three years. It
appears, however, that the German-American Bund became a lesser focus of the Dies
Committee‘s investigations during wartime, perhaps because popular fears that this group
represented a fifth column became less salient or potentially because Dies perceived the
Roosevelt administration to be taking appropriate repressive action with regard to the Bund.
Instead, the Dies Committee appears to have focused its campaign against un-Americanism
almost exclusively on linking Roosevelt with Communism. On numerous occasions throughout
the period from 1941 to 1945, Dies made sweeping accusations of subversion in the federal
government. For example, in March of 1942, he accused 35 members of the Board of Economic
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Welfare of disloyalty, while, in September of 1942, he announced possession of a list of 1900
allegedly subversive federal employees.393
State and local restrictions
In terms of targets of repression, the restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties by the
federal government was mirrored to a significant extent by state and local governments. One
notable difference, however, is the extent to which the program of repression shifted in focus
after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. From 1938 to 1941, the primary targets of state or local
repression were the German-American Bund, the Communist Party, organized labor, and the
Jehovah‘s Witnesses. After 1941, however, the Jehovah‘s Witnesses were the only major targets
of repression. That fact suggests a high degree of repression given how innocuous are Jehovah‘s
Witnesses.
Prior to American involvement in the war, in the period between 1938 and 1941,
demands for the repression of political dissidents grew, such that by December 7, 1941 (the day
the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor), this growing climate for repression had been
institutionalized by a number of state and local governments. During that early period, pressure
for repression gradually took hold of state and local governments. Instances of repression in a
few states—New York, Washington, California, Oklahoma, Colorado, and Arkansas—are worth
considering in brief as they demonstrate the growing climate for repression. In four of these
states, legislative committees (which often resembled the Dies Committee, and therefore became
known as ―Little Dies Committees‖) began to investigate the nature and extent of subversive
activities. In New York, these committees focused largely on radicalism in the public school
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system, while in California, the committees appear to have focused more broadly on unAmerican activities.394
Although sporadic, there were also instances in which academics employed by state
institutions of higher education were fired for political reasons. For example, a teacher was fired
in California for prior membership in the Communist Party, while the president of the Western
Washington College of Education was fired by the governor of the state of Washington
following allegations of tolerance for subversive activities. Even more repressive, in Arkansas,
Commonwealth College was shut down after it could not pay fines levied by the state for
refusing to display the American flag and for displaying a hammer and sickle. Complementing
efforts to weed subversives from academia, there were also sporadic efforts to screen subversives
from state governments. For example, in 1940, the Washington State Legislature voted,
successfully, to exclude from the floor an elected representative who had once been a member of
the Communist Party. In California, the governor successfully appealed to the state legislature to
exclude from the ballot the Communist Party. Additionally, in New York, the state legislature
passed a law banning from state employment all persons advocating the necessity of violent
overthrow of the government.395
In 1941 alone, nine states enacted laws excluding political parties that advocated the
violent overthrow of the government from the ballot, while two states enacted sedition laws and
another five enacted laws banning subversives from employment with the state government. At
the local level, a few cities and towns passed ordinances that struck at subversives. For example,
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one city in Florida made illegal all meetings of the Communist Party and the German-American
Bund.396
In the period between 1938 and 1941, the targets of state and local repression—the
German-American Bund, the Communist Party, labor, and the Jehovah‘s Witnesses—suffered
heavily. The Bund, which was strongest in New York and New Jersey, experienced the greatest
amount of harassment. The organization was made the subject of numerous legislative inquiries
and was repeatedly targeted for repression by state legislatures. Furthermore, a number of the
organizations‘ members were charged with a variety of obscure and disparate offenses. By the
end of 1941, in large part because of the conviction of the organization‘s leader, Fritz Kuhn, the
German-American Bund had been virtually destroyed. Although apparently more concerned with
the Bund, state and local governments also lashed out at the Communist Party. In 1940, the
organization was excluded from the ballot in fifteen states. In addition, communists were
arrested sporadically throughout the country for a variety of different crimes.397
While less patently political than the suppression of the Bund and the Communist Party,
organized labor was also targeted for repression.398 During the period, twenty-two states enacted
anti-labor laws. At the same time, throughout this period, there were a few major incidents of
violence against labor that were sanctioned by state and local governments—most notably the
1938 CIO International Workers of America lumber strike in Westwood, California, the 1939
Missouri Sharecroppers‘ Strike, and the 1941 North American Aviation Strike (discussed
earlier). The fourth major group targeted for repression by state and local governments during
the period from 1938 to 1941 was the Jehovah‘s Witnesses, who were sometimes arrested on
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obscure charges and were subjected to severe mob violence in which local authorities
occasionally stood by without trying to stop it. Mob violence against the Witnesses was so severe
that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) reported that nearly 1,500 Witnesses were
victims of mob violence in one five-month period in 1940, from May to October. In addition, the
children of many Jehovah‘s Witnesses were expelled from school for refusing to salute the
American flag.399
However, after 1941, this began to change. Between 1941 and 1945, there was
quantitatively less repression at the state and local level than during the preceding three years.
This was due largely to two factors. First, after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in
December of 1941, there was relatively little organized opposition to American involvement in
the Allied war against Germany, Italy and Japan. This was partly a function pre-war repression,
which had helped to bring about the downfall of the German-American Bund, though in larger
part was the breakdown of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and the attack on Pearl Harbor
(which galvanized popular support for war).
The second factor was that the Roosevelt administration began to actively campaign
against the repression of dissent at the state or local level beginning as early as 1940 and
continuing throughout the war. Hoping to avoid the widespread vigilantism of the First World
War and looking to concentrate the repression of dissent at the federal level, President Roosevelt,
as well as Attorneys General Robert Jackson and Francis Biddle, met with state officials
throughout the war to ensure that state sedition laws would go unenforced and that mob violence
would be restrained.400 Given the general lack of organized resistance to the war and the active
efforts of the Roosevelt administration to concentrate the repression of dissent at the federal
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level, it should not be surprising then that there were fewer instances of repression at the state or
local level during the period from 1941 to 1945.
While repression at the state and local level was less after 1941, there was one major
violation of Americans‘ civil liberties as well as a number of less notable incidents of repression.
The most significant violation occurred when the governor of the territory of Hawaii authorized
the imposition of martial law after the bombing of Pearl Harbor and transferred ―all of the
functions of government, territorial and county, including the functions of judicial officers‖ to
Lieutenant General Walter Short, the Commander of the Department of Hawaii.401 From
December 7, 1941 to October of 1944, Hawaii remained under a state of martial law. During this
period, the restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties was so harsh that ninety-nine percent of
military trials conducted in 1942 resulted in convictions. Further, throughout the period, ―martial
law could not even be discussed in the mass media.‖402
Aside from the imposition of martial law in Hawaii, an action of which Roosevelt
approved, there were a number of other, less noteworthy instances of repression at the state and
local level. First, throughout the war, there were sporadic instances of repression against pacifists
in states including California, Kentucky, Florida, and Washington. For example, in California,
there were at least two cases in which teachers were dismissed for refusing ―to sell defense
stamps to elementary school children.‖403 Second, throughout the war, the California Committee
on Un-American Affairs continued to investigate all things un-American, such as the activities of
right-wing anti-war groups and the alleged influence of Communism in the California school
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system. Third, in New Jersey, state and local authorities routinely targeted the German-American
Bund for repression. For example, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, state officials shut down the
Bund‘s Camp Nordlund. In general, however, relatively few new state or local laws against
subversion were enacted during the war and those already on the books went largely
unenforced.404
After 1941, the only major targets of state or local repression were the Jehovah‘s
Witnesses. As in the period prior to U.S. involvement in the war, the Witnesses were the victims
of deportation, arbitrary arrest, and severe mob violence. In the two-year period from December
of 1941 to December of 1943, there were at least 300 incidents of mob violence against the
Witnesses. During the same period, at least 200 Witnesses were arrested, often for their refusal to
salute the flag. After May of 1942, the repression of Jehovah‘s Witnesses began to decline after
the Justice Department threatened to prosecute state and local officials for violating the
Witnesses‘ constitutional rights, a threat upon which the Department acted in June of 1942.
Throughout the war, the children of Jehovah‘s Witnesses were also routinely expelled from
school for refusing to salute the flag; however, this changed in June of 1943, when the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled the practice unconstitutional in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette 2000. From 1935 to June of 1943, 2000 children were so expelled, with most expelled
after 1941.405
Executive tone toward civil liberties
In assessing the degree to which Americans‘ civil liberties were restricted during the First
World War, the third factor to consider was the tone set by the executive branch toward civil
liberties. As was evident in the Quasi-War, the Civil War, and the First World War, to a large
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degree the tone set by the executive during national crises dictates the willingness of
policymakers throughout the federal government, as well as state and local governments, to
respect the constitutional rights of dissidents. The actions and statements of President Franklin
Roosevelt, as well as Attorneys General Murphy, Jackson, and Biddle reflect the
administration‘s tone. Most broadly, the approach set by the Roosevelt administration can best
be characterized as a blend of political expediency, on the part of the President, and cautious
protection of civil liberties, on the part of the successive Attorneys General.
Though supportive of civil liberties in the abstract, President Roosevelt tended to follow
the path of political expediency in making judgments that affected Americans‘ civil liberties. To
put it more bluntly, ―he supported them in the abstract, but not when they got in his way.‖406
This view of President Roosevelt‘s approach to civil liberties and dissent reflected the fact that
while he appeared to be concerned with avoiding the gross excesses of the First World War, he
was directly responsible for some of the worst abuses of the Second.
That President Roosevelt was concerned with preventing the types of unrestrained abuse
of Americans‘ civil liberties that occurred during the First World War, such as the American
Protective League‘s slacker raids, seems evident in two major respects. First, Roosevelt was
critical of the Dies Committee‘s broad and often irresponsible investigations of un-American
activities.407 Second, throughout the crisis, Roosevelt, and his administration, worked to restrain
state and local authorities from committing the types of excesses that characterized the First
World War. For example, at a conference of governors in 1940, the President warned those in
attendance against tacitly accepting vigilantism.408 Further, the efforts of his administration
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―resulted in an almost completely unpublicized gentleman‘s agreement in which state officials
promised to restrain vigilantes and to let state sedition laws go unenforced.‖409
Yet while President Roosevelt seems to have worked to prevent the abuses of the First
World War, he was directly responsible for some of the most egregious abuses of World War II.
This was evident in his approach to wartime internment and the surveillance and prosecution of
dissent. In general, the President seems to have been quite unconcerned with the gross abuse of
Americans‘ civil liberties that a program of wartime internment would entail. This was evident in
two respects. First, when Roosevelt signed the proclamations establishing regulations for the
treatment of enemy aliens during wartime, which also authorized the Attorney General to intern
such aliens as he deemed necessary, FDR ―suggested that it might be wise to intern all German
nationals‖ as, in his view, they posed a unique threat far and above Italian nationals.410
Second, the President appears to have chosen to prolong the wartime internment of the Japanese
until after the presidential election of 1944 because he believed that authorizing their release
would jeopardize his prospects for reelection, even though the Secretary of War had told him in
May that it would be safe to release those interned,.411
In addition to his lack of concern for the harm caused by internment, President Roosevelt
was also not overly concerned with the morality of violating the civil liberties of political
dissidents. This was evident in two respects. First, in deciding not to veto the Smith Act,
Roosevelt argued that its provisions criminalizing the advocacy of overthrowing the United
States government did not constitute an abuse of Americans‘ civil liberties, given the state of the
world at that time.412 Second, throughout the crisis, Roosevelt routinely requested the
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surveillance and prosecution of political dissidents. For example, in mid-1940, he began to
encourage the FBI to investigate people ―who had sent him messages indicating opposition to his
foreign policy.‖413 In addition, on at least one occasion, Roosevelt directly reproached Attorney
General Biddle for his inaction in prosecuting Nazi sympathizer William Dudley Pelley for
sedition.414
In assessing the tone set by the executive during the crisis, it is also relevant to assess the
roles played by the different Attorneys General—Murphy, Jackson, and Biddle. At a broad level,
because ―each had learned the lessons of World War I, each was a committed civil libertarian,
and each came into office determined to avoid the mistakes of the past,‖ these three men
exercised a liberalizing influence on the Roosevelt administration.415 Throughout the crisis, each
not only resisted popular pressure for the suppression of dissent, but also resisted demands for
repression directly from the president.416 Thus, each of these three men deserved credit for
helping to prevent even worse abuses of Americans‘ civil liberties than those which did occur
during the crisis.
Deference of the U.S. Supreme Court
The final relevant facet that reveals the degree to which Americans‘ civil liberties were
restricted is the deference of the U.S. Supreme Court to the executive and legislative branches
during the crisis—seen in terms of two periods from 1938 to 1941 and from 1941 to 1945. In
general, the Court acted as a counterbalance to pressures for repression from the executive and
legislative branches. Although it deferred to the Roosevelt administration in a number of
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important respects, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional rights of dissidents during a
crisis for the first time ever.
Prior to American involvement in the war, the Supreme Court exercised a mostly
liberalizing influence, upholding Americans‘ civil liberties in a variety of cases until 1940, at
which point the Court shifted markedly away from its previous stance of protecting freedom of
speech. From 1938 to mid-1940, the Court ruled consistently in favor of individual liberty in a
series of decisions related to the rights of Jehovah‘s Witnesses to distribute literature and the
rights of labor unions to organize and picket. In the latter half of 1940, however, the Court began
to shift away from its previous positions. The change in the Court‘s stance toward civil liberties
was first evident in Minersville School District v. Goblitis (decided in June of 1940), in which
the Court upheld the expulsion of the children of Jehovah‘s Witnesses for refusing to salute the
flag.417 This shift away from the protection of civil liberties was further evident in the Court‘s
1941 decisions in Cox v. New Hampshire and Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor
Dairies, in which the Court ruled against the rights of Jehovah‘s Witnesses and labor,
respectively.418
As during the period from 1938 to 1941, the U.S. Supreme Court‘s wartime record with
regard to the protection of civil liberties was mixed, though generally supportive of the
constitutional rights of dissidents. Broadly viewed, the Court‘s shift away from the protection of
civil liberties continued until 1943; after that year, with the exception of decisions related to the
wartime internment of the Japanese, the Court consistently upheld the rights of dissidents. In
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1942, the Supreme Court ruled against the claims of Jehovah‘s Witnesses in the cases of
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire and Jones v. Opelika. The next year, however, when the Allied
position in the war had grown stronger, the Court reversed its opinion in Jones v. Opelika.419 In
part, the shift in the Supreme Court‘s stance was a result of the direct intention of several justices
to move away from their earlier decision in Goblitis.420 Later that year, in the case of West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court reversed its 1940 opinion in Minersville
School District v. Goblitis, ruling that it was unconstitutional to expel schoolchildren for refusing
to salute the flag.421
From 1943 on, leaving aside for the moment decisions involving the internment of the
Japanese, the Supreme Court consistently ruled in favor of individual liberty in opinions related
to the denaturalization of subversives, the prosecution of dissidents for sedition, and the rights of
labor. In 1943 and 1944, respectively, the Court ruled against the claims of the Roosevelt
administration in the cases of Schneiderman v. United States and Baumgartner v. United States.
Both cases involved individuals whom the Roosevelt administration had attempted to
denaturalize on the basis that they had not been sufficiently attached to the principles enshrined
in the Constitution at the time of their naturalization.422 During the same period, the Court also
protected the right to free speech in the cases of Taylor v. Mississippi, Hartzel v. United States,
and Viereck v. United States. Taylor and Hartzel both involved individuals indicted for
statements or activities deemed to be seditious, while Viereck, which was similar in many
respects, involved the prosecution of a man named George Viereck for violating the Foreign
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Agents Registration Act (on the basis that he had failed to report certain activities undertaken as
a foreign agent for the German government).423 The last major decision related to American civil
liberties issued by the Court during the Second World War, aside from those involving the
internment of the Japanese, was Thomas v. Collins, in which the Court supported the right of
labor unions to organize free from state regulation.424
The U.S. Supreme Court‘s position on the wartime internment of individuals of Japanese
descent represents a major exception to its post-1943 protection of speech. In assessing the
degree to which the Court acted as a check on the executive and legislative branches during, and
in the years before the Second World War, this exception demonstrates continued acquiescence
on behalf of the Court to the Roosevelt administration‘s claims of military necessity. In 1943 and
1944, the Court issued three decisions involving the internment of the Japanese—Hirabayashi v.
United States, Korematsu v. United States, and Ex Parte Endo. In the first, Hirabayashi, decided
in 1943, the Court upheld the constitutionality of wartime restrictions (specifically a curfew
order) placed on enemy aliens and individuals of Japanese descent by the Roosevelt
administration.425 In the second, Korematsu, decided in 1944, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Roosevelt administration‘s wartime exclusion of individuals of Japanese
descent from the west coast.426 The last decision, delivered on the same day as Korematsu, was
the case of Ex Parte Endo, in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional the Roosevelt
administration‘s practice of interning individuals of Japanese descent deemed to be loyal. It
should be noted that the Court‘s decision in Endo was issued the day after the Roosevelt
administration had already decided to release those interned, which gives weight to the
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conclusion that ―the Court intentionally delayed its decision in Endo to allow the President rather
than the Court to end the internment.‖427
Clearly, the Court played a role that was cautious about protecting civil liberties during,
and in the years before, the Second World War. At first glance, the Court‘s role in the crisis
seemed contradictory. On one hand, for the first time in the history of American national crises,
the Court acted as a significant counterbalance to pressures for repression from the executive and
legislative branches. On the other hand, the Court acted as a rubberstamp for the Roosevelt
administration‘s wartime internment of individuals of Japanese descent. The reason for the
apparent contradiction was simply that while the Justices were willing to check the Roosevelt
administration to an extent, they were still responsive to the perceived exigencies of wartime.
Return to “Normal”
Although the most blatant violations of Americans‘ civil liberties of the Second World
War ended approximately with the end of the crisis, less noticeable restrictions produced during
the period from 1938 to 1945, such as repressive laws and illegal surveillance practices,
continued on into the next major national military crisis in American history—the Cold War. In
large part, this was simply the result of timing—the beginning of the Cold War followed closely
on the heels of the end of the Second World War. In other words, the new crisis occurred before
the balance between civil liberties and national security could shift to a more appropriate postwar state. However, as will be considered in the next chapter and in the conclusion, the specific
types of restrictions produced during the crisis also helped to extend the longevity of wartime
restrictions.
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End of the crisis
The Second World War officially ended on September 2, 1945, when the Japanese
surrendered to the Allies on the sole condition that ―the person of the Emperor and the imperial
throne remain inviolate.‖428 By that time, however, the war had been over in Europe for at least
four months, as the last remaining troops of fascist Italy had surrendered on May 2, with
Germany, devastated and demoralized, surrendering unconditionally five days later.429 Although
the Allied nations had begun to gain some momentum against the Axis powers in mid- to late1943, real momentum did not develop until mid-1944, when the Allies gained a foothold in
Western Europe with the invasion of Normandy and subsequently liberated France. From there,
the Allies took control of most of Italy; forced the Germans out of parts of Eastern Europe; and
reduced the Japanese navy and air force to ―mere shadows of what they had been.‖430 By the
early part of 1945, the noose tightened as the Allies gained increasing military advantage over
the Axis powers throughout Europe and Asia. On May 2, the Russian Army marched into and
took control of Berlin.431 At the same time, in Asia the Japanese empire was ―coming apart at the
seams.‖432 Nevertheless, in August, fearing the costs of invading the Japanese mainland,
President Truman decided to drop atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in an
effort to force Japan to surrender. The attacks achieved their purpose; the war was over.433
When the war finally ended, seventeen million soldiers and at least twenty million
civilians lay dead. In Europe, ―Northern France, the Low Countries, the great sweep of the North
German Plain, and a wide swath running all the way to Moscow and Stalingrad lay devastated;‖
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―cities were heaps of rubble, railways were lines of craters and twisted rails, bridges were down,
canals and rivers blocked, dams blown, and electric power grids destroyed.‖434 In East Asia and
the Pacific, ―huge nations—China and Japan—and the great empires of the colonial powers were
all brought low.‖435 Perhaps worse, ―weapons of new and hitherto unimagined potential had been
unleashed upon the world‖ and huge power vacuums in Europe and Asia had been created,
which the two remaining superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—would spend
the next fifty years attempting to fill.436
Duration of restrictions
To a greater degree than in any earlier major national military crisis in American history,
even World War I, the restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties from the Second World War
outlasted the end of the crisis. In general, the most blatant forms of repression ended
approximately with the surrender of the Japanese in September of 1945, while less noticeable
forms lasted into the Cold War.
That the most noticeable violations of Americans‘ civil liberties produced by the Second
World War did not continue after the end of the war was evident from three aspects of the
crisis—the longevity of wartime prosecutions, the legacy of the government‘s internment of the
Japanese, and the change in U.S. Supreme Court decision-making after the end of the war. For
the most part, the prosecution of dissent appears to have ended roughly with the end of the crisis.
This was perhaps most evident from the fact that the federal government dropped its charges of
thirty native fascists in the Great Sedition Trial—the most important sedition prosecution to arise
out of the war—four months after the surrender of the Japanese.437 It should not be surprising,
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however, that wartime prosecutions did not outlast significantly the end of the crisis given that
the majority of prosecutions for sedition initiated during wartime involved a range of obscure
political dissidents indicted for relatively harmless criticisms of the war. One important
exception that belied the generally short duration of wartime prosecutions was the case of
conscientious objectors (COs) whose status the Army agreed to uphold. Confined in unpaid work
camps for the duration of the war, COs found that they were not allowed to leave immediately
after the war ended. In protest of their continued confinement, many refused to work. This
ultimately led to the arrest and conviction of twenty-two objectors, who were subsequently not
released until 1947.438
Another aspect of the crisis that demonstrated that the most noticeable forms of
repression ended with the surrender of the Japanese, was the wartime internment of individuals
of Japanese descent. As discussed earlier, the Roosevelt administration authorized the release of
all internees who remained in government camps in December of 1944. In the years that
followed, policymakers in the federal government sought to make amends for the damage caused
by internment. Most immediately, in 1948, Congress passed the Evacuation Claims Act, which
compensation for the property losses of internees. Unfortunately, the program was incredibly
inefficient and by 1958, less than 25 percent of those interned had received any money (which
generally amounted to only 1,400 dollars per person).439
Much later, in 1976, President Ford offered an official apology to all those who had been
interned during the war. Four years later, still seeking to make amends, Congress established the
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians to investigate the application of
Executive Order 9066. In 1983, the Commission reported that the government‘s program of
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internment was largely the result of prejudice, hysteria, and failed leadership and recommended
that Congress pass a joint resolution condemning and apologizing for the program. Still later, in
1984 and 1987, respectively, a judge in the Ninth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals issued
writs of coram nobis to Fred Korematsu and Gordon Hirabayashi, which overturned their
wartime convictions. The next year, Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which,
following the earlier recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians, condemned the internment of the Japanese, submitted an official
apology, and offered reparations.440
The last aspect of the crisis that demonstrates that the most blatant violations of
Americans‘ civil liberties in the Second World War ended with the end of the crisis was the postwar change in U.S. Supreme Court decision-making. In general, after the surrender of the
Japanese, the Supreme Court began to approach laws discriminating against aliens in a new way.
In a series of decisions issued in the years after the war (Takahashi v. Fish and Game
Commission, Oyama v. California, and Duncan v. Kahanamoku), the Supreme Court rejected a
number of laws that discriminated against the Japanese. Of the three listed above, Duncan v.
Kahanamoku was certainly the most important as it ruled unconstitutional the imposition of
martial law in the territory of Hawaii during wartime. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed its
decision in Ex Parte Milligan that military courts could not ―supplant civil courts that were open
and properly functioning.‖441
While the most noticeable violations of Americans‘ civil liberties ended approximately
with the end of the crisis, less noticeable forms of repression continued into the Cold War, as
was evident from two aspects of the crisis—the longevity and legacy of federal legislation and
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the durability of the government‘s efforts to monitor political dissidents. Without any exceptions,
every major piece of repressive legislation produced during the crisis remained on the books into
the Cold War. These included the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the Hatch Act, the Espionage
Act of 1917 (which, in 1940, was reenacted and made applicable in peacetime), the Smith Act,
the Voorhis Act, and the Smith-Connally Act.442 As was also true of legislation produced during
the Quasi-War and the First World War, these pieces of legislation would come to be important
instruments of repression in following national crises. Beyond their longevity, however, these
pieces of legislation were important as they undoubtedly helped to set a precedent for the
creation of similarly repressive laws during the Cold War.
In addition to the longevity and legacy of federal legislation, the durability of the
government‘s efforts to monitor political dissidents also proved that the less noticeable forms of
wartime repression significantly outlasted the end of the crisis. This was true of the surveillance
efforts of both military intelligence and the FBI. During the war, copies of all international
communications were provided to military intelligence for censorship. Although this program
should have ended with the surrender of the Japanese, ―representatives of the Army Signal
Security Agency convinced the major international communications companies in the autumn of
1945 to continue to turn over copies of messages sent by private citizens to and from foreign
countries.‖443 The surveillance of international communications continued under the control of
military intelligence until 1952, at which point the newly formed National Security Agency

442

―Allied Federal Laws Now in Effect,‖ Congressional Digest, Vol. 28 Iss. 10 (Oct. 1949): p. 235, Academic
Search Premier, EBSCO, Connecticut College, New London, CT, 18 Feb. 2009
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=12174757&loginpage=Login.asp&site=ehostlive>; ―Antistrike Laws Miss the Point,‖ Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 218 Iss. 35 (2 Mar. 1946): p. 100, Academic
Search Premier, EBSCO, Connecticut College, New London, CT, 18 Feb. 2009
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=19502370&loginpage=Login.asp&site=ehostlive>.
443
Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, p. 273.

154
(NSA) assumed control of the program and retained it until at least 1975 in a program known as
Operation SHAMROCK.444
Perhaps an even greater impact resulted from the fact that the FBI continued to engage in
a variety of questionably legal practices and programs long after the crisis had ended, even
though the Bureau limited the focus of its investigations in the final years of the war. Five such
practices and programs were of chief concern. First, the FBI continued its wartime practice of
maintaining lists of individuals to be detained in the event of war until at least 1973. Second, the
Bureau continued to place informants in defense plants until 1969, as well as employing
members of the American Legion to report on subversion and espionage until 1954. Third, the
FBI continued its wartime practice of warrantless wiretapping at least until 1972. Fourth, the
Bureau continued its program of monitoring first class mail at least until 1966.445 Finally, FBI
agents continued to engage in ―black bag jobs,‖ illegal break-ins with the purpose of stealing
information from targeted subversive groups, at least until 1966.446
Conclusion
Like the earlier crises in American history, the Second World War was a crisis of limited
duration involving a conventional, non-ideological threat to American national security. Similar
to the First World War, the restriction of civil liberties that it produced occurred through a range
of different avenues of repression, both overt and covert, and was the province not only of the
federal government, but of state and local governments as well. A major difference with the
previous crisis, however, was that the Roosevelt administration, acknowledging the excesses of
the previous crisis, actively sought to centralize the repression of dissent at the federal level.
While those efforts reflected concern for civil liberties, the Roosevelt administration nevertheless
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abused Americans‘ civil liberties in a number of important respects. The U.S. Supreme Court
played a significant role in checking those excesses. Although it deferred to the President on the
issue of internment, the Court upheld the constitutional rights of dissidents in a range of
decisions related to the denaturalization of alleged subversives, the prosecution of dissidents for
sedition, and the rights of organized labor.
Most of the overt forms of wartime repression, such as the prosecution of dissent and the
internment of the Italians, Germans, and Japanese, ended approximately with the end of the
crisis, if not earlier. In contrast, most of the covert forms of repression practiced during World
War II continued well into the Cold War. That was particularly true of the monitoring of
international communications by military intelligence and the FBI‘s use of questionably legal
practices and programs established during wartime, including warrantless wiretapping, black bag
jobs, and the maintenance of custodial detention lists.
The Second World War reflected a number of broad evolutionary changes in the nature of
wartime repression. First, as during World War I, the crisis reflected a growing body of law on
which to build a campaign of repression. Early in the crisis, Congress reenacted the Espionage
Act of 1917, making it applicable in peacetime. Once World War II ended, the crisis left behind
a number of major repressive laws, many of which were used to suppress dissent during the Cold
War. That was particularly true of the Smith Act, which was used throughout the McCarthy era
and during the years after to prosecute members of the Communist Party. Second, to a greater
degree than in any previous national military crisis, the U.S. Supreme Court exercised a check on
the executive and legislative branches, helping to limit a number of prominent forms of wartime
repression. Third, although difficult to measure, the crisis demonstrated growing respect for civil
liberties. That was evident in part from the Roosevelt administration‘s efforts to minimize the
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repression of dissent by state and local governments. Fourth, the crisis also reflected growing
sophistication in the federal response to crisis. As during World War II, Americans‘ civil
liberties were restricted through nearly every available avenue of repression.
In addition to those evolutionary changes, the crisis also reflected growing reliance on
covert forms of repression. During the crisis, both military intelligence and the FBI expanded in
size and in the scope of their operations. Additionally, surveillance became an increasingly
important method of repression, with the FBI engaging in black bag jobs and warrantless
wiretapping throughout much of the crisis.
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V. COLD WAR (1946-1991)
The fifth, and final, past major national military crisis to test the United States‘
commitment to individual liberty was the Cold War. Although certain periods of repression
during that crisis—the McCarthy era (which includes the Korean War) and the Vietnam War
era—have received a tremendous amount of attention, no author has yet assessed the impact of
the Cold War, in its entirety, on American civil liberties. This is unfortunate as the level of
attention directed at these particularly intense periods of repression obscures the broader truth
that popular fears of Soviet (communist) subversion, as well as the exploitation of those fears for
partisan political advantage, led to the restriction of civil liberties in differing degrees throughout
the roughly forty-five years of the crisis.
Background of the Crisis
Coupled with the reaction of American policymakers and the public to developments
throughout the crisis, the international and domestic events that led to the Cold War provide a
critical context for understanding the restriction of civil liberties during wartime. In addition,
these aspects of the crisis help to explain significant variations in the intensity of repression
crucial to understanding the broad impact of the Cold War on American civil liberties.
Trigger of the crisis
In contrast to earlier crises in American history, with the notable exception of the QuasiWar against France, the Cold War cannot easily be labeled the result of any single, prominent
incident. The firing of Confederate guns on Fort Sumter, the assassination of Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, and the Japanese bombing of the American fleet at Pearl Harbor all serve as clearly
identifiable triggers for their respective crises. The Cold War, however, defies such simple
explanations. Rather, after the end of the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet
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Union rapidly slipped into an era of tensions and conflict—characterized by proxy wars at the
edges of rival empires—that lasted nearly until the end of the twentieth century.447
At its core, the Cold War was the outgrowth of conflicting visions of the postwar
landscape among the most powerful of the Allied nations—the United States, England, and the
Soviet Union. During the war, American President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill envisioned a postwar settlement in which a durable peace would be
achieved through ―cooperation among the great powers,‖ ―a new United Nations collective
security organization,‖ and the promotion of ―self-determination and economic integration.‖448 In
contrast, Soviet Union General Secretary Joseph Stalin sought a postwar settlement that would
not only ―secure his own and his country‘s security,‖ but encourage ―the rivalries among
capitalists that he believed‖ would bring about their destruction and the ―eventual Soviet
domination of Europe.‖449 Given those starkly different hopes for the postwar landscape, it
should not be surprising that tension and discord between the Soviet Union and the other Allied
nations began to develop even before the end of the war.
When World War II ended, the wartime alliance began to break down as each country
increasingly sought to ensure its own postwar security. Although the British had motives of their
own, they tended to defer to the United States, accepting American leadership as the cost of
long-term security.450 A number of developments in the years after 1945 further eroded the
relationship between the Soviet Union and the other Allied nations while, at the same time,
giving form to the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union that lasted for the next
half-century. One of the first major postwar developments that helped give rise to the Cold War
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was Stalin‘s effort in 1946 to secure territorial concessions in parts of Iran, Turkey, and the
Mediterranean. Roosevelt and Churchill had acceded to Stalin‘s demands for territory during
wartime out of fear that he ―might again cut a deal with Nazi Germany‖ to establish a separate
peace.451 However, freed from that fear, the postwar leaders of the United States and Britain—
President Harry S. Truman and Prime Minister Clement Attlee, respectively—refused to permit
further Russian expansion.452
Stalin‘s aggressive efforts to acquire new territory during and after the Second World
War caused American officials to search for some explanation of Soviet behavior. In February
1946, Foreign Service officer George Kennan provided an answer. In an 8,000-word telegram—
the so-called ―long-telegram‖—Kennan argued that Russian ―intransigence…reflected the
internal necessities of the Stalinist regime.‖453 The only way to counter Stalin‘s aggressive
expansionistic tendencies, therefore, was to contain the Soviet Union, as ―there would be no
change in the [country‘s] strategy until it encountered a sufficiently long string of failures to
convince some future Kremlin leader…that his nation‘s behavior was not advancing its
interests.‖454 Fleshed out in a later draft, Kennan‘s theory of containment became the basis of
American policy toward the Soviet Union for the rest of the Cold War. Stalin responded to
Kennan‘s ―long telegram‖ by ordering the Russian ambassador to the United States to draft a
similar assessment of American behavior and foreign policy. Unsurprisingly, it reached equally
pessimistic conclusions.455
In the first six months of 1947, President Truman significantly escalated the developing
Cold War through his efforts to implement Kennan‘s broad strategy of containment. In March of
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that year, he offered military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey in order to assist the
governments of each country in resisting communist rebels. In doing so, he broadly declared that
future American policy would be oriented toward supporting ―free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.‖456 However, the Truman
Doctrine was only part of the President‘s plan to contain the Soviet Union. In June, Truman‘s
Secretary of State, George Marshall, announced a plan that committed the United States to the
reconstruction of Europe. The Marshall Plan (as well as its later, less well-known equivalent in
Japan, the Dodge Plan), was an integral part of the administration‘s strategy of containment.457 It
sought to curry favor with Europeans, while, at the same time addressing the key factors that
might lead them to vote communists into power—―hunger, poverty, and despair.‖458 Further, the
Marshall Plan sought to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and the nations of Europe.
American policymakers rightly believed that Stalin would never accept American aid for either
the Soviet Union or its satellites and that his refusal to do so would strain the Soviet Union‘s
relationship with its satellites, while simultaneously allowing the United States to seize ―both the
geopolitical and the moral initiative in the emerging Cold War.‖459
As expected, Stalin reacted to the announcement of the Marshall Plan by ―tightening his
grip‖ on the nations of the United Soviet Socialist Republic.460 In the year after the
announcement of the Marshall Plan, Stalin directed the creation of the Cominform, an
organization dedicated ―to enforc[ing] orthodoxy in the international communist movement;‖
sanctioned a plan for communists to seize power in Czechoslovakia; unsuccessfully attempted to
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subject Josip Broz Tito, the communist leader of Yugoslavia, to ―Cominform orthodoxy‖; and
authorized the blockade of Berlin.461 In the end, those measures failed to bring greater security to
the Soviet Union as they persuaded policymakers in the United States and Europe that Stalin
indeed posed a threat to their own security. Motivated by Stalin‘s attempts to clamp down on
Soviet satellites, Congress passed the Marshall Plan (which it had not yet done), while the
nations of Europe requested the formation of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). By
the end of 1949, Stalin‘s ―strategy for gaining control of postwar Europe lay in ruins.‖462
Despite the success of American foreign policy in preventing the Soviet Union from
gaining additional influence in Europe, a series of developments in 1949 and 1950 widened and
intensified the Cold War, appearing to outweigh ―the European victories the West had won.‖463
First, on August 19, 1949, the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb. In doing so, it stripped
the United States of the nuclear monopoly that American policymakers had expected to retain for
at least a few more years. To regain the lead over the Soviet Union, President Truman increased
the production of nuclear weapons, announced that the United States would develop a hydrogen
bomb, and later authorized the reinforcement of American troops in Europe. Second, on October
1, Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong finally triumphed over nationalist leader Chiang Kaishek and announced the formation of the People‘s Republic of China. Shattering Western hopes,
Mao did not follow in the footsteps of Yugoslavia‘s communist leader, Tito (who resisted Soviet
control and flirted with a place in the Western sphere of influence, despite his commitment to
communism).464 Rather, Mao wholeheartedly embraced cooperation with the Soviet Union. The
fall of China to communism and the subsequent alliance between Stalin and Mao appeared to
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validate popular perceptions of communism as a monolithic threat to the American way of
life.465
Third, in January 1950, two of the most prominent espionage cases of the entire Cold
War came to light. On January 21, former State Department official Alger Hiss was convicted of
perjury for denying under oath that he had been a spy for the Soviet Union during the late 1930s
and early 1940s. Shortly later, on January 24, British physicist Klaus Fuchs confessed to having
supplied atomic secrets to the Soviet Union for four years while he was working on the
Manhattan Project.466 In part, the information that he and other spies collected ―had made it
possible for the Soviet Union to succeed so quickly in building its own atomic bomb.‖467
Combined with the earlier Cold War developments of 1949, the Alger Hiss and Klaus Fuchs
espionage cases further stoked popular fears of communist subversion in the United States,
making red-baiting an even more profitable strategy for securing partisan political advantage.
Indeed, Wisconsin Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy made his first broad accusations of
communist infiltration in the federal government at a Republican Women‘s Club meeting in
Wheeling, West Virginia shortly after those espionage cases broke.468
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, on June 25, 1950, the communist North Korean
government invaded the Western-supported government of South Korea. President Truman
immediately decided to meet the United Nations‘ request for troops, authorizing General
Douglas MacArthur to lead American forces in pushing North Korean troops back to the 38th
parallel (which divided the two nations). Despite serious initial setbacks, UN forces soon seized
the initiative and began pushing into North Korea, advancing all the way to the Yalu River
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(which formed the border between North Korea and China) by November of 1950. That same
month, fearing invasion, China sent 300,000 troops into North Korea, widening the Korean War
and significantly intensifying the Cold War.469 Ultimately, regardless of which point one choose
to identify as the beginning of the Cold War, it is clear that by 1948, 1949, and 1950, the Cold
War was well under way.
Reaction to the crisis
In earlier crises, the reaction of American policymakers and the public to the immediate
outbreak of war provided insight into the nature of wartime repression. However, in the case of
the Cold War, it is necessary to discuss the reaction of policymakers and the public to the threat
posed by the Soviet Union throughout the entire crisis. This reaction reveals significant
variations in the intensity of wartime repression, variations that provide vital context for
understanding the broad effects of the crisis on American civil liberties. These variations can be
broken into four distinct periods: the McCarthy era, which lasted roughly from 1946 to 1954; a
period of reduced tensions and hysteria from 1954 to 1964, referred to in this treatise as the Cold
War Interlude; the Vietnam War era, from 1965 to 1981; and the Reagan era, which lasted until
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
McCarthy era
By the end of World War II, the prospects for civil liberties in the United States looked
bright.470 Unfortunately, hopes for the return to a pre-war ―normal‖ were not realized. Over the
next four years, a series of events—a few major espionage scares; the announcement of the
Truman Doctrine in March, 1947; the Truman administration‘s institution of a strict federal
loyalty program later that month; the Soviet Union‘s successful test of a nuclear weapon; and the
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fall of China to communism—brought Cold War tensions to new heights, transforming suspicion
of the Soviet Union into popular fear and eventually widespread hysteria. During this period,
Americans came increasingly to see communism as a monolithic, general threat to the American
way of life.
At the same time, red-baiting became an increasingly profitable strategy for securing
partisan political advantage throughout these years. The growing prevalence and intensity of this
strategy both reflected and heightened fears of communist subversion. Republican candidates
such as Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy first made successful use of the ―red‖ issue in the
congressional elections of 1946, in which each lambasted his opponent for alleged affiliations
with ―communistically-inclined‖ groups.471 Although other issues no doubt featured
prominently, smashing Republican success in the 1946 elections (they gained fifty-four seats in
the House and eleven in the Senate) was at least partially a function of their exploitation of fears
of communism.472 Over the next few years, red-baiting became increasingly more common. By
1948, President Truman had adopted the strategy himself. In the presidential election of that
year, he attacked the Progressive Party, whose candidate, Henry Wallace, represented a serious
challenge to his reelection, as ―controlled by Communists.‖473
In 1950, the Cold War, as well as the contest between Democrats and Republicans for
control of the ―red‖ issue, significantly intensified due to a series of developments.474 Discussed
earlier, they include the Alger Hiss and Klaus Fuchs espionage cases; Truman‘s announcement
of his administration‘s intention to develop a hydrogen bomb; Senator McCarthy‘s first
accusations of massive communist infiltration in the federal government; and the outbreak of war
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in Korea. Taken with the developments of 1949 (particularly the fall of China to communist
leader Mao Zedong), those events further confirmed in the minds of many Americans the
accuracy of Republican portrayals of communism as a monolithic, insidious enemy.475 In doing
so, they gave traction to the more vicious fear mongering of partisans like Joseph McCarthy. For
this reason, red-baiting in the congressional elections of 1950 ―reached unprecedented levels.‖476
Intense red-baiting continued into the presidential election of 1952. Indeed, Republican
presidential nominee General Dwight D. Eisenhower selected infamous red-baiter Richard Nixon
as his running mate. The strategy continued to prove successful, yielding the Republican Party
control not only of the House and Senate, but the White House as well.477 Once in office,
President Eisenhower ―either passively supported or actively appeased McCarthy‘s tactics,‖
while simultaneously ―ratcheting up‖ the government‘s program of repression.478 Partly as a
result, Senator McCarthy continued to grow in power, appearing nearly untouchable by the
summer of 1953. After that point, however, a number of domestic and international events
conspired to bring about his downfall. These included a devastating attack on McCarthy by
influential broadcast journalist Edward R. Murrow; increasing opposition to the Senator‘s tactics
by the nation‘s press479; the death of Joseph Stalin, which brought into power leaders who
―appeared to be considerably more conciliatory‖; and the signing of an armistice ending the
Korean War.480 Partly because of those events and partly because the Senator‘s investigations in
1953 increasingly challenged the President, the Eisenhower administration finally began to
denounce McCarthy in the first months of 1954. This led to the Army-McCarthy hearings and,
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ultimately, McCarthy‘s censure by the Senate in December.481 In the congressional elections of
that year, the Democratic Party ―scored heavy gains,‖ winning control of both houses of
Congress.482 From this point on, the level of overt repression declined significantly.
Cold War Interlude
Following the McCarthy era, a period of reduced overt repression lasted roughly ten
years, from 1954 to 1964. Robert Goldstein referred to that period simply as ―An Interlude
between the Wars,‖ for the obvious reason that it was bracketed by the end of the Korean War
and the escalation of the Vietnam War. In this treatise, however, that period is referred to even
more simply as the Cold War Interlude. During the first year of that period, as hysteria over the
threat of communist subversion began to ease, some of the most prominent institutions of
McCarthy era repression began to come under increasing attack from Democrats, as well as
some Republicans. On the international stage, the Soviet Union agreed to restore Austrian
independence and the leaders of the United States, Russia, France, and Britain met at a
conference in Geneva for the first time in ten years. Both of these events further reduced both the
intensity of the Cold War and the intensity of wartime hysteria in the United States. As the
intensity of hysteria began to diminish, so too did the level of overt repression on the federal,
state, and local levels. This was particularly true of political deportations and the federal
government‘s strict loyalty program.483
Nevertheless, while the level of overt repression diminished significantly following
McCarthy‘s rapid fall from grace, federal policymakers continued to repress dissent. For
example, congressional committees continued to hold hearings into the activities of left-wing
organizations and pacifist groups, though certainly not with the same devotion and intensity
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characteristic of the McCarthy era.484 Additionally, the FBI continued to grow throughout the
Eisenhower years. Of particular importance, the Bureau established its first Counterintelligence
Program (COINTELPRO) against the Communist Party (CP) in 1956. The program, which
largely formalized preexisting harassment of the Communist Party, sought to monitor and disrupt
CP activities through a broad range of questionably legal investigative techniques, such as breakins, mail opening, and wiretapping. It ultimately became the model for the establishment of
similar operations against other dissident groups throughout the 1960s.485
During the Kennedy years, from 1961 to 1963, the level of political activism in America
increased significantly as the climate for civil liberties improved. In part, this was a function of
the Kennedy administration‘s liberal approach to moderate dissent. Indicative of the Kennedy
administration‘s tone, in February 1962, the President ordered coffee and hot cocoa sent to a
group outside the White House protesting nuclear weapons and advocating disarmament.486 The
early 1960s saw the rise of a number of protest movements. In addition to the civil rights
movement, college students (some of whom learned strategies of nonviolent resistance through
their participation in the civil rights movement) began to organize around issues related to
education, civil liberties, and peace. Students protested the House Un-American Activities
Committee (HUAC) and university regulations preventing communists from speaking on
campus, while a few organizations, most notably Students for a Democratic Society (SDS),
worked broadly to advance social reform.487 Further, the pacifism movement grew during those
years, as groups such as the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) and the
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Student Peace Union (SPU) protested atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons and advocated
disarmament.488 The movement began to fade, however, after the Kennedy administration signed
the Partial Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1963.489
In general, tolerance of moderate dissent grew during the Kennedy years. Nevertheless,
federal, state, and local governments continued to fight radicalism throughout the early 1960s,
even though radical left-wing dissident groups such as the Communist Party, the Socialist
Workers Party, and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (a pro-Castro group) represented relatively
insignificant forces in American society. They paled in influence, for example, to right-wing
groups such as the John Birch Society, which grew rapidly during the early 1960s and
experienced little repression. Thus, while greater tolerance of dissent began to develop during the
Kennedy years, radical left-wing dissidents were still seen as not entitled to American civil
liberties.490
Vietnam War era
The Cold War Interlude was followed by the Vietnam War era, which lasted from
approximately 1965 to 1981. When Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency after the
assassination of John F. Kennedy in November 1963, the level of overt repression of Americans‘
civil liberties was quite low, at least by the standards of the Cold War. In Johnson‘s first year as
president, the number of HUAC hearings declined, the number of political deportations remained
low, and there were few overt repressive acts. Even red-baiting had lost much of its usefulness
by the election of 1964.491
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After 1965, however, a number of developments came together to usher in the second
major period of intense repression during the Cold War. The most important of these was
undoubtedly the war in Vietnam. Although Dwight D. Eisenhower first promised support to
South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem in 1954 and John F. Kennedy first committed
American troops to support the South Vietnamese Army in 1961, President Johnson deserves
credit for escalating the relatively limited American presence in Vietnam to the point of war.492
In 1965, President Johnson first authorized the deployment of American combat troops to South
Vietnam following congressional authorization the previous year to take all measures necessary
to protect American forces and to prevent further North Vietnamese aggression (subsequent to an
allegedly unprovoked attack by North Vietnamese ships on American naval vessels in the Gulf
of Tonkin).493 Over the next few years, the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam skyrocketed, from
184,000 troops by the end of 1965, to 385,000 by the end of 1966, and over 500,000 by the end
of 1967.494
As the American presence in Vietnam grew, so too did public opposition to the war,
which grew from SDS protest marches and teach-ins at a few universities in early 1965 to
massive protests in 1967 and 1968.495 One of the more notable protests of the period was a march
on the Pentagon in October 1967, in which protesters sought ―to turn the war itself into a ‗theater
of the absurd‘‖ by attempting to ―levitate the Pentagon.‖496 Although President Johnson believed
in the theoretical right of dissidents to protest, he also believed that that right should not be
exercised when it came to foreign policy, as doing so undermined the President, making him and
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the country weaker.497 Nevertheless, he ―refused to criticize—let alone prosecute—his
detractors‖ out of fear of undermining support for his beloved Great Society program, a package
of social reform policies meant to eradicate poverty and racial injustice.498 Johnson‘s fear that the
war in Vietnam would undermine his domestic policies led his administration to put forth ―halftruths‖ designed to avoid ―alarming the public over the increasing likelihood that ‗a major war
was in the offing.‘‖499 In doing so, the President quickly developed what became known as a
credibility gap.
The presidential election of 1968 represented a major turning point in the Vietnam War
era. Earlier that year, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army had launched the Tet
Offensive, a massive assault throughout South Vietnam that, while militarily a defeat for the
Communist forces, confirmed in the minds of most Americans that the war was not drawing to a
close, as the Johnson administration had repeatedly promised.500 Following the Tet Offensive, a
nascent movement within the Democratic Party to unseat Johnson gained traction and the
President subsequently announced that he would not run for re-election. Robert Kennedy
ultimately scored the Democratic nomination for the presidency; however, his assassination left
Vice President Hubert Humphrey to challenge the Republican nominee. By the time the election
arrived, ―increasing racial disorders, antiwar demonstrations, leaping crime rates, and the growth
of a ‗counter-cultural‘ movement among the young…had all become lumped together in the
minds of many Americans as a general threat to peace and stability.‖501 Running on the
campaign theme of ―Law and Order,‖ McCarthy era red-baiter and former Vice President
Richard M. Nixon secured the presidency that year by a very narrow margin. His election
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brought about a major change in the treatment of political dissidents throughout the rest of the
Vietnam War era.
Elected on the campaign theme of ―Law and Order‖ and inheriting a massive surveillance
apparatus built up during the Johnson administration, President Nixon immediately went to war
against dissidents. Although the intense repression of the Nixon years was due in part to the
growth of the civil rights and anti-war movements, it was more largely the result of the Nixon
administrations‘ hostile approach to dissent. During Nixon‘s time as President, his administration
massively expanded federal surveillance of dissent; carried out a major campaign of harassment
directed at radicals, liberals and other opponents of the President‘s policies; and formed a WhiteHouse intelligence unit known as the Plumbers, which was meant to plug leaks to the media.502
The radical movement began to wane after the summer of 1970 and was in definite
decline by 1972. This was reflected in decreasing public anti-radical hysteria during the election
of 1972 and the years afterward.503 However, the larger reason for diminished repression in the
early to mid-1970s was the disclosure of massive abuses of governmental power by the Nixon
administration. During those years, the FBI‘s Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO)
first came to light, and was subsequently shut down by Director J. Edgar Hoover. Additionally,
the New York Times published excerpts of the Pentagon Papers, a highly classified study of U.S.
decision-making in Vietnam commissioned by former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Watergate scandal broke, leading to Richard Nixon‘s
resignation in 1974.504 As a result, by the mid-1970s, the repression of the Vietnam War era was
in steep decline. Over the next few years, Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, as well as
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Congress, heavily restricted the extent and scope of surveillance in the United States. The
Vietnam War era was over.
Reagan era
The fourth and final period in the Cold War was the Reagan era, which lasted from
Ronald Reagan‘s ascendance to the presidency in 1981 to the collapse of the Soviet Union ten
years later. During that period, President Reagan significantly escalated the Cold War, portraying
the Soviet Union ―as an ‗evil empire‘—a godless, atheistic octopus extending its tentacles
everywhere in remorseless efforts to destroy the ‗free world.‘‖505 At the same time, his
administration worked to undo the checks on governmental power put in place in the mid- to
late-1970s to prevent the widespread abuse of Americans‘ civil liberties that characterized the
Vietnam War era. In addition, his administration attacked the Freedom of Information Act
(which had been established in 1966 and strengthened in 1974 pursuant to ―the Watergate
revelations of the consequences of secret, unaccountable government‖)506 and increased
government secrecy.507 Although the Reagan administration may have wished to expand
surveillance and secrecy in government independent of the Cold War, these initiatives clearly
―represent[ed] a continuation of the fears and ‗national security‘ concerns of previous
administrations.‖508
Restriction of Civil Liberties
The four major periods of repression during the Cold War— the McCarthy era, from
1954 to 1964; the Cold War Interlude, from 1954 to 1964; the Vietnam War era, from 1965 to
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1981; and the Reagan era, from 1981 to 1991—were all linked by repressive actions motivated
by widespread fears of Soviet or communist subversion. However, the focus of government
repression evolved significantly throughout the crisis. In the beginning of the Cold War, during
the McCarthy era, the overriding motivation of American policymakers was to provide broad
protection against the threat of communist subversion and infiltration. Although the climax of the
red scare occurred roughly in 1954, this fear continued to be reflected at a lower level of
intensity in the actions of policymakers during the next major period, the Cold War Interlude. As
the war in Vietnam escalated in the mid-to late-1960s, concern for the threat of communist
subversion increasingly took a backseat to the perceived threat of the antiwar and civil rights
movements. As the Vietnam War subsided, and the Reagan era began, the central focus of
American policymakers‘ concerns for national security shifted once more to the threat of Soviet
subversion, though communist ideology was by that point a less tangible threat to the American
way of life than it was during the McCarthy era.
During those four periods, the evolution of wartime repression is evident in four areas:
restrictions enacted by the federal government; restrictions enacted by state and local
governments; the executive‘s tone toward the protection of civil liberties; and deference by the
U.S. Supreme Court to the executive and legislative branches.
Federal restrictions
As in previous crises in American history, though probably to a greater degree, the
federal government set precedents for repressive action that state and local governments later
emulated. For that reason, the restriction of civil liberties by policymakers in the federal
government were more important than the reaction of state and local governments. Four key
aspects of the federal government‘s response to the crisis are particularly relevant: repressive
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legislation enacted by Congress; presidential directives related to civil liberties; efforts on behalf
of the federal government to control political discourse; and federal efforts to monitor and
suppress dissent.
Legislation
For the most part, in its passage of repressive legislation, Congress reflected the broad
evolution of repression described above. As the majority of, and the most important, civil
liberties-related laws were enacted during the McCarthy and Vietnam War eras, these two
periods receive the greatest level of attention.
During the McCarthy era, Congress passed three major laws directed at stemming the
alleged spread of communism in American society. The first was the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947,
which Congress passed over Truman‘s veto. Although its main purpose was to check the
influence of labor by imposing a variety of restrictions on the scope of union activities, the TaftHartley Act contained a provision that sought to purge all communist and radical influence from
labor unions. To do so, the law required all union officers to sign non-communist affidavits as a
condition of retaining access to the benefits of the Wagner Act.509
The second major law, which Congress also passed over Truman‘s veto, was the Internal
Security Act of 1950 (also known variously as the McCarran Act or the Subversive Activities
Control Act). In addition to broadly criminalizing conspiracies to establish a totalitarian regime,
the law required ―communist-action organizations‖ and ―communist front organizations‖ to
register with the Attorney General, and in the process provide critical information about their
operations (i.e. funding sources, membership lists, etc.). In doing so, it established a Subversive
Activities Control Board (SACB) to ensure that groups registered, and it directed a range of
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penalties for groups (and their members) that neglected to do so.510 For example, the Act made
deportable all persons naturalized after January 1, 1951 who joined registered groups within the
next five years. Finally, it authorized the President to declare an ―internal security emergency,‖
at which point the Attorney General would be empowered to detain all persons whom he had
―reasonable grounds‖ to believe might engage in, or conspire to engage in, espionage or
sabotage.511
The third major repressive law passed during the McCarthy era was the McCarran-Walter
Act of 1952 (also known as the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act). Among other things, the
Act specified ―thirty-three reasons for excluding individuals from the United States, combining
prostitutes, paupers, and the insane with ideological undesirables and homosexuals.‖512 Often
ignored in analyses of political repression during the late 1940s and early 1950s , this law was
used over the next forty years to prevent people from visiting the United States on the basis ―of
their political beliefs and associations.‖513
The fourth major law was the Communist Control Act of 1954. In that law, Congress
outlawed the Communist Party by stripping it of its legal rights. The Act was clearly largely
symbolic, however, as it was never enforced. In the same bill, Congress also authorized the
Attorney General to petition the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) to declare certain
labor unions to be under communist domination. Unions so designated would thereby lose their
standing before the National Labor Relations Board and, hence, their status as unions under law.
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Further, their members would thereafter be subjected to a variety of restrictions in employment
with the federal government and with other unions. The cumulative effect of that provision was
to accelerate a pre-existing trend of labor unions purging any members that might cause the
entire organization to be labeled as communist-infiltrated.514
Aside from these major pieces of legislation, Congress enacted a number of other, less
important laws variously restricting and lashing out at members of the Communist Party and
other groups deemed ―communistically-inclined.‖ Four of these are particularly worth
mentioning. The first, the Expatriation Act of 1954, revoked ―the citizenship of persons
convicted under the Smith Act.‖515 The second, an amendment to the Internal Security Act
passed in 1954, required all Communist-action or front groups registered with the government to
register any printing equipment they owned.516 The third, also enacted in 1954, was the
Espionage and Sabotage Act. Also referred to as the Rosenberg Law because it was passed
shortly after the execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in 1953 for passing nuclear secrets to
the Soviet Union, the law made espionage during peacetime a capital offense.517
After the climax of the McCarthy era in 1954, the pace at which repressive laws were
enacted slowed considerably. During the Cold War Interlude, Congress passed only one major
piece of repressive legislation directed at preventing subversion. The law, a 1962 amendment to
the Smith Act of 1940, criminalized ongoing organizational activities by groups advocating the
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illegal overthrow of government—a bill directed specifically at the Communist Party.518 In
enacting the law, Congress was responding to the U.S. Supreme Court‘s 1957 decision in Yates
v. United States, in which the Court ruled that the ―organize‖ provision of the Smith Act referred
only to the original establishment of such a subversive group, and not to continuing
organizational work.519
In addition to this bill, Congress enacted a slew of minor laws during this period that
sought to limit the scope of activities in which communists could engage. In many cases, this
goal was achieved by including loyalty oaths in major pieces of legislation. This was the case in
both the National Defense Education Act of 1958 and the Anti-Poverty Bill of 1964. In other
cases, however, it was clearly felt that loyalty oaths were not sufficient. In the Landrum-Griffin
Act of 1959, Congress replaced the anti-communist loyalty oath established by the Taft-Hartley
Act by making it a crime for past or present CP members to be in the employ of labor unions.
Similarly, in 1962, Congress replaced the anti-communist loyalty oaths of the 1958 National
Defense Education Act and the 1950 National Science Foundation Act by making it a crime for
members of communist-action or front groups to apply for scholarships or grants.520 In a piece of
legislation particularly indicative of continuing concern about the threat of communist
subversion, Congress overturned President Kennedy‘s 1961 ban on the confiscation of foreign
communist propaganda by the Post Office through the 1962 Postal Rate-Federal Pay Increase
Bill (although the bill ―watered-down‖ the previous mail-censorship program somewhat).521
With the escalation of the Vietnam War, the related growth of the anti-war movement,
and the increasing strength and militancy of the civil rights movement in the mid-late 1960s, the
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focus of congressional repressive action shifted from a focus on communism to efforts to ban
dissent. Many major pieces of legislation passed during the Vietnam War era represented efforts
to prevent specific forms of dissent. For example, in 1965, Congress responded to the growing
practice of burning draft cards as a form of public protest by banning the intentional destruction
of draft cards in an amendment to the Universal Military Training and Service Act that year.522
Later, in 1968, Congress responded to the increasing prevalence of flag burning as a form of
public protest by criminalizing the destruction of the flag.523
Much more broadly, in the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Congress included a provision
(often referred to as the Anti-Riot Act of 1968)524 that made it illegal to travel across state lines
or to use interstate facilities, such as a telephone, in order to incite a riot. The provision very
broadly defined a riot to mean an act, or the threat, of violence by at least one person in a group
of three or more people. Although enacted in the aftermath of serious race riots the previous year
and intended primarily to stem increasing violence in the civil rights movement, the Act was
applied in a number of instances to individuals protesting the Vietnam War.525 Equally broadly,
Congress passed a series of bills throughout the Vietnam War era that sought to deny federal
education funds to students involved in dissident activities. Due to those laws, federal financial
aid was denied to over one thousand college students in 1969 and 1970 alone.526
In addition to legislation directed at specific forms of dissent, one other major law was
passed during the Vietnam War era. Reflecting continued concern with the threat of communist
subversion and infiltration, Congress passed a law in 1967 that revived the SACB by authorizing
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the Board simply to list organizations deemed communist, rather than requiring them to register.
In doing so, Congress circumvented previous court decisions that had made the SACB virtually
powerless.527 It should be noted, however, that the legislation had little practical effect, as it
merely formalized an executive order of similar content and purpose issued by President Nixon
on July 2, 1971 (Executive Order 11605).528
In the 1970s, revelations of massive abuse of authority by the Nixon administration and
the federal intelligence agencies led Congress to adopt a different approach to dissent and to
stand against the restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties. In 1971, following the disclosure of the
FBI‘s Counter Intelligence Program and the publication of the Pentagon Papers by the New York
Times, Congress repealed the Emergency Detention Provision of the Internal Security Act of
1950.529 The next year, Congress struck down an attempt to formalize an executive order issued
by Nixon (11605) that sought to revive the SACB.530 Following the Watergate scandal, Congress
strengthened the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in 1974 to improve transparency in
government.531 Much later, in 1978, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) in order to prevent the excesses of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The bill prescribed
―when and how the government could pursue foreign intelligence investigations.‖532
During the Reagan era (as during the Cold War Interlude), the pace at which repressive
legislation was enacted slowed considerably. Only two laws passed during the period are worth
noting. The first, enacted in 1982, was the Intelligence Identification Act. Proposed by the
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Reagan administration, this law criminalized ―the disclosure of information that could lead to the
identification of an intelligence agent, regardless of the public nature of the source of the
information or the illegal or unauthorized nature of the agent‘s activities.‖533 The second, a
provision included in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, exempted certain law enforcement
records from disclosure by normal FOIA regulations. Among those exempted were ―FBI records
pertaining to foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and international terrorism.‖534
Presidential directives
The issuance of presidential directives throughout the Cold War also reflected the broad
evolution in the focus of governmental repression, though to a lesser degree. No major executive
orders or presidential proclamations stemming from fears of communism were issued during the
Cold War Interlude. However, the directives issued during the other periods of the crisis confirm
shifting perceptions of threats to American national security, from communist subversion and
infiltration during the McCarthy era and dissent in general during the Vietnam War era to Soviet
infiltration in the Reagan era.
Every major repressive presidential directive issued during the McCarthy era sought, in
one way or another, to screen potentially subversive individuals from positions of importance in
American society. Of the five issued, three related directly to a centralized effort to prevent
disloyal or even questionably loyal citizens from securing employment with the federal
government. President Truman first established the federal loyalty program through Executive
Order 9835, which he issued on March 21, 1947. His order established a comprehensive federal
loyalty program in which all federal employees and applicants for employment were required to
undergo an extensive loyalty investigation that would draw on files from both the FBI and
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HUAC. Employees could be dismissed and individuals denied from applying for employment if
there existed ―reasonable grounds‖ to believe they were disloyal. Additionally, it directed the
Attorney General to create and maintain a list of subversive organizations that was for all
practical purposes to a government-run blacklist.535 Although the President believed that the
threat of communist infiltration was largely manufactured by Republicans seeking partisan
advantage, he hoped that the establishment of the loyalty program would allow him to subvert
further attacks and to allay popular fears.536 In establishing the program, however, he invited the
serious abuse of Americans‘ civil liberties by making both employees‘ beliefs and associations
grounds for dismissal. This event, more than any other, helped to pave the way for the
widespread hysteria of the early 1950s.537
Four years later, responding to growing hysteria over the ―red menace‖ and undoubtedly
seeking to head off Republican accusations that Democrats were ―soft‖ on communism,
President Truman sought to strengthen the federal loyalty program. To do so, he issued
Executive Order 10241, which ―changed the standard for loyalty firings from the existence of
‗reasonable grounds‘ for the belief that the employee was disloyal to ‗reasonable doubt‘ as to the
loyalty of the individual.‖538 Because of this change, 565 cases previously decided in favor of
federal employees were reopened to review whether the employees in question remained loyal
under the new standard.539 Two years later, and only a few months after he became President,
Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized a significant overhaul of the federal loyalty program. In
Executive Order 10450, Eisenhower established ―a new and more stringent loyalty standard,‖
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ordered all federal agencies to check previously decided cases for compliance with the new
standard, extended the power of summary dismissal to all federal agencies, and authorized all
agencies to dismiss employees ―on ‗security‘ and ‗suitability‘ grounds for such offenses as
drunkenness, sexual perversion and mental disorders.‖540
Aside from federal loyalty directives, two other, less far-reaching, repressive directives
were issued during the McCarthy era. The first, Executive Order 10173 (issued by Truman on
October 18, 1950), authorized the Commandant of the Coast Guard to exclude any person from
maritime employment (government or private) that he deemed a threat and to restrict coastal
areas as he felt necessary to protect American national security.541 The second, issued by
President Truman on January 9, 1953, was Executive Order 10422.542 In EO 10422, Truman
authorized the investigation of all American citizens employed with, or applying to work at, the
United Nations (UN).543
During the Vietnam War era, the threat of communist subversion and infiltration no
longer dominated the concerns of American policymakers to the extent it had previously. To
some extent, this was reflected in the presidential directives issued during that period. But what
was more obvious from the directives issued, was the broader shift from efforts to expand
repression in the very early 1970s to efforts to prevent repression in the mid-late 1970s. In 1971,
President Nixon issued an executive order, 11605, that sought to breathe life into the SACB by
giving the Board ―power formerly held by the attorney general to investigate and compile a list
540
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of groups which it considered‖ radical.544 Nixon‘s directive ultimately failed to revive the SACB,
as Congress refused to appropriate funds for the Board in 1972. Consequently, Nixon later
abolished the Board a year later.545
After the revelations about the extent of surveillance of domestic dissent and the
disclosure of the Watergate scandal in the early to mid-1970s, Presidents Ford and Carter each
issued directives limiting the degree to which certain intelligence agencies could investigate
dissent. On February 18, 1976, Ford issued Executive Order 11905, which banned the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) from launching domestic investigations and prohibited the National
Security Agency (NSA) from monitoring the communications of persons within the United
States (even if the communication in question originated from or was directed to someone
outside the country).546 Two years later, on January 25, 1978, President Carter issued an
executive order, 12036, that limited FBI ―investigations of ‗terrorist‘ and ‗potentially subversive‘
organizations‖ and more broadly restricted the permissible scope of activities in which the
federal intelligence agencies might engage.547 While the three directives discussed above were in
large part a reflection of the issuing president, they also reflected broader trends in American
society.
As in the McCarthy and Vietnam War eras, the presidential directives issued during the
Reagan era reflected shifting perceptions of threats to American national security. In particular,
the various repressive directives issued demonstrated increased concern during the Reagan years
with the threat of Soviet espionage, which was evident from the fact that the most important
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directives expanded surveillance and increased secrecy in government. Without a doubt, the most
important directive issued by President Reagan was Executive Order 12333. Issued on December
4, 1981, the order reversed many of the reforms of the late 1970s by significantly expanding the
scope of activities in which the federal intelligence agencies could engage.548 For example, the
order empowered the CIA to launch domestic intelligence operations, authorized the ―infiltration
of domestic groups,‖ and appeared to open the door to warrantless wiretapping.549 Following this
order, FBI intelligence operations involving wiretaps, infiltration, and other previously illegal
techniques increased significantly. Further, reports surfaced in the early 1980s that the Bureau
was interviewing groups opposed to President Reagan‘s policies in Central America.550
Aside from his efforts to free the federal intelligence agencies from the constraints
imposed during the mid-to-late 1970s, Reagan issued a series of directives throughout the 1980s
that sought to expand secrecy in government. The first, Executive Order 12356, established a
new security classification system that reversed a long-term trend toward growing transparency
in government. Under that order, the ―threshold standard for classification‖ was lowered, the
automatic declassification of classified materials was eliminated, ―the presumption in favor of
openness [was] reversed,‖ and federal officials were no longer required to balance ―the public‘s
need to know against the need for classification.‖551
Over the next few years, the President issued a number of National Security Decision
Directives (NSDD) that variously increased secrecy in government. For example, on March 11,
1983, Reagan issued NSDD 84. Among other things, this directive authorized the use of
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polygraph tests in loyalty investigations and required all Executive Branch employees with
access to highly classified material ―to sign nondisclosure agreements containing prepublication
review clauses,‖552 whereby employees were ―required to submit their public writing, speech
texts, and publication drafts for prior review by security officials.‖553 However, the most
controversial features of this directive, including the prepublication review clause and the
polygraph provision, were subsequently dropped after massive opposition from Congress.554 The
next year, in NSDD 145, issued on September 17, 1984, the Reagan administration introduced ―a
new category of controllable data: ‗sensitive but unclassified government or government-derived
information, the loss of which could adversely affect the national security interest.‘‖555 Later, in
November 1985, the Reagan administration tried once more to authorize the use of polygraph
examinations for federal employees with access to highly classified material through NSDD 196.
This effort was also unsuccessful, however, and was rescinded a year later. Although these
directives represent only a few of the most prominent executive orders issued during the Reagan
years, they demonstrate an extremely high level of concern that sensitive information might fall
into the wrong hands, a concern that continued into the presidency of George H. W. Bush.556
Efforts to control political discourse
During the Cold War, there was no centralized federal effort to control political discourse
by flooding the marketplace of ideas with government propaganda, at least not domestically. The
idea of an official government propaganda agency had fallen very much out of favor after the
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excesses of George Creel‘s Committee on Public Information (CPI). Even so, other factors also
prevented a similar agency from being established. For example, during the McCarthy era, there
was simply no need to establish a new CPI as federal policymakers were already able to
manipulate the public by exploiting popular fears of the ―red menace.‖ Later, during the mid1960s, President Johnson sought to downplay the war in Vietnam in order to maintain support
for his Great Society domestic reforms. Had he even been friendly to the idea, the establishment
of a government propaganda agency would have undermined this central goal by focusing
attention on the war.
There was also relatively little direct censorship of the press, at least by the federal
government. Nevertheless, despite minimal direct censorship, members of the press were not
entirely free from constraints. Press freedom was restricted in two ways throughout the Cold
War. First, during conflicts such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War and Grenada, journalists
were frequently denied access to the critical information needed to inform the public. Second, at
various points throughout the crisis (particularly during the Nixon years), influential journalists
were investigated and harassed by intelligence agents attempting to intimidate them into selfcensorship.
Upon the outbreak of war in Korea, President Truman, acting through the United Nations,
committed American troops to the defense of the Republic of South Korea. As in any war,
military officials were confronted with the difficult task of balancing the public‘s need to be
informed about the progress of the war with the military‘s need to protect vital information such
as troop movements and ―the strength of forces.‖557 Initially, General Douglas MacArthur, the
commander of UN forces in the Korean War, resisted efforts to censor the press, advocating
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instead press self-censorship. Under pressure from Washington, however, MacArthur eventually
consented and the Eighth Army established a set of rules governing censorship. Unsurprisingly,
while intended to prevent the dissemination of critical information, military censorship led to the
suppression of a range of information embarrassing to military and governmental authorities.558
Later, during the Vietnam War, the American military did not establish a similar program of
censorship. Throughout the war, despite strategies of ―official dishonesty‖ and ―news
management‖ on the part of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, members of the press
were accorded wide leeway to publish as they so chose.559 That said, the South Vietnamese
government not only maintained its own censorship program, but subjected reporters to
investigation and harassment.560
Although the press faced some restrictions in covering the wars in Korea and Vietnam,
press censorship in those conflicts paled in comparison to the Reagan administration‘s strategic
denial of access to the news media during the 1983 invasion of Grenada, in which American
troops invaded the island nation to overthrow a recently installed communist government.561
During that conflict, the Reagan administration not only refused to admit that an invasion was
planned until after American troops had landed, but also refused to allow members of the press
any access until the conflict had almost concluded. In doing so, the President was able to win
over the majority of Americans, despite outrage in Congress and from abroad.562 Outrage over
the Reagan administration‘s conduct led to the creation of a ―Department of Defense Media
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Pool.‖563 Unfortunately, during the invasion of Panama six years later, this program failed to
guarantee press access to developments on the ground, as President Bush‘s Secretary of State,
Richard Cheney, ―delayed the activation of the pool and obstructed Army efforts to create a pool
of reporters who were already in Panama.‖564
Beyond the denial of access during wartime, members of the press were also subjected to
investigation and harassment throughout the Cold War. Press censorship was broadly
unnecessary during the McCarthy era as the press was swept up in widespread public hysteria
over the threat of communist subversion. During this period, editors and publishers worked with
government officials to expose alleged communists ―to public opprobrium,‖ while the movie,
radio, and television industries avoided unpopular content, dismissed questionably loyal
employees, and operated a blacklist.565 The press began to assume a more independent stance,
however, after the climax of the McCarthy era in 1953 and 1954.566
When Kennedy came into office in 1961, he found it necessary to devise strategies of
news management and to order ―government agencies to spy on and sometimes harass journalists
who managed to uncover sensitive or embarrassing information.‖567 These strategies of
information control and repression continued throughout the Johnson administration. However,
President Nixon embraced their use more fully than did any other Cold War era president.
During his administration, Nixon used the FBI and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), as well
as a number of other agencies, to investigate and intimidate the press.568 Additionally, the White
House ―began a massive program of subpoenaing the files and unused films and photographs of
563
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reporters‖ in an effort to stifle press contact with radical groups.569 Later, after the New York
Times began publishing the Pentagon Papers—which the Nixon administration challenged
unsuccessfully before the U.S. Supreme Court in one of the only major attempts at
prepublication press censorship during the Cold War—the White House ―set up its own secret
‗Plumbers‘ unit to investigate leaks to the news media.570 The group‘s illegal actions eventually
led to Nixon‘s resignation in 1974. After his resignation and the reforms of the mid-late 1970s,
the investigation and harassment of the press declined significantly, if not entirely.571
Efforts to monitor and suppress dissidents
The surveillance and repression of dissent was clearly not uniform throughout the Cold
War. As circumstances changed and as different avenues of repression became more or less
attractive, policymakers chose to monitor and suppress dissent in different ways and in differing
degrees. During the McCarthy era, the repression of dissent was accomplished most prominently
through the federal loyalty program and by congressional investigation. Less prominent, but still
impactful, were prosecutions, surveillance, and efforts to exclude foreigners and naturalized
citizens. As popular fears of communist subversion diminished throughout the Cold War
Interlude, the loyalty program improved and congressional investigations of communism
declined. Efforts to exclude radicals also became less frequent, while the prosecution of
Communist Party leaders under the Smith Act ended for a time following the U.S. Supreme
Court‘s 1957 decision in Yates v. United States. Nevertheless, despite a general decline in overt
repression, the surveillance of political dissidents expanded, motivated in large part, no doubt, by
the growing strength of the civil rights movement.
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As the antiwar and civil rights movements grew stronger and more militant throughout
the mid-late 1960s and early 1970s, prosecutions and surveillance became the most prominent
methods of repression, though congressional committees also investigated and reported on
communist infiltration in the antiwar movement. Meanwhile, efforts to exclude foreigners and
naturalized citizens remained low and the federal loyalty program effectively dropped off the
radar. After the decline of the antiwar and civil rights movements in the early 1970s and the
concurrent revelations of massive governmental abuse of power, the repression of dissent
diminished significantly as Congress and Presidents Ford and Carter dismantled, or imposed new
restrictions on, many instruments and institutions of wartime repression. Once President Reagan
came into office in 1981, however, his administration began to actively undo some of those
reforms. As a result, during the Reagan era, the surveillance of political dissidents rose
somewhat, along with the exclusion of foreigners for political reasons. During that period,
opponents of Reagan‘s Cold War foreign policies in Central America were a major target of
exclusion.
The Cold War presidents used five specific avenues of repression to monitor and
suppress dissent. They include direct prosecution; surveillance; the exclusion of foreigners and
naturalized citizens; loyalty programs; and congressional investigations.
Direct prosecution
Although the McCarthy era and the Cold War Interlude represent distinct periods of
differing intensity, from the perspective of the prosecution of dissent, it was a continuum. During
both periods, the majority of repressive prosecutions focused on removing communist influence
from important positions in American society. Unsurprisingly, the Communist Party was of the
greatest concern. The first major prosecution occurred in July 1948, when twelve top CP leaders
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were indicted, and subsequently convicted, for ―conspiring to advocate the overthrow of
government.‖572 The U.S. Supreme Court eventually upheld their convictions in the 1951
decision Dennis v. United States. Following the Court‘s decision, the Truman administration
began to indict second-string leaders of the Communist Party. This practice continued
throughout the Eisenhower administration until the U.S. Supreme Court‘s 1957 decision in Yates
v. United States, in which the Court overturned the conviction of twelve California CP leaders in
what ―seemed a routine rerun of Dennis.‖573 In doing so, the Court effectively outlawed further
use of the ―Smith Act as a weapon in the campaign against American Communists.‖574 In the six
years between the Court‘s decision in Dennis and its decision in Yates, 145 first- and secondstring leaders of the Communist Party were indicted under the Smith Act, most for conspiring to
advocate the overthrow of government (though some solely for membership in the Party).575 The
cumulative effect of these prosecutions, combined with other forms of repression and intense
public anti-communism, was to cause the Communist Party to collapse.576
Aside from prosecuting prominent CP leaders, the federal government also sought to
exorcise allegedly communist influences in the labor movement. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947
went a long way toward advancing that goal as it forced labor unions to purge individuals from
positions of power who were even remotely sympathetic to communist ideology.577
Nevertheless, the Eisenhower administration sought further to destroy communist influence in
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the labor movement by leveling a series of perjury indictments against the officers of the few
remaining radical unions who signed non-communist loyalty oaths. This campaign resulted in
twenty convictions by 1956, as well as the destruction of ―six of the ten expelled CIO unions by
1955.‖578
During the Vietnam War era, the focus of federal repression shifted from communists
primarily to political dissidents involved in the civil rights and anti-war movements. In general,
there was relatively little direct and overt prosecution of dissent during the Johnson
administration. As already mentioned, the President feared that suppressing criticism of his
administration‘s foreign policies with regard to Vietnam would alienate the very people that
supported his Great Society social reforms. However, two repressive actions on behalf of the
Johnson administration are worth mentioning. The first, while not a prosecution, per se, had a
similar effect. Following a major demonstration at the Pentagon in October 1967, the Director of
the Selective Service System, Lewis Hershey, recommended that all local draft boards reclassify
and induct antiwar demonstrators.579 Although Director Hershey and Attorney General Ramsey
Clark publicly backed off from that order in December, at least 537 students lost their student
deferments over the next year for protesting the war by turning in their draft cards.580
The other major repressive action initiated by the Johnson administration was the January
1968 prosecution of five leading members of the anti-war movement, which included Yale
University chaplain William Sloane Coffin and renowned pediatrician Dr. Benjamin Spock. The
Boston Five, as they were called, were charged with conspiring to violate the Selective Service
Act on the basis of speeches given at anti-war rallies, as well as their role in helping others to
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violate the law. Four of the defendants were convicted; however, their convictions were later
overturned.581
During the Nixon administration, the prosecution of political dissidents increased
dramatically. Elected on a platform of ―Law and Order,‖ Nixon was far from shy in his efforts to
prosecute political dissent, which his administration did primarily in three ways—by initiating
sweeping conspiracy trials, by using the grand jury system as a method of repression, and by
arresting and prosecuting antiwar demonstrators. From 1969 to 1973, the Nixon administration
initiated four major conspiracy trials, as well as a string of lesser-publicized trials. Perhaps the
most prominent among these was the prosecution of eight anti-war leaders for allegedly
fomenting a riot outside the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, as well as the
prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo for their role in stealing the Pentagon Papers.
Despite their prominence, nearly ever conspiracy prosecution that was initiated during that time
ultimately failed to produce convictions because of insufficient evidence, illegal government
actions, or the government‘s refusal to produce records of illegal wiretapping. Nevertheless,
these conspiracy prosecutions achieved their purpose, as they were extremely costly, in both time
and money, to the anti-war and radical movements.582
As early as 1970, the Nixon administration also began to actively prosecute dissent by
convening federal grand juries for what amounted to broad ―fishing expeditions‖ into the extent
of radical activities in the United States. While grand juries are intended to investigate specific
crimes, the grand jury proceedings held during the Nixon years were often more closely akin to a
―general political intelligence operation‖ and came to represent a convenient method by which
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the administration could punish dissidents without resorting to direct prosecution.583 From 1970
to 1973, over one-hundred grand juries, operating in thirty-six states and eighty-four cities,
subpoenaed one thousand witnesses and issued roughly four hundred indictments. Further,
during this time, roughly thirty witnesses were imprisoned for contempt after they refused to
testify.584
Meanwhile, throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Nixon administration actively
prosecuted individuals who demonstrated against the war in the nation‘s capitol. For example,
during the November 1969 Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam, which was held in
Washington, D.C., police arrested 186 people who were praying peacefully on the steps of the
Pentagon.585 Later, during the May Day protests of 1971, Washington police, along with the
military, responded to an attempt by protestors to shut down the capitol by blocking major streets
and bridges with a massive program of indiscriminate arrests.586 In the few days of the protest,
roughly 13,400 people were arrested, of which 625 pled guilty or no contest, while only 122
were subsequently convicted. Years later, finding ―massive civil rights violations and
unnecessary police violence during every major demonstration‖ between 1969 and 1975, a
federal court judge ordered the destruction of all related arrest records.587
After the end of the Vietnam War era, there were no major prosecutions of political
dissent. This was partly a function of reduced opposition to American foreign and domestic
policy. However, increased awareness of the dangers of repression also played an important role,
particularly in shaping the political constraints on policymakers‘ ability to repress dissent. That
there was little direct prosecution of dissent was evident from the Reagan administration‘s
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treatment of the Sanctuary movement, which emerged in the early to mid-1980s (as a part of the
broader Central America peace movement) and sought to smuggle refugees from war-torn
Central American countries into the United States. In general, despite being subjected to
government surveillance, members of the Sanctuary movement were not prosecuted for voicing
their dissent. A number of activists were indicted between early 1984 and 1985 for transporting
undocumented refugees; however, it would be difficult to argue that those prosecutions violated
their civil liberties.588
Surveillance of dissidents
In addition to direct prosecution, the surveillance of dissident groups and individuals was
a major element of federal repression during the Cold War. Although this was particularly true
during the Vietnam War era, the scope and extent of federal surveillance increased throughout
the years preceding President Johnson‘s first major escalation of the war in Vietnam in 1965.
Indeed, the first two FBI COINTELPRO operations were established in 1956 and 1961,
respectively.
In contrast to other, more overt, forms of repression, federal surveillance largely
continued after the end of the Second World War, as discussed in Chapter 4. Although the FBI
limited its investigations of dissent toward the end of World War II, the Bureau continued to
monitor and open first class mail and continued to engage in a variety of questionably legal
practices and programs, originally begun during the war, such as warrantless wiretapping and
surreptitious entries, as noted in Chapter 4. Further, military intelligence continued to monitor
international communications. It is interesting to question whether the Truman administration
would have maintained these forms of surveillance after 1945 had a new threat to American
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national security not emerged; regardless, the Cold War provided new justifications for the
expansion of surveillance.
In the years immediately after the war, the FBI stepped up its political intelligence
operations significantly, focusing primarily on the threat of communist espionage. Bureau agents
conceived of this threat rather broadly. For example, they investigated a childcare center in New
York that was allegedly run by communists. Additionally, in advance of the presidential election
of 1948, the Bureau investigated individuals only loosely associated with Henry Wallace‘s
Progressive Party.589 Throughout the period, FBI agents not only employed the questionably
legal surveillance techniques established during World War II,590 but also relied heavily on paid
informants, only some of whom were agents of the Bureau. Infiltration of the Communist Party
was so extensive during the late 1940s and early 1950s that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, along
with Attorney General McGrath, claimed to know the identity of every communist in the
country. Unfortunately, a number of these informants were of questionable trustworthiness and
reliability. Many gave inconsistent statements, while one paid informant, Matthew Civet, had ―a
long history of mental illness.‖591 Additionally, throughout the McCarthy era, the FBI continued
to maintain its Security Index of individuals to be arrested in the event of invasion, which the
Justice Department incorporated into a formal emergency detention plan in 1948.592
Although the McCarthy era ended in 1954, the FBI continued to expand its investigations
of dissent throughout the Cold War Interlude. In 1956, during the Eisenhower administration, the
Bureau established its first Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO). Directed against the
Communist Party, the purpose of COINTELPRO-CP was to disrupt and ultimately neutralize the
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CP by utilizing a wide variety of non-traditional and highly abusive methods. For example, FBI
informants worked to create dissention within the Party, while other Bureau agents mailed anticommunist propaganda to CP members believed to have doubts about the Party‘s leadership.593
While it is difficult to gauge concretely the effectiveness of the operation, the surviving remnants
of the CP collapsed in factional infighting between 1957 and 1959.594 Even so, the FBI continued
to expand the scope and extent of its political intelligence investigations throughout the Kennedy
administration. During the early 1960s, the FBI focused increasingly on pro-Castro Cuban
groups (particularly following the 1961 Bay of Pigs and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis), the civil
rights movement, and white-hate groups, as well as extreme left-wing groups.595 Indeed, the FBI
initiated a second COINTELPRO against the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) in 1961, and a third
against the Ku Klux Klan in 1964 (during the Johnson administration).596
Although less impactful, two other agencies also monitored dissent during the McCarthy
era and the Cold War Interlude. The most important was probably the CIA. In 1952, the agency
began to examine the covers of letters mailed between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The program was primarily based out of New York. However, the CIA also examined mail
travelling to and from New Orleans, San Francisco, and Hawaii. Over the course of the program,
the CIA handled over four million letters, opening approximately 8,700.597 Later, in 1958, the
agency began to collaborate with the FBI by providing the Bureau with information that they had
obtained that was relevant to the maintenance of internal security.598 The other agency was the
IRS, which was used at various points to monitor (and punish) dissent by selectively auditing
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radical organizations.599 In 1956, for example, IRS agents raided the Daily Worker, a publication
produced by the Communist Party; seized vital equipment and records; and claimed that the
Party owed hundreds of thousands of dollars in back taxes. Later, during the Kennedy
administration, the IRS began to investigate extreme right- and left-wing groups, ultimately
revoking the tax-exempt status of at least six organizations.600
Building on earlier federal efforts to monitor dissent, the most extensive surveillance of
dissident groups and individuals occurred during the Vietnam War era, with the greatest excesses
occurring because of the Nixon administration‘s determination to suppress dissent. In contrast to
what one might think, during the early years of the Johnson administration, the President, along
with FBI Director Hoover, worked to restrict the scope of federal surveillance. In 1965, Johnson
severely restricted the placement of wiretaps, which he allowed only when essential to the
national security and only with the explicit approval of the Attorney General. Additionally, from
roughly 1964 to 1966, Hoover not only restricted the FBI‘s use of wiretaps and bugs, but also
banned surreptitious entries to collect information (so-called ―black bag jobs‖); ended the
Bureau‘s mail-opening program; and forbid the practice of examining mail and trash for
sensitive information (known as mail and trash covers, respectively). Unfortunately, those efforts
only amounted to minor reform. FBI agents continued to engage in many questionably legal
surveillance practices, such as surreptitious entries and the placement of wiretaps.601
After 1966, as the racial and anti-war movements grew in intensity, federal efforts to
monitor political dissent grew to unprecedented levels. Over the next two years, the FBI
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established two new massive COINTELPROs against black nationalist hate groups and the New
Left, while continuing its broad, and intensely irresponsible, efforts to disrupt and destroy the
CP, the SWP, and white hate groups.602 Indicative of the reckless and abusive nature of the FBI‘s
counterintelligence efforts in those years was Operation Hoodwink, in which Bureau agents
sought to create conflict between the CP and organized crime by sending each group highly
critical letters purporting to come from the other group. For example, one letter attacked the
labor policies of a major mob figure.603 In addition to the expansion of its counterintelligence
efforts, the FBI continued to maintain its Security Index, while also creating new lists of
individuals to be detained in a time of crisis. These included a ―Rabble Rouser Index,‖ an
―Agitator Index,‖ a ―Key Activists Index,‖ and a ―Key Activist photo album.‖604
Complementing the active efforts of the Bureau to monitor political dissidents, the CIA,
the NSA and military intelligence expanded their political intelligence operations in ways only
loosely related to their intended functions. While continuing its mail-opening program, the CIA
also established three massive domestic surveillance programs—codenamed Project
MERRIMAC, Project RESISTANCE, and Operation CHAOS—that, while ostensibly intended
to protect CIA assets and vet future employees, investigated a wide range of political dissent.
Around the same time, the NSA supplemented its general monitoring of international
communications (Project SHAMROCK) with Project MINARET, which sought to uncover
communist influence in the civil rights and anti-war movements. Finally, in 1967, Army
intelligence instituted its own domestic surveillance program meant to help the Army respond
more effectively in the event of serious domestic disorders.605
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The surveillance of political dissidents by the federal government reached its peak during
the Nixon years, particularly between 1969 and 1971. Federal surveillance was so intense during
those years that nearly a quarter million people were kept under active surveillance, while
thousands of organizations were investigated and files were developed on hundreds of thousands
of people.606 Throughout the period, the FBI, CIA, NSA, and military intelligence continued to
expand the scope and extent of their political intelligence operations.607 Meanwhile, the IRS, at
the behest of the Nixon administration, investigated a wide range of radical groups, such as SDS,
with the goal of removing their tax-exempt status.608 Additionally, during the early 1970s, the
White House began to maintain an ―enemies list‖ and, after the release of the Pentagon Papers in
1971, established its own investigations unit, the ―Plumbers‖ (discussed earlier).609
From the early to mid-1970s, revelations of massive governmental abuse of power on
behalf of both the Nixon administration and previous administrations, led to the termination of
every major surveillance program and the placement of restrictions meant to prevent the excesses
of the Nixon years from reoccurring. Most importantly, the FBI‘s COINTELPRO was terminated
in 1971 following public disclosure of the Bureau‘s activities, though some FBI agents continued
to engage in actions characteristic of the program for the next few years.610 Also in 1971, the FBI
was forced to rename its Security Index the Administrative Index (ADEX) in order to avoid
scrutiny after Congress repealed the Emergency Detention provisions of the 1950 Internal
Security Act. In the following years, the ADEX was reduced substantially, and ultimately
terminated in October 1975.611 The trend toward decreased FBI surveillance culminated in the
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mid-1970s, when Attorney General Levi issued a set of surveillance guidelines and President
Carter issued an executive order (12036, discussed earlier) that, in different ways and to different
degrees, ―imposed stringent limitations on the investigative authority and activities of the
FBI.‖612 Meanwhile, during the early 1970s, the political intelligence operations of the CIA, the
NSA, and military intelligence were wound down and eventually terminated.613 This trend
concluded in 1976, when President Ford issued an executive order (11905, also discussed earlier)
prohibiting the CIA from investigating domestic dissent and forbidding the NSA from
monitoring communications to, from, or within the United States.614
The reforms implemented during the mid- to late-1970s remained in effect until the
Reagan administration. Shortly after entering office, President Reagan issued an executive order
(12333) that, among other things, authorized the CIA to investigate and infiltrate domestic
groups.615 Later, in 1983, Attorney General Smith reversed the Levi guidelines, issued in 1976,
by expanding significantly the FBI‘s authority to investigate and infiltrate dissident groups. 616
Under those less restrictive guidelines, the federal intelligence agencies increased their political
intelligence operations throughout the 1980s. The FBI continued to employ some of the practices
established during the Second World War and the Cold War, such as surreptitious entries and the
infiltration of dissident groups. Further, as part of its Library Awareness Program, Bureau agents
approached libraries to inquire about their users, for example, foreigners who request scientific
books.617 Targets of Reagan era surveillance included the Central America peace movement
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primarily, as well as the antinuclear movement, both of which the Reagan administration alleged
were ―national security threats and heavily influenced by foreign elements.‖618
Exclusion of foreigners and naturalized citizens
Complementing the prosecution and surveillance of dissent, there were also efforts, over
the course of the Cold War, to exclude from the country those foreigners and naturalized citizens
deemed injurious to the national interest. This was done by deporting or denaturalizing
dissidents, as well as by restricting the issuance of visas and passports, practices that reached
their height during the McCarthy era. As early as 1948, the Truman administration banned
foreign communists from visiting the country and started to deny passports to American citizens
deemed harmful to the national interest. During the same year, the Truman administration also
launched a highly publicized campaign to deport individuals deemed subversive, which focused
most heavily on radical union leaders and critics of Truman‘s Cold War foreign policies,
particularly supporters of Henry Wallace‘s Progressive Party. Though the campaign brought
about few deportations, it resulted in the arrest of over one hundred alleged communists between
February and May 1948 alone. As public hysteria and the President‘s need to fend off
Republican attacks on the Democratic Party as ―soft‖ on communism grew throughout the late
1940s and early 1950s, the Truman administration stepped up its efforts to exclude alleged
subversives.619
Once President Eisenhower came into office, federal efforts to exclude foreigners and
naturalized citizens intensified even further. In March 1953, Eisenhower‘s Attorney General,
Herbert Brownell, announced that 10,000 people were being investigated for potential
denaturalization, along with another 12,000 for potential deportation. Political deportations
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reached their peak in 1954, having grown more than threefold in only three years (from eighteen
in 1951 to sixty-one in 1954). After that point, however, efforts to exclude began to diminish as
the threat of communist subversion and infiltration became less tangible. Deportations rapidly
dropped to just six in 1958, with a small spike occurring between 1959 and 1960. From 1962
onward, the number of political deportations hovered between two and four throughout the 1960s
and 1970s.620 Efforts to exclude foreigners and naturalized citizens undoubtedly continued to
occur, but at reduced levels, during the Cold War Interlude and the Vietnam War era.
During the Reagan era, there appeared to have been few instances in which political
dissidents were deported or denaturalized; however, the Reagan administration did employ some
of the strategies of exclusion prominent during the McCarthy era. In particular, throughout the
1980s, the State Department (acting under the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952), routinely denied
visas to foreign speakers critical of Reagan‘s Cold War foreign policies, particularly with regard
to Central America.621 When visas were issued to such individuals, they were often ―limited to
particular cities or special public appearances.‖622
Loyalty program
Another important aspect of the federal campaign to monitor and suppress dissent during
the Cold War was the federal loyalty program, a major instrument of repression during the
McCarthy era. As early as 1946, policymakers began to grow very concerned with protecting the
federal government from communist infiltration. Those fears, and the associated political
pressures, led Truman to establish a Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty in November
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1946.623 After reviewing the federal loyalty program, the Commission ―recommended the
vigorous and effective punishment of disloyal individuals in the government.‖624 Following those
recommendations, President Truman issued an executive order (9835, discussed earlier) that
established a strict, centralized loyalty program in which all federal employees were to undergo
an investigation and be dismissed if ―reasonable grounds‖ existed to believe they were
disloyal.625 In large part, Truman‘s decision was motivated by political calculations. Although
relatively unconcerned with the treat of communist infiltration himself, he hoped the
establishment of the federal loyalty program would allow him to head off increasingly vicious
Republican red-baiting.626 One major outgrowth of that directive was the Attorney General‘s List
of Subversive Organizations, a published, government-run blacklist that effectively dictated to
the public the groups that they could or could not join. Though most important for its broad
chilling effect on the freedom of speech, the Attorney General‘s List also had an overwhelmingly
negative effect on group membership and contributions. Further, the groups on the list were
vulnerable to other forms of repressive action. For example, Congress passed legislation in 1952
banning ―members of listed organizations from eligibility for public housing.‖627
After 1947, the federal loyalty program was made successively more stringent as
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower revised the standards for dismissal (through executive orders
10241 and 10450, respectively). Additionally, the program was effectively broadened in 1949
when the Department of Defense (DoD) announced that it would hold private employees of DoD
contractors to similar loyalty standards.628 By mid-1953, the federal loyalty program had reached
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its peak in terms of breadth and severity. Only a year later, in June 1954, the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) announced that J. Robert Oppenheimer, the father of the atomic bomb,
would no longer have access to classified AEC material. This incident, more than any other
symbolized and made evident the gross excesses of the federal loyalty program.629 After
Oppenheimer‘s dismissal, the program began to show signs of improvement, in large part
because of greater awareness of the need for caution in determining the loyalty of employees. By
the Vietnam War era, it was no longer a major method of repression (though the Attorney
General‘s List was not abolished until 1974).630
Ultimately, throughout the McCarthy era, 13.5 million people, or roughly twenty percent
of the American work force, were subjected to the federal loyalty program, with approximately
20,000 subjected to formal hearings. During this time, 3,900 federal employees, in addition to
5,400 private-sector employees working for government contractors, were dismissed as disloyal.
Those numbers are likely conservative estimates, however, as they discount the number of
employees fired due to similar loyalty programs and blacklists established voluntarily by private
companies. In the end, at a cost of 350 million dollars and countless lives ruined or reputations
tarnished, the federal loyalty program failed ―to uncover a single spy.‖631
Congressional investigation
The last major avenue of repression prominent during the Cold War was the surveillance
and suppression of political dissidents by congressional investigation. In contrast to the intended
purpose of their investigatory power, congressional committees conducted investigations into
dissent in order to define the acceptable standards of thought and to enforce those standards by
exposing subversives to public opprobrium. In this way, the types of investigations conducted
629
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throughout the Cold War were broadly similar to the federal loyalty program, as each sought to
punish dissent without according dissidents the normal due process guarantees of the courtroom.
Though particularly powerful and vicious during the McCarthy era, congressional committees
investigated subversion from 1945 until the last remaining internal security subcommittees were
abolished in mid- to late 1970s.
During the McCarthy era, congressional investigations of dissent were so extensive that
their impact was felt in ―virtually all aspects of American life‖:
[They] spread a chill of fear…throughout the whole of American society – fear not only
of advocating communism, but of advocating virtually any dissenting or unpopular
opinion, fear of joining radical or liberal organizations, fear of reading dissenting
periodicals, and ultimately fear of thinking ‗bad‘ thoughts.632
Although the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), the Senate Internal Security
Subcommittee (SISS), and Senator McCarthy‘s Subcommittee on Investigations were most
responsible for fostering that repressive climate, numerous other House and Senate
subcommittees also investigated political dissent in different ways and to different degrees
throughout the period.633
Of the three listed above, HUAC was the most well-known and most vicious red-hunting
congressional committee. In the first two years after the end of World War II, before it became
fully apparent that the United States and the Soviet Union had descended into a Cold War,
HUAC received little attention, as well as limited appropriations. In 1947, however, following
Truman‘s establishment of the federal loyalty program, HUAC began to investigate, in a highly
publicized and extremely irresponsible manner, the extent of communist activities in the United
States.634 In doing so, the committee compiled and published its own massive lists of subversive
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organizations and individuals. For example, in 1948, HUAC announced that it had ―compiled
lists of signers of CP election petitions ‗for various years in twenty states, showing 363,119
signatures.‘‖635 Over the next seven years, targets of HUAC investigation ran far and wide, from
government officials and the movie industry to left-wing unions, alleged CP ―front groups,‖ and
the Progressive Party.636 Indicative of the committee‘s reckless behavior were its attacks on the
arts. HUAC not only sought and achieved the blacklist of prominent, allegedly subversive,
writers (such as playwright and author of The Crucible Arthur Miller), but also investigated
communist subversion in the movie industry. The committee‘s investigations led to the
imprisonment of numerous prominent Hollywood figures for contempt and led the movie
industry to blacklist any person who refused to deny membership in the Communist Party. 637
By 1957, HUAC had heard testimony from 3,000 people and, in the process, ruined the
careers and reputations of countless individuals. Of those who appeared before the committee,
135 were cited for contempt (though the majority of contempt citations were ultimately
dismissed). Beyond the direct consequences of non-cooperation, many ―unfriendly‖ witnesses
were subsequently dismissed from their jobs, and in some cases became the targets of mob
violence.638
After the climax of the red scare in 1954, congressional investigations into communist
subversion and infiltration declined sharply. In part, the decrease in activity was the product of
diminishing hysteria; however, it also reflected the simple fact that there were few ―subversives‖
left to investigate. Despite the decline, congressional committees continued to investigate
throughout the Cold War Interlude, but at a reduced rate. Targets of investigation during those
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years included a disparate collection of left-wing individuals, groups, and institutions (such as
unions, summer camps, teachers, and businesspersons), as well as the nuclear test ban movement
(and the pacifism movement more broadly). Indicative of a changing climate, however, was the
fact that college students began to protest HUAC as early as 1960 (though, unsurprisingly, their
efforts were portrayed as part of the broader communist conspiracy against the so-called
―American way of life‖).639
The investigation of dissent by congressional committees continued to decline into the
early 1960s. But congressional activity increased once more after President Johnson began to
escalate the American presence in Vietnam. Over the following years, HUAC and SISS held
investigations into the anti-war movement, dissent on college and university campuses, and
Black Nationalist groups, as well as the KKK. As during the McCarthy era, throughout the late
1960s and early 1970s, both committees routinely issued reports charging communist control of
the anti-war movement.640 For example, in 1968:
[HUAC] urged the use of the Internal Security Act‘s concentration camps for the
‗temporary imprisonment of warring guerillas‘ and claimed that radical and black groups
were ‗seriously considering the possibility of instituting armed insurrection in this
country.‘641
By the mid-1970s, revelations of extensive governmental spying and disruption of dissident
groups during the Nixon years, along with the collapse of the anti-war and civil rights
movements, made further congressional investigations into dissent both increasing unnecessary
and increasingly untenable. Subsequently, the House abolished HUAC (which had been renamed
the House Internal Security Committee, or HISC) in January 1975, while SISS continued to hold
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hearings into dissident activities until it too was abolished by the Senate in early 1977.642 After
that point, congressional investigation was no longer a major instrument of repression throughout
the rest of the Cold War.
State and local restrictions
In general, throughout the Cold War, the repression of dissent at the state and local levels
closely mirrored repressive actions taken by the federal government. During the McCarthy era,
state and local policymakers responded to growing fears of the ―red menace‖ (and the
exploitation of those fears by federal policymakers seeking partisan advantage) by enacting a
wide range of laws targeting ―subversives‖ and by conducting legislative investigations into
dissent. It is noteworthy that state and local repression began after the establishment of the
federal loyalty program in 1947, though growing hysteria would almost certainly have produced
such a result regardless.
Though only a few states instituted full-fledged loyalty programs, nearly thirty states
enacted laws banning subversives from state employment (nine of which specifically barred
communists), while around a thousand state and local governmental districts or institutions
across the country required employees to sign loyalty oaths. Reflecting a similar purpose, twenty
states also enacted legislation preventing members of the Communist Party and other subversive
organizations from running for public office. In addition to those efforts, nine states passed
legislation modeled after the Internal Security Act of 1950, which required ―communist-action‖
and ―communist-front‖ groups to register with the federal government. Additionally, many states
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criminalized membership in subversive groups. A few even outlawed the Communist Party
entirely.643
Although less common, a number of states (at least twelve) also investigated dissent
through legislative committees. Their focus and activities were broadly similar to the
congressional committees, particularly HUAC, as they sought to expose subversives to public
condemnation and to develop as much information on dissident individuals and groups as
possible. In general, they cast an equally wide net with a particular focus on subversion in the
public school system. State investigations into radicalism in academia not only resulted in the
dismissal of a number of teachers and professors, but also led a few institutions to institute
loyalty standards of their own.644
After the end of the McCarthy era, diminishing public hysteria was reflected in the
actions of state and local governments. Over the next five years, from 1955 to 1960, very few
repressive state or local laws were enacted. During the same period, the prosecution of
subversives fell significantly after the U.S. Supreme Court declared in Pennsylvania v. Nelson
(1956) that federal laws directed against sedition superceded all state and local laws of the same
purpose.645 Although the Kennedy years saw the enactment of additional repressive state
legislation in response to the Cuban Revolution and growing right- and left-wing activity, the
prosecution of political dissidents remained relatively rare.646 It should be noted that, throughout
the period, southern state and local governments exploited fear of communist subversion and
infiltration to suppress the growing civil rights movement. For example, some southern state
legislatures held investigations into civil rights organizations such as the NAACP, while laws
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originally intended to stem the alleged spread of communism were frequently used to prosecute
prominent civil rights activists. Some states even attempted to force the NAACP to disclose its
membership lists under communist registration laws.647
During the Vietnam War era, the supression of dissent at the state and local level
increased dramatically. As state and local policymakers took cues from the federal government,
they generally mirrored federal repression. However, some actions taken by state and local
governments during the period (particularly in the late 1960s and early 1970s) demonstrated a
willingness to suppress dissent that exceeded even that of federal policymakers. Four major
forms of state and local repression were evident throughout the period. These include legislation,
surveillance, prosecutions, and the occasional excessive use of force by local police and state
National Guard troops.
In general, significantly fewer repressive laws were enacted during the Vietnam War era.
One major exception, however, were laws enacted that sought to quell political protests on
campus. In 1969 and 1970 alone, almost eighty laws were passed in thirty-two states that
variously prevented students from becoming active in the anti-war and civil rights movements.
Some directed the expulsion of students who engaged in protests against campus regulations,
while others made it possible to eliminate financial aid for dissident students. Although many of
those laws were undoubtedly directed at legitimate incidents of violence on campus, they made it
easier for state authorities to suppress dissenting opinions. Significantly more important was the
expansion of surveillance throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. During that period, local
police in hundreds of municipalities developed their own intelligence divisions (often referred to
as ―Red Squads‖), while a number of states established full-scale surveillance operations. In
many cases, state and local intelligence units committed many of the same excesses
647
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characteristic of the FBI‘s Counterintelligence Program, such as infiltration protest groups and
developing extensive files on alleged subversives.648
The prosecution of dissent by state and local governments was another major form of
repression during the Vietnam War era. Throughout the period, a large number of individuals
were arrested and prosecuted under flag desecration and red flag laws. There were also numerous
criminal syndicalism prosecutions, the majority of which appear to have been quite baseless.
Finally, there were numerous instances in which political dissidents were arrested under
disorderly conduct laws for using offensive language and under loitering laws. Certainly some of
these prosecutions were legitimate; however, there can be no doubt that at least some were part
of the broader effort to suppress dissident speech.649
The last major form of repression was the excessive use of force by state and local
authorities. Although certainly not the intent of policymakers, there were a number of major
instances throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s in which local police and state National
Guard troops responded to protesters in a harsh and violent manner. There were undoubtedly
many protesters who were antagonistic, if not downright hostile, to those authorities. For
example, at the October 1967 Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam, some protesters ―urinated
on the Pentagon, threw rocks at first-floor windows, and taunted, insulted, and spat upon [federal
troops there to protect the Pentagon], who stood fixed at attention.‖650 However, the level of
antagonism does not excuse the level of violence that protesters occassionally received. The most
well-known incident was at Kent State University in 1969, in which Ohio National Guard troops
―responded to taunts and rock throwing by firing their M-1 rifles into a crowd of students, killing
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four, wounding thirteen.‖651 A few days later, 1.5 million college and university students
responded to the tragedy by walking out of their classes.652
The repression of dissent by state and local governments appears to have declined during
the mid-1970s concurrent with the decline of federal efforts to monitor and suppress political
dissidents. Thus, by the end of the Vietnam War era, there was undoubtedly relatively little
repression on the state and local levels. Once President Reagan came into office, his
administration escalated the Cold War, increasing government secrecy and federal surveillance
in the process. Fortunately, as the Reagan era was not a particularly intense period of the Cold
War, those efforts do not appear to have resulted in any appreciable increase in state and local
repression.653
Executive tone toward civil liberties
The third major facet that should be considered in assessing the degree to which
Americans‘ civil liberties were restricted during the Cold War is the tone set by different
presidents toward civil liberties and dissent. Although there were nine different presidents during
the crisis, attention is given only to Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon, as those four
presidents had the greatest affect on the course of the Cold War. Reagan is extremely important
to Cold War developments as well, however, the amount of radical dissent in American society
during the 1980s was so low, relatively, that it is difficult to assess Reagan‘s approach to dissent
without relying heavily on clearly polemical material.
Throughout his time as president, members of the Republican Party attacked Harry S.
Truman viciously as ―soft‖ on communism. Feeding on, and cultivating, popular fears of massive
communist subversion and infiltration in the U.S. government, Republicans scored huge gains in
651
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the election of 1946.654 Thereafter, many policies advanced by the Truman administration
reflected the President‘s need to head off Republican attacks and to take control of the ―red‖
issue. A perfect case in point was the federal loyalty program. As discussed earlier, Truman
established a comprehensive loyalty program in 1947 (through Executive Order 9835) that
subjected millions of Americans to investigation and made possible their dismissal for affiliation
with individuals or groups deemed subversive. The program ultimately helped to lay ―the
foundation of the anti-Communist hysteria that gripped the nation over the next decade.‖655
However, it was created not because Truman was particularly concerned with the threat of
communist infiltration—indeed, he felt that the communist threat was being overblown—but
because he had come to believe that ―acting first on the loyalty issue‖ would allow him to
subvert Republican attacks and to allay popular fears.656
Yet despite establishing a strict federal loyalty program and authorizing other forms of
repression (such as the prosecution of prominent CP leaders and the deportation of radicals),657
Truman was unable to head off Republican attacks on himself and the Democratic Party.
Nothing anyone in his administration did or said seemed to diminish the Republican onslaught or
the fear that many prominent Republicans ―spread in the government and the nation.‖658
Truman‘s legacy, then, is this: though he felt fears of communist subversion and infiltration
overblown, disapproved of HUAC,659 and distrusted the FBI,660 he instituted a number of
repressive policies that not only failed to shield the Democratic Party from Republican redbaiting in the long run, but paved the way for McCarthyism and the hysteria of the early 1950s.
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To an extent, President Eisenhower was faced with some of the same challenges that
beset Truman. Although a dedicated anti-communist, he ―deplored McCarthy‘s tactics and
regretted the damage they were doing to the country.‖661 Nevertheless, throughout the first years
of his administration, he tolerated, even appeased, McCarthy out of the belief that the Senator
was too powerful to be taken down. In part, he also feared, rightly, that challenging McCarthy
would divide his own party and make it difficult for him to lead. 662 The President finally stood
firm against McCarthy‘s abusive and irresponsible tactics in mid-1954 after the Senator
overstepped his bounds by attacking a decorated Army commander, Brigadier General Zwicker,
during the Army-McCarthy hearings. After that attack, the President invoked a twisted
interpretation of executive privilege to deny McCarthy the power to subpoena executive branch
employees. This effectively ended the Senator‘s efforts to intimidate the Eisenhower
administration and went a long ways toward bringing down McCarthy.663
Yet while Eisenhower opposed McCarthy‘s tactics, he was nevertheless a vigilant anticommunist. Immediately upon taking office, he revised Truman‘s loyalty program by loosening
the requirements for the dismissal of employees. Throughout the period, his administration
continued to prosecute Communist Party leaders under the Smith Act, even after the Senate
voted to censure McCarthy. Additionally, although he was not initially aware of the FBI‘s
Counterintelligence Program, Eisenhower presided over a significant increase in political
surveillance and was given ―[ample] warnings that [FBI Director] Hoover‘s campaign against
American Communists might broaden into a general war against political dissent.‖664 In sum,
although President Eisenhower opposed the worst excesses of the McCarthy era and helped to
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destroy the career of its namesake, his administration clearly believed that it was necessary to
monitor and suppress radical dissent.
When Lyndon Johnson became president in 1963, communism was no longer the issue it
had been during the McCarthy era. By that point, the hysteria of the late 1940s and early 1950s
had died down to such a point that, unlike Truman, Johnson did not need to defend himself
constantly against Republican charges of being ―soft‖ on communism. That said, many
prominent federal policymakers, including the President, continued to believe that communism
lay behind much of radical, even moderate, dissent in America. That belief was particularly true
of the growing civil rights and anti-war movements, extending even to the press and left wing
congressmen.665
Yet while inclined to believe that criticism of his policies reflected communist
subversion, Johnson sought to avoid prosecuting political dissidents. Although he believed that
―the president needed to be virtually ‗unassailable‘‖ on matters of foreign policy, he feared that
suppressing dissent would undermine support for his Great Society domestic reforms.666 The
President‘s tolerance of, or rather refusal to suppress, dissent began to diminish, however, as the
anti-war and civil rights movements intensified. Increasingly, Johnson ordered the FBI and the
CIA to intensify their surveillance and disruption of dissident groups and individuals. By the
time he left office, his administration had mobilized a significant internal security apparatus,
which the Nixon administration later exploited in a broad effort to destroy all manner of
dissent.667 Ultimately, although Johnson largely refused to prosecute political dissidents, his

665

Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and his Times, 1961-1973 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1998), pp. 281-284, pp. 352-353, pp. 366-367, pp. 487-490.
666
Stone, Perilous Times, p. 441.
667
Stone, Perilous Times, pp. 436-451, pp. 488-490, p. 492.

217
belief that criticism of his policies reflected communist subversion and his efforts to expand
federal surveillance of dissent helped to make possible the abuses of the Nixon years.
Of the nine Cold War presidents, Richard M. Nixon was undoubtedly the least tolerant of
dissent and the least respectful of Americans‘ civil liberties. Throughout his administration, he
labeled protesters bums, thugs, and hoodlums, frequently implying that dissident college students
were ingrates because of their protest activities on campus.668 Additionally, his administration
routinely attacked the news media on the basis of its alleged liberal bias.669 More broadly, as the
antiwar movement grew particularly intense in early to mid-1970, the President came to believe
that it would be necessary to vilify critics of his administration in order to rally his supporters.
His efforts to do so undoubtedly helped to spur the anti-antiwar demonstrations that arose around
that time, many of which turned violent against peace protesters.670
Unsurprisingly, the President‘s general intolerance of dissent extended beyond the
rhetoric put forth by his administration. To a greater degree than Lyndon Johnson, Nixon was
convinced that there was a link between foreign communists and the United States‘ ―domestic
troubles,‖ particularly with regard to the anti-war movement.671 Operating on that belief, the
President further expanded the already massive internal security apparatus that he had inherited
from Johnson. As early as 1970, his administration also began to compile a White House
―enemies list,‖ which contained the names of at least two hundred individuals and eighteen
organizations.672 Later, after the release of the Pentagon Papers in 1971, the Nixon
administration established a secret White House investigations unit—the Plumbers—dedicated to
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plugging leaks to the news media and disseminating information damaging to the Democratic
Party.673 Additionally, throughout the Nixon years, the Justice Department actively sought to tie
up prominent leaders of the antiwar movement by charging them with violating federal laws
against conspiracy.674 In sum, during his time as president, Richard M. Nixon struck a hostile
tone toward civil liberties by savaging political dissidents in public addresses and by expanding
and utilizing the government‘s weaponry against dissent.
Deference of the U.S. Supreme Court
The last aspect of the crisis that is relevant in assessing the restriction of Americans‘ civil
liberties during the Cold War is the deference of the U.S. Supreme Court to the executive and
legislative branches. The Court‘s record on issues of civil liberties and dissent varied throughout
the crisis, with the McCarthy era representing a particular low point. Overall, however, the Court
exercised a significant liberalizing influence on federal, state, and local policymakers.
McCarthy era
Toward the end of World War II, the Supreme Court began to shift to a stance more
protective of Americans‘ civil liberties. This more tolerant approach continued after the end of
the war. However, by 1948, as the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union
escalated, the Court increasingly began to favor the side of the government in cases involving
individual liberty.675 This shift grew more pronounced throughout the late 1940s such that by the
early 1950s the Court was routinely upholding instances of wartime repression. In part, the
growing conservatism of the Court during those years was also the result of the appointment of

673

Reeves, President Nixon, pp. 348-349; Stone, Perilous Times, pp. 514-515.
Stone, Perilous Times, pp. 482-483; Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, p. 487.
675
Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, p. 268.
674

219
two conservatives to the U.S. Supreme Court—Frederick M. Vinson (who was appointed Chief
Justice in 1946) and Sherman Minton.676
During the McCarthy era, the Court endorsed the restriction of civil liberties by federal,
state, and local governments in a variety of cases. Most notable was the Court‘s June 1951
decision in Dennis v. United States. In Dennis, the Court upheld the 1948 conviction of twelve
national CP leaders for ―conspiring to advocate the overthrow of government.‖677 In doing so, it
opened the door to additional Smith Act prosecutions. Immediately following the Court‘s
decision, nineteen second-string CP leaders were arrested in New York, as well as numerous
other leads in states and municipalities including California, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, and
Cleveland. Efforts to prosecute prominent leaders of the Communist Party continued until 1957,
at which point the Supreme Court overruled parts of the Smith Act through its decision in Yates
v. United States.678
In addition to its subversive advocacy decision in Dennis, the Supreme Court routinely
upheld federal, state, and local efforts to screen alleged subversives from positions of influence.
This was the case in a number of decisions in which loyalty or non-communist oaths were an
issue, such as Bailey v. Richardson (1950); American Communications v. Douds (1950); Garner
v. Board of Public Works (1951); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore
(1951); and Adler v. Board of Education (1952).679 Garner and Adler both illustrate the types of
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repressive actions the Court chose to uphold. In Garner, which was decided on the same day as
Dennis, the Court upheld a Los Angeles law requiring all municipal employees to pledge that
they had not joined any subversive organizations after 1943. Similarly, in Adler, the Court
upheld a New York law banning subversives—i.e. those who advocated the overthrow of
government—from employment in the public school system.680
During the same period, the Supreme Court also proved unwilling to check federal efforts
to deport or exclude allegedly subversive aliens. As with loyalty oaths, the Court routinely
upheld Smith Act deportations of CP members, along with the exclusion of foreigners from the
United States on ideological grounds.681 Perhaps the most important, or at least the most well
known, case of this type was Harisiades v. Shaughnessy. Decided in 1952, the Court ruled that it
was constitutional to deport three aliens for past membership in the Communist Party, even
though they had each lived within the United States for at least thirty-two years and had not
belonged to the CP for over twelve years.682
Cold War Interlude
Although the Senate voted to censure McCarthy in late 1954, cracks in the U. S. Supreme
Court‘s support for government repression did not begin to show until a few years later. In 1955
and 1956, the Court issued a few important decisions—Peters v. Hobby in 1955 and Slochower
v. Board of Higher Education, Cole v. Young, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, and Communist Party v.
Subversive Activities Control Board in 1956—that began to limit specific forms of repression. In
those decisions, the Court restricted the federal loyalty program, struck down state sedition laws,
reversed the dismissal of a New York college professor for pleading the Fifth Amendment before
680
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SISS, and reversed an SACB order requiring the CP to register with the federal government. 683
The ―climax of the Court‘s assault on McCarthyism‖ occurred the next year.684 On June
17, 1957, which later became known as ―Red Monday,‖ the Court ―handed down four decisions
that reversed the course of constitutional history.‖685 Of those issued, Watkins v. United States
and Yates v. United States were undoubtedly the most important. In Watkins, the Supreme Court
ruled that HUAC‘s investigations of dissent were unconstitutionally broad in scope. More
importantly, the Court ruled in Yates that convictions under the Smith Act required more than
mere theoretical advocacy of violence and that the Act‘s ―organize‖ provision referred only to
the original establishment of a subversive group, and not to continuing organizational work. As a
result, Yates significantly undermined the extent to which the federal government could use the
Smith Act to prosecute members of the Communist Party.686
Although the growing willingness of the Supreme Court in those years to challenge
government repression was partly the result of diminishing anti-communist hysteria, it was more
largely a function of changes in the composition of the Court. In 1953, President Eisenhower
appointed as Chief Justice moderate Republican Earl Warren. Later, in 1956, he appointed
William J. Brennan. To his dismay, both men adopted liberal approaches to issues of dissent and
transformed the Supreme Court ―from a national security court into a civil liberties court.‖687 The
Court‘s strong support for civil liberties in cases involving alleged communists did not last,
however. Following significant criticism of its 1956 and 1957 decisions, the Warren Court
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appeared to adopt a more cautious approach to such cases.688 This was evident in part from the
fact that the number of cases involving civil liberties that the Court refused to review rose
dramatically in the years after 1957.689
Nevertheless, by the early 1960s, it had brought to an end the prosecution of Communists
under the Smith Act.690 One particularly important decision in that regard, aside from Yates, was
Scales v. United States, in which the Court limited significantly the circumstances in which
individuals could be prosecuted under the Smith Act for mere membership in the Communist
Party.691 The Court‘s record in cases involving congressional and state legislative committees
was slightly more uneven. However, it did issue a few decisions that declared it unacceptable for
congressional and state legislative committees to investigate alleged subversives merely to
expose them to public opprobrium.692
Vietnam War era
During the Vietnam War era, the Supreme Court‘s record in cases related to political
dissent was much more positive. Throughout the period, the Court demonstrated support for
Americans‘ civil liberties in a range of cases involving acts of dissent, many involving symbolic
nonverbal speech (such as burning an American flag to protest the war). Three different types of
cases particularly demonstrate the Court‘s increasingly broad interpretation of First Amendment
rights. First, the Supreme Court routinely ruled unconstitutional state and local laws
criminalizing flag desecration. For example, in its 1974 decision in Smith v. Goguen, the Court
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overturned the conviction of a Massachusetts man prosecuted for sewing a replica of the
American flag to the seat of his pants.693 Second, in a number of major cases, the Supreme Court
ruled against university and public school restrictions on radicalism. For example, in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District, it ruled unconstitutional the expulsion of
three students for refusing to remove black armbands intended as a form of protest against the
war in Vietnam.694 Third, the Court also overturned a number of cases in which individuals were
prosecuted under disorderly conduct statutes for symbolic speech deemed to be offensive by
local authorities.695
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court also demonstrated support for Americans‘ civil
liberties in two major subversive advocacy cases. The first was Bond v. Floyd, which was
decided in 1966. In Bond, the Court ruled unconstitutional the efforts of the Georgia House of
Representatives to deny elected representative Julian Bond a seat in the legislature. Bond had
endorsed a statement issued by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC, of
which he was the director of communications) that expressed opposition to the war in Vietnam
and ―sympathy‖ for those who violated the draft.696 The second, and more important, case was
Brandenburg v. Ohio, which was decided on June 9, 1969. In Brandenburg, the Court overturned
the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader who was prosecuted under a 1919 Ohio criminal
syndicalism law (which was passed during the Red Scare) for broadly suggesting that violence
693
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might be necessary if the suppression of the white race continued. To a greater degree even than
most other Vietnam War era cases, the Supreme Court‘s decision in Brandenburg expressed
strong support for free speech, as the Court used the opportunity provided by the case ―to revisit
all of its prior decisions about subversive advocacy.‖697
The U.S. Supreme Court‘s strong support for American civil liberties during the Vietnam
War era was further evident in two major cases involving broad claims of executive power by the
Nixon administration. The first was United States v. U.S. District Court, decided in June 1969. In
that case, the Court rejected unanimously the Nixon administration‘s claim that the President
could authorize electronic surveillance without first obtaining a court order.698 In the second,
United States v. New York Times Co. (1971), the Court ruled that the Nixon administration could
not prevent the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing excerpts of the
Pentagon Papers as it had not provided sufficient evidence to justify laying prior restraint on the
press. In demonstrating the supremacy of the rule of law, the Court‘s decision in the case was
one of its most important during the entire Vietnam War era. As the editors of the New York
Times wrote the day after it was decided, the case represented ―a ringing victory for freedom
under law‖ and ―strongly reaffirmed the guarantee of the people‘s right to know, implicit in the
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.‖699
Although the U.S. Supreme Court was a strong defender of civil liberties throughout the
Vietnam War era, the Court issued a few major decisions that went against that record. Two are
particularly relevant: United States v. O’Brien (1968) and Branzburg v. Hayes (1972). In
O’Brien, the Supreme Court upheld the 1966 conviction of a man who burned his draft card as a
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form of public protest in violation of a law passed by Congress the previous year. The law in
question should have been held unconstitutional as it was clearly passed in an effort to suppress
dissent; however, the Supreme Court decided in favor of the government because it did not think
it wise to attempt to evaluate Congressional motives in enacting the bill.700 In Branzburg, the
Court upheld the contempt citations of three journalists who had refused to provide information
about their sources to federal and state grand juries, leaving journalists open to similar citations
in the future. As the New York Times noted, ―the Court‘s majority seemed oblivious of the
chilling effect of its decision on the press‘s freedom to investigate, to expose, without fear of
governmental sanctions.‖701
Reagan era
By the end of the Vietnam War era, the restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties had
declined dramatically. During the Reagan era, there were no major U.S. Supreme Court cases
involving civil liberties that stemmed from the Cold War.
Return to “Normal”
By the time the Cold War ended, most overt forms of wartime repression had long been
discontinued. That was also partially true of covert forms of repression. However, though
continuing at a significantly lower level than during previous periods of the crisis, the size and
scope of the federal intelligence agencies, which was a product of the crises of the twentieth
century, continued.
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End of the crisis
The Cold War ended on December 25, 1991, when Russian General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev signed an edict ordering the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev had sought
to reform the Soviet Union during his time as head of state, but he never intended to dissolve it.
However, the seeds of the U.S.S.R.‘s destruction were long in the making and by December
1991, he had no choice but to recognize a fait accompli. Putting the best spin possible on the
event, he declared, ―An end has been put to the ‗Cold War,‘ the arms race, and the insane
militarization of our country, which crippled our economy, distorted our thinking and
undermined our morals. The threat of a world war is no more.‖702
By the 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union had settled into détente, a period of
comparatively relaxed tensions in the Cold War in which ―the stability of the Soviet-American
relationship‖ was prized over its fairness because the risks of continuing conflict—all out nuclear
war—were ―too frightening to contemplate.‖703 During that period, both countries effectively
agreed to refrain from taking actions that would escalate the Cold War, such as intruding on the
other‘s sphere of influence or accelerating the production and development of nuclear arms. In
doing so, both countries accepted the maintenance of the status quo. Implicit in that acceptance
was the belief that the Cold War was going to be a permanent part of the geopolitical landscape
and that it fell to policymakers to negotiate the rules by which the conflict would be waged.704
However, détente began to break down relatively quickly during the mid-to-late 1970s
for a variety of complex reasons that are beyond the scope of this treatise. One of the significant
reasons it ended was that many people saw it as perpetuating injustice. This was true in two
respects. First, détente proposed that Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)—the idea that the
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United States and the Soviet Union could not attack each other directly because the resultant
nuclear war would destroy both countries—was an acceptable, even necessary, arrangement that
ensured stability. Second, it also accepted the denial of self-determination and human rights to
those living under communist control as a necessary cost for stability. Another major factor in
the collapse of détente, beyond the debate about its morality, was Soviet aggression during the
late 1970s, particularly the Soviet Union‘s invasion of Afghanistan.705
During the 1980s, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev became heads of state of the
United States and the Soviet Union. To a greater degree than the previous leaders of their
respective countries, both sought fundamental change in Soviet-American relations. President
Reagan refused to believe that the Cold War was a permanent part of the geopolitical landscape.
He accelerated military spending; repudiated the concept of MAD by announcing a plan to build
an intercontinental ballistic missile shield, his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI); and proposed
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Further, he portrayed the Soviet Union in stark terms
reminiscent of the McCarthy era, referring to it as the ―evil empire.‖706
At the same time, General Secretary Gorbachev was extremely honest about the past
failures of the Soviet Union and sought fundamental reforms both within the U.S.S.R. and in
Soviet-American relations. He sought arms reductions and limited capitalist economic reforms.
More importantly, he also refused to suppress growing dissent in the Warsaw Pact countries, a
trend that had begun under previous Soviet leaders during the early 1980s.707 Rather quickly, that
led to political liberalization in numerous Warsaw Pact countries and ultimately their secession, a
trend that accelerated after the fall of the Berlin wall in late 1989. By the end of that year, the
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Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe was in tatters and pressures within the Soviet Union
for autonomy and independence were growing rapidly.708
In June 1991, Boris Yeltsin was elected president of Russia. While Gorbachev sought
reform, he sought to dissolve the Soviet Union. He quickly abolished the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union and disbanded the Congress of People‘s Deputies (the governing body of the
Russian federation), establishing in its place a Commonwealth of Independent States. By
December 1991, all that remained was for Russian Secretary Gorbachev to officially declare the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and to resign.709
Duration of restrictions
In general, the overt restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties during the Cold War ended
in the 1970s, long before the crisis itself ended. That was also broadly true of covert forms of
repression, particularly with respect to the activities of the different federal intelligence agencies.
Recall that the political intelligence operations of the FBI, the CIA, the NSA, and military
intelligence were reduced and eventually terminated during those years. However, once Ronald
Reagan became president, his administration weakened many of the strong reforms put in place
during the 1970s, believing they were too restrictive. In spite of those changes, the core of the
1970s reforms remained until the end of the Cold War, throughout the 1990s, and until the ―War
on Terror‖ provided new justifications for the restriction of civil liberties.710
While there was something of a return to ―normal‖ after the end of the Cold War, the
restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties during the crisis clearly legitimized the institutions and
established the practices of wartime repression. To be sure, there was a strong backlash against
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the excesses of the late 1960s and the early 1970s; however, that alone was insufficient to
dissolve the foundations of repression created during the war. The ―War on Terror‖ would later
build on those institutions and practices.
Conclusion
Unlike the previous crises in American history, the Cold War was an unconventional,
ideological crisis of potentially unlimited duration. Like the other crises of the twentieth century,
however, the restriction of civil liberties that it produced was a product not only of the federal
government, but of state and local governments as well. Further, the wartime restrictions put in
place occurred through a range of different avenues of repression, utilizing both overt and covert
methods. As the crisis developed, the forms of repression employed were increasingly covert.
That shift was in large part caused by increasing civil liberties-protectiveness on the part of the
U.S. Supreme Court and growing support for civil liberties among the public, which reached its
culmination in the reaction of policymakers and the public to the abuses of the Nixon years.
Changing methods of repression over the course of the crisis were certainly correlated with
shifting perceptions of threats to American national security, from communism broadly during
the McCarthy era and the Cold War Interlude to dissent generally during the Vietnam War era
and Soviet infiltration more narrowly during the Reagan era. However, increasing respect for
civil liberties by the Court and the public was a more powerful causal factor in the shift toward
increasing use of covert forms of repression.
In general, the overt forms of repression established during the Cold War ended during
the 1970s. That was also mostly true of covert forms, which were restricted or eliminated
through a series of intelligence reforms during those years. Those reforms were weakened
somewhat during the Reagan era; however, their core remained essentially intact. Ultimately,
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although the covert methods of repression established were not employed after the end of the
Cold War, they served as significant precedents enabling the restriction of civil liberties during
the ―War on Terror.‖ Similarly, the creation and expansion of the federal agencies during the
Cold War served as a ready foundation on which to build a campaign of repression during the
current crisis.
Different Cold War presidents set very different tones toward civil liberties throughout
the Cold War. During the first period of the crisis, the McCarthy era, Truman reluctantly
restricted civil liberties in response to immense external pressures for the elimination of
communist influences in American society. To an extent, that was also true of Eisenhower.
However, in contrast to Truman, Eisenhower was a dedicated anti-communist who continued to
take repressive actions directed at members of the Communist Party even after the censure of
McCarthy. Later, during the Vietnam War era, Johnson expanded covert forms of repression, but
refrained for the most part from restricting civil liberties in an overt manner because he feared
that doing so would undermine support for his Great Society domestic reforms. Nixon inherited
the internal security apparatus established during the Johnson years and immediately began to
use it to suppress dissent. After the excesses of the Nixon years and the reforms of the 1970s,
Reagan set an intolerant tone toward civil liberties through his efforts to weaken previous federal
intelligence reforms and to expand secrecy in government, thereby denying access to the
American people. The U.S. Supreme Court played a strong role in checking the executive and
legislative branches throughout the crisis. Although it limped into the McCarthy era, it began to
assert itself in the mid-to-late 1950s. That was particularly true of the Court‘s decision in Yates v.
United States, which limited the extent to which the Smith Act could be used to prosecute
members of the Communist Party. The Court played a stronger role during the Vietnam War era,

231
which was especially evident through its decisions in United States v. U.S. District Court and
United States v. New York Times Co.
To a greater degree than previous crises, the Cold War reflected significant evolutionary
changes in the nature of wartime repression. Four were particularly relevant. First, the crisis
reflected and contributed to a growing body of laws on which to build a campaign of repression.
For example, early on in the crisis, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations prosecuted
members of the Communist Party under the Smith Act, a law passed before the bombing of Pearl
Harbor during the Second World War. Additionally, the laws enacted during the crisis
established precedents that would help to enable the restriction of Americans‘ civil liberties
during future crises. Second, throughout the crisis, the U.S. Supreme Court was increasingly
protective of civil liberties, particularly the freedom of speech. Overall, the Court played a
stronger role in checking executive and legislative branch excesses than during any previous
crisis. Third, the crisis demonstrated growing public support for civil liberties, as particularly
evidenced in the 1970s backlash against the excesses of the Nixon years. Fourth, with regard to
evolving methods of repression, the increasing protection of civil liberties by the U.S. Supreme
Court and growing public support for civil liberties helped to make the repression of dissent less
politically and legally tenable. That change, in turn, caused a shift toward increasing use of
covert repression, as the disincentives for employing overt forms of repression were increasingly
significant.
In addition to those evolutionary changes, the crisis also reflected change in the nature of
threats to American national security. Change occurred in both the distribution of power in the
international system and in the nature of the conflict. The power balance shifted from pre-war
multipolarity to post World War II bipolarity. The two dominant powers (the United States and
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the Soviet Union) were locked in an ideological battle between their most deeply held values:
atheistic communism and Judeo-Christian capitalism. Those two changes created a vastly longer
crisis, not simply because it was an ideological conflict, but also because the nation that
embodied the ideological threat to the American way of life was the other global hegemon in a
bipolar world. That meant that it would be much more costly to destroy, particularly in an age of
nuclear weapons.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States became the sole global hegemon.
The international system was suddenly unipolar. Around the same time and in following years,
there was a growing diffusion of technologies of mass destruction to non-state actors, a
―democratization of violence.‖ That shift decreased, and continues to decrease, the asymmetries
between state and non-state actors, leaving modern states vulnerable not only to attack by other
states but to attack by terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda. Thus, after the Cold War, the
redistribution of power in the international system was such that the major credible threats to
American national security were non-state actors, which were, and are, increasingly becoming
capable of inflicting significant damage to states.
The Cold War also reflected growing government capabilities to monitor and suppress
dissent in a covert manner. During the Cold War, new federal intelligence agencies were
established and expanded. Further, those already in existence, the FBI in particular, grew vastly
stronger than they had been during previous crises. Although the creation and expansion of those
agencies would have occurred regardless of the Cold War, the degree to which they expanded
was undoubtedly greater than if the crisis had never occurred. That is relevant because it means
that the footprint of the federal intelligence agencies after the Cold War was greater than if the
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crisis had not occurred. Additionally, the crisis reflected growing reliance on forms of electronic
surveillance, such as wiretapping, bugging, and the monitoring of international communications.
In the latter years of the Cold War and in the years after, the growth of technologies of mass
surveillance was extraordinary. As a result, their significance was most clearly reflected in the
current ―War on Terror.‖
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VI. CONCLUSION
This treatise was designed to test the thesis that the evolution in Americans‘ response to
national military crises has not been a simple progression toward increasing restraint on the part
of federal, state, and local policymakers, as is sometimes assumed. Rather, major twentieth and
twenty-first century developments relating to the nature of threats to American national security
and government capabilities to covertly repress dissent have interacted with evolutionary
changes in the nature of wartime repression in reinforcing and conflicting ways. Because of
those changes, modern crises will last longer, the restriction of civil liberties during wartime will
increasingly be accomplished through covert forms of repression, and, therefore, the durability of
wartime restrictions will be greater. In sum, during future crises, Americans‘ civil liberties will
be restricted for longer periods, with the return to normalcy after those crises becoming
increasingly difficult.
To test that thesis, this treatise sought to answer three central research questions. First, to
what degree were civil liberties restricted during the past crises of American history? Second, for
each of those crises, to what degree did wartime restrictions outlast the crises during which they
were established? Third, how did the nature of wartime repression change over the course of
American history? The first two questions were answered in great depth in Chapters I through V.
This chapter focuses specifically on the third question, examining the evolution of Americans‘
response to national military crises in terms of the three broad sets of changes identified in the
Introduction and referenced above. To restate, those changes include 1) evolutionary changes in
the nature of wartime repression, 2) twentieth and twenty-first century changes in the nature of
threats to American national security; and 3) twentieth and twenty-first century changes in
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government capabilities to monitor and suppress dissent. In the final section, this chapter reviews
areas for future study.
Findings
In general, the central thesis of this treatise proved valid. The evolution of wartime
repression in America has clearly been driven by the reinforcing and conflicting interactions of
the three sets of changes listed above. Yet while those changes account for the evolution in the
restriction of civil liberties over the course of American history, they do not fully explain
Americans‘ response to crisis. Other factors are also relevant. Therefore, before examining those
changes, this treatise reviews two major constants in Americans‘ reaction to national military
crises revealed in the case study analysis in Chapters I through V, as well as four aspects of
crises that are not directly a product of the broad changes identified in this treatise.
Constants
The first major constant evident in Americans‘ response to crisis relates to the broad
pattern established in the Introduction, whereby Americans restrict civil liberties in times of
crisis in ways that they later come to regret. In every crisis in American history, including the
―War on Terror,‖ policymakers and the public demonstrated a similar fear-based response to
threats to American national security. In each, those fears led people to accept restrictions on
their civil liberties that usually exceeded any limitations justifiable by the threat posed.
Afterwards, they came to regret those restrictions. The Civil War may represent an exception to
this pattern, as Lincoln‘s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus may very well have ultimately
ensured survival of the union. There is simply no way to know for sure. However, the pattern is
clear overall. In this treatise, it was perhaps most evident from the Roosevelt administration‘s
active efforts to avoid the excesses of the First World War.
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The second major constant evident in the crises on which this treatise focuses, which was
also evident in the early years of the ―War on Terror,‖ is the willingness of Americans to define
the enemy as ―other‖ and to link domestic dissidents with that enemy. Viewing dissidents and the
enemy on the same plain, Americans become particularly willing during intense times of crisis to
deny the civil liberties of those who voice any fundamental opposition. This link has frequently
been exploited for partisan political purposes. For example, during the Quasi-War, the
Federalists attacked the Democratic-Republicans as Jacobins (i.e. Frenchmen who supported the
Revolution). Later, during the Cold War, the Republicans attacked Democrats as ―parlor pinks‖
(communist sympathizers). Similarly, during the ―War on Terror,‖ the Republicans attacked the
Democrats as ―soft on terrorism.‖ However, Americans‘ tendency to identify dissidents with the
enemy during wartime exists independent of political battles between the two major parties.
During World War I, German-Americans were a major target of mob violence, along with
members of left-leaning radical groups such as the IWW and the Socialist Party of America.
Later, after the bombing of Pearl Harbor during World War II, the Jehovah‘s Witnesses were a
major target of mob violence. Further, Americans imprisoned for refusing to go to war were
subjected to extremely harsh treatment while in prison. In short, the charge of ―un-Americanism‖
has been, and will continue to be, leveled in national military crises.
Independent variables
Beyond these constants, three major independent variables—that is, aspects of the crisis
that vary and are not directly correlated with the three sets of changes identified in this treatise—
are evident in Americans‘ response to crises. First, and perhaps most important, is the
willingness of different presidents to manipulate public fears and to suppress dissent. To be sure,
that willingness is also the result of other factors, such as the nature of the crisis, the motivations
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of policymakers and the context in which civil liberties are restricted. For example, even if
Lincoln had been intolerant of dissent, his larger goal of reuniting the South and the North meant
that he could not actively repress dissidents because doing so would have risked alienating the
Border States. Regardless, the tone set toward civil liberties and dissent is clearly in large part a
function of the President, and that tone powerfully affects the nature of wartime repression.
The second, and most obvious, independent variable evident in the case studies is that the
specific types of repression employed are a reflection of the nature of the crisis. For example,
during World War I, the repressive actions taken by the Wilson administration, such as the
prosecution of dissidents for sedition and the establishment of the Committee on Public
Information, reflected the President‘s need to build support for involvement in the war in Europe.
Similarly, during the McCarthy era, the repressive actions taken by Presidents Truman and
Eisenhower, as well as Congress (the establishment of the federal loyalty program and
congressional investigations into alleged communist influences in American society are the most
suitable examples) reflected the perceived need to shield the United States government from
communist infiltration. This variable is further reflected in the ―War on Terror.‖ During the early
years of the current crisis, the Bush administration sought to increase government surveillance
and expand secrecy in government in order to detect terrorist cells and to deny them access to
critical information.
Third, overt forms of wartime repression are always discontinued at the end of a crisis
unless new situations or crises emerge shortly thereafter that provide strong justification for the
continuance of wartime restrictions. This was the case in three of the crises analyzed in this
treatise: the Civil War, World War I, and World War II. After the end of the Civil War,
Reconstruction provided justifications for the continued restriction of civil liberties. In that
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context, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the trial of civilians (in the South) by
military commission continued for years after Confederate General Robert E. Lee surrendered to
Union General Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Court House. Later, after the end of the First
World War, the Red Scare ensured the maintenance of wartime restrictions until early 1920.
Similarly after the end of the Second World War, the rapid development of the Cold War
ensured that there would be no return to ―normal.‖ As a result, wartime restrictions, like the
Smith Act, continued well into the new crisis.
Evolutionary changes
At a broad level, the four evolutionary changes in Americans‘ response to national
military crises identified in the Introduction of this treatise were reflected in the case studies in
Chapters I through V. To restate, they include the growing body of repressive laws, increasing
civil liberties-protectiveness on the part of the U.S. Supreme Court, growing public support for
civil liberties, and evolving methods of repression. Another change was evident, however, that
was not addressed in the Introduction—the restriction of civil liberties by state and local
governments. Taken together—that is, seen as interacting fluidly in both reinforcing and
conflicting ways—these five changes have produced a gradual shift from narrow, limited, and
overt repression to broad-based, sophisticated, and increasingly covert repression. In parallel,
there has been increasing support for civil liberties by the U.S. Supreme Court and the public at
large. This has interacted with the other evolutionary changes, helping to produce the shift
toward increasingly covert methods of repression, while simultaneously helping to militate
against repression.
The first change that helped to produce this shift has been the growing body of repressive
laws on which to build a campaign of repression. It is clearly too extreme to assert that repressive
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laws established during times of crisis continually accumulate and, hence, pose an ever-growing
and ever-more significant threat to American civil liberties. Indeed, some major repressive laws
have expired or been repealed after the end of crises, though their mere enactment establish
important precedents. For example, both the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 expired at the end
of President Adams‘ term in office. Additionally, the Sedition Act of 1918 was repealed only
two years later, after the end of the Red Scare. However, it is not extreme to assert that laws
established during wartime often outlast the crises during which they were enacted, leaving them
as ready weapons for the restriction of civil liberties during the future. Indeed, this has occurred
in most of the crises on which this treatise focuses. Perfect examples are World Wars I and II and
the Cold War. During World War I, Congress enacted an amendment to the Espionage Act of
1917 that effectively reenacted the Sedition Act of 1798. Later, during World War II, Congress
reenacted the Espionage Act of 1917 and made it applicable in peacetime. Only a few years after
the end of that crisis, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations began to prosecute members
of the Communist Party for violation of the Smith Act of 1940. Clearly, even when laws expire
or are repealed, their enactment and use establishes important precedents that helps to make
possible repression in future crises.
The second relevant change has been the increasing protectiveness of speech and civil
liberties by the U.S. Supreme Court, which has militated against repression. It is difficult to
identify specific points at which Supreme Court decision-making changed relative to previous
wartime decisions without examining in-depth the specific legal reasoning used in key cases.
Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the Court has become gradually more protective of Americans‘
civil liberties over time. The broad role played by the Supreme Court in both past crises and the
current ―War on Terror‖ demonstrates the point. During the first crisis, the Quasi-War, the Court
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played no role because it had not yet firmly established the power of judicial review. The
Supreme Court began to assert itself more strongly during the Civil War. However, its efforts
were ineffectual. The Court did not have a chance to rule on the constitutionality of wartime
repression during World War I. However, after the crisis, during the Red Scare, it upheld
numerous wartime sedition prosecutions. Although it deferred to the Roosevelt administration on
the issue of internment, the Supreme Court protected the rights of dissidents in a range of cases
during the Second World War. The Court played an even stronger role throughout the Cold War.
The trend toward increasing protection of civil liberties has also been evident in the ―War on
Terror,‖ particularly through the Court‘s decisions in cases such as Rasul v. Bush (2004),
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), and Boumediene v. Bush (2008).711
The third relevant change has been growing public support for civil liberties. This shift is
particularly evident from the emergence in the twentieth century of groups advocating civil
liberties, such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights.
Although clear and undeniable, the shift is only indirectly reflected, in this treatise, through
changes in wartime repression. The increasing willingness of the U.S. Supreme Court to uphold
the rights of dissidents during times of crisis partly reflects that shift. Perhaps more indicative is
the evolution of press censorship. The contrast between the Quasi-War and the current crisis
illustrates the point. During the Quasi-War, journalists were prosecuted for sedition. Today, a
similar occurrence is virtually unthinkable, even in the early years of the ―War on Terror.‖ To be
sure, people are still willing to restrict the rights of dissidents. For example, in the early years of
711
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the ―War on Terror,‖ many people defended increased government surveillance with statements
such as, ―if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear.‖ However, it is a question of
degree. Although this may not be true in the most intense moments of a crisis and may only
extend to the freedoms of speech and of the press, Americans appear to be more willing today
than during the Quasi-War and other past crises to support the civil liberties of dissidents during
wartime.
The fourth change that helped to produce the shift toward more broad-based,
sophisticated, and increasingly covert restrictions on Americans‘ civil liberties has been the
evolving methods of repression employed during crises. This change has two parts. First, there
has been a gradual progression from simple to complex methods of repression. For example,
during the Quasi-War, the repression of dissent was accomplished strictly through simple
legislative means, i.e. the enactment of legislation and the prosecution of dissidents. Later,
during the Cold War, a significantly broader variety of methods was used to suppress dissent.
They included direct prosecution, surveillance, loyalty programs, congressional investigations,
and the exclusion of aliens. Second, after each crisis, the forms of repression previously
employed become increasingly untenable politically and legally because of the growing support
for civil liberties by the public and the U.S. Supreme Court. The trend to reject these discredited
methods has resulted in an increasing premium on covert methods of repression. This, in its own
right (even barring the twentieth and twenty-first century changes in government capabilities to
covertly repress dissent discussed later), has ensured the increasing use of covert methods of
repression.
The final relevant evolutionary change in Americans‘ response to crises has been the
restriction of civil liberties by state and local governments. At first glance, state and local
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repression appeared to be an independent variable affected primarily by a range of factors other
than time, such as the tone set by the executive and the nature and intensity of the crisis.
However, the case study analysis in Chapters I through V provide evidence to support a different
conclusion. It appears that state and local repression has been dependent on the willingness and
ability of state and local governments to repress dissent. This is evident from an apparent shift at
the beginning of the twentieth century toward the repression of dissent by state and local
governments. During the first two crises of American history, the Quasi-War and the Civil War,
there was no significant state or local repression. However, during every crisis of the twentieth
century, state and local governments joined the federal government in restricting Americans‘
civil liberties. Further research is needed to ascertain to what extent that shift is reflected in the
current ―War on Terror.‖ Regardless, while not yet conclusive, the evidence suggests that state
and local repression has evolved over time.
Changes in threats to national security
In addition to the evolutionary changes discussed above, major twentieth and twenty-first
century developments in the nature of threats to American national security have also driven the
evolution of wartime repression in America. These developments—the shifting distributions of
power in the international system, the recent prevalence of ideological conflicts, and the
―democratization of violence‖ (the diffusion of technologies of mass destruction to non-state
actors)—have produced a shift from conventional, non-ideological crises of limited duration to
unconventional, ideological crises of potentially unlimited duration. The broad effect of these
developments has been to extend the length of crises and, thus, the length of time in which civil
liberties are restricted. These changes were partially seen in the Cold War and have been more
fully reflected in the current ―War on Terror.‖
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In length and in nature, the Cold War was a radically different crisis from the other
national military crises on which this treatise focuses. That was primarily the result of two
factors. First, after the end of the Second World War, the distribution of power in the
international system shifted from multipolarity to bipolarity, as the United States and the Soviet
Union emerged from the crisis the only global hegemonic powers. Second, in contrast to earlier
crises, the Cold War involved an ideological threat to the American way of life. At heart, it was a
conflict between atheistic communism and Judeo-Christian capitalism. To be sure, previous
crises had ideological elements to them. The Civil War and World War II are perfect examples.
However, neither of those conflicts was driven by ideology to the same degree as the Cold War
and the ―War on Terror,‖ at least in its early years. On their own, the redistribution of power in
the international system and the ideological nature of the Cold War would not have produced a
longer crisis. Yet together, they created a crisis that lasted nearly half a century and only ended
after one of the two belligerent nations collapsed, along with its ideology. There were very few
other ways in which the Cold War could have ended, given that it was an ideological struggle
between two global hegemonic powers. This explains why the crisis lasted so long; the two
countries could not resolve ideological differences and were simply unable to destroy each other
for a variety of reasons.
The major twentieth and twenty-first century developments in the nature of threats to
American national security became even more important in the current ―War on Terror.‖ This
has been true in three respects. First, after the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet
Union left the United States the sole global hegemonic power. The world had become unipolar
and as a result, the United States no longer faced a credible threat from other states. This meant
that the only credible threat to American national security could come from non-state actors.
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Second, the ―War on Terror,‖ at least in its early years, was strictly framed as an ideological
conflict between the American way of life and radical Islam, which was often posited broadly by
the Bush administration as seeking to advance the antithesis of American values. The ideological
nature of the conflict appears to have become less important in recent months and years,
particularly with the election of President Barack Obama in 2008, who has refrained from even
referring to the conflict as a ―War on Terror.‖ Nevertheless, there is no way of knowing whether
the crisis will again intensify and thereby resume its previous intense ideological overtones.
Another terrorist attack on a scale similar to the attacks of September 11th could easily produce
such a result.
Third, the growing ―democratization of violence‖ has decreased the asymmetries between
states and non-state actors. Although this shift began in the final years of the Cold War, it was
only truly a major factor in the current ―War on Terror.‖ The horrific attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon proved in an utterly destabilizing way—by making Americans suddenly
aware of their vulnerability—the damage that small groups of determined people could cause in
the modern era. A major effect of this ―democratization of violence‖ has been to expose
Americans to attack at any time and in any location, making some more willing to accept what
were once seen as wartime restrictions, restrictions tolerated only for the duration. Additionally,
this shift combined with the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity has made the United States
especially vulnerable to attack by terrorist groups because, as the sole global hegemon, its hard
and soft power extends across the world.
Changes in covert repression capabilities
The last major change driving the evolution of Americans‘ response to national military
crises has been twentieth and twenty-first century developments in government capabilities to
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monitor and suppress dissent in a covert manner. In general, these developments, which include
the creation and expansion of federal intelligence agencies and the proliferation of surveillance
technologies, have produced a shift toward increasing reliance on covert methods of repression.
In doing so, they have extended the durability of wartime restrictions on Americans‘ civil
liberties, as the covert methods of repression increasingly employed tend to have greater
durability after the end of crises because of their comparative invisibility to the American people.
In broad outline, the establishment and expansion of the federal intelligence agencies
throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has been a progression toward increasing
strength and breadth in the scope of their activities. The progression is clear from World War I
and World War II to the Cold War. In each of these crises, federal capabilities to covertly
monitor and suppress dissent grew, with the balance between overt and covert methods shifting
inexorably toward the latter. During the 1970s, the excesses of the Nixon years led policymakers
to implement strong controls on the different intelligence agencies. Although weakened by the
Reagan administration, the core of those controls remained essentially intact throughout the
1980s and 1990s. However, during the early years of the ―War on Terror,‖ the Bush
administration all but dismantled those reforms, at least for the FBI.712
Along with the establishment and expansion of the federal intelligence agencies, the
proliferation of surveillance technologies was also important in producing the shift toward more
covert forms of wartime repression. In general, the effect of these technologies was relatively
limited in the crises on which this treatise focused. Electronic forms of surveillance first became
important methods of repression during World War II. Their use expanded significantly during
the Cold War. However, it has only been during the ―War on Terror‖ that these technologies
712
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have begun to have significant impacts on Americans‘ civil liberties. Although a large number of
individual dissidents were subjected to surveillance during past crises, it seems quite clear that
surveillance technologies have played a vastly more important role during the ―War on
Terror.‖713
Of all the changes examined in this treatise, the creation and expansion of the federal
intelligence agencies and the proliferation of surveillance technologies have been the most
significant causes of the increased durability of wartime repression. After every major crisis in
the twentieth century, these changes have ensured the post-war maintenance of wartime
restrictions. For example, during World War I, the Bureau of Intelligence did not end its
investigation of radicals until 1924. Later, many questionably legal practices and programs
established by the FBI during the World War II continued well into the Cold War. Although
most covert methods of repression established during that crisis were discontinued during the
1970s, their use served as major precedents that later helped to make possible the restriction of
civil liberties during the ―War on Terror.‖
Summation
Each of these three broad sets of changes has driven different shifts in the evolution of
wartime repression in America. First, the evolutionary changes in Americans‘ response to crises
have not only driven a shift toward increasing support for civil liberties by the U.S. Supreme
Court and the public, but have also driven a shift from narrow, limited, and overt methods of
repression to more broad-based, sophisticated, and increasingly covert methods of repression.
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Second, the twentieth and twenty-first century developments in the nature of threats to American
national security have produced a shift from conventional, non-ideological crises of limited
duration to unconventional, ideological crises of potentially unlimited duration. Third, the
twentieth and twenty-first century changes in government capabilities to repress dissent covertly
have fed into the evolutionary changes described above by producing a shift toward increasing
reliance on covert methods of repression, methods that tend to have greater post-war durability
because of their relative invisibility to the American people.
Ultimately, these three sets of changes have not acted independently. It is the complex
interplay among them that has driven change in the nature of wartime repression. In the first two
crises of American history, the evolutionary changes alone drove the shift in the nature of
wartime repression. However, over the course of the twentieth century, growing government
capabilities to covertly repress dissent increasingly became the method of choice as overt forms
of repression were increasingly discredited. This increased the durability of wartime repression.
Similarly, after World War II, the changing nature of threats to American national security has
created longer, more diffuse crises, which has meant that Americans‘ civil liberties are restricted
for longer periods. One can only anticipate how these changes will be reflected in the future.
Areas for Future Study
This treatise raises a few additional research questions. First, to what degree have civil
liberties been restricted in the current ―War on Terror,‖ in what way, and to what degree have the
changes identified herein been reflected? Second, how has the ideological nature of recent crises
changed the nature of wartime repression, beyond helping to extend crises? Third, to what extent
is the crisis mentality demonstrated in this treatise reflected in other types of crises, such as
economic crises? These questions pose a rich mine for future research.
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